分類檔案: 安全

RFC 6189:ZRTP是最後一個標準!

最後ZRTP已指派官方RFC分配, RFC6189 ZRTP:媒體路徑單播安全RTP協議的關鍵。

它作為一個依賴的SRTP的 ,現在已經被定義為256位的AES的關鍵尺寸RFC6188。

這是令人興奮參閱RFC終於發布,因為它設置為ZRTP年底到終端的加密很像官方標準的PGP對電子郵件的一個重要的里程碑。

現在世界上任何一個組織將正式能夠實現終端到終端的協議語音加密ZRTP

目前有3種不同的公眾實現 ZRTP協議的存在:

他們每個人都提供了不同功能的協議,但最重要的是可互操作。

新一波的語音加密世界,進入一個灰色地帶,大部分做手機的加密系統的公司已實施自定義的加密irrupting。

現在的標準已經設置有幾個原因,實施不同的東西留下來。

自由一台先生 齊默爾曼和所有的公司(如社區PrivateWave )和個人(如沃納Dittmann ),它的工作!

今天,它是一個偉大的一天,這種技術是目前官方與多個現有的實施也的!

菲利普,你做一遍,我讚美你純粹的精神和決心 :-)

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為GSM的進展,在弗賴堡大學開裂

移動協議的令人興奮的世界(GSM,GSM - R系統,TETRA數字集群,UMTS等)黑客是從大學的官方研究活動。

的投資,使破解軟件的開源代碼發布給機會大學生的工作,改進和做強大的科研。

弗賴堡大學剛剛發布的紙張上的GSM A5 / 1加密 gsmframencoder支持工具的實戰演練,提高嗅探,解碼和開裂的過程。

開放硬件,開放軟件,開放的協議證明任何一種專有的方法或過程,建立通信和安全技術的弱點。

嘗試打開和打擊任何一種專有和封閉的技術力量行業與互操作和開放的態度,只有在設計通信協議,它應任何科學家的目標。

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智能 攔截 安全性

TETRA的黑客是:OsmocomTETRA

這是非常令人興奮地看到OsmocomTETRA , TETRA解調器,PHY和MAC層較低的第一個開源的SDR( 軟件定義無線電 )實施的釋放。

它的TETRA版本的GSM airprobe解鎖TETRA通信協議的數據幀的訪問,從而使黑客攻擊的機會很大!

現在還 TETRA技術已被打開,我們應該想到,在這個 2011,看到開源 TETRA嗅探器和最有可能也茶加密(利加密算法)破解!

TETRA是由警察,應急服務和軍隊作為一種替代的移動通信網絡,可以即使沒有網絡覆蓋的可用性(僅沒有一個基站移動到移動),並提供一些特殊的高可用性服務。

我寫的TETRA在我的幻燈片主要語音安全議定書“的審查

在OsmocomBB郵件列表中已經有討論一些TETRA網絡的狀態:

  • 比利時警方TETRA ASTRID網絡:不加密
  • 德國警方測試 TETRA網絡在亞琛:不加密
  • 一些前jugoslawia TETRA網絡:不加密
  • 荷蘭 C200的TETRA網絡:TEA2靜態密鑰加密
  • 英國大氣電波 TETRA網絡:TEA2 TEA2加密

這將是非常有趣地看到,新的警察和救援服務,黑客來自舊的模擬時代,新的數字無線電 :-)

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加密移動座機電話通話與Asterisk 1.8

我們剛剛發布了一個技術HOWTO 如何建立擔保移動座機VoIP基礎設施

像這樣的其他HOWTO將在未來幾週內出來 FreeSWITCH的,所有在開源安全技術的透明度和槓桿的精神,如使用其他的服務器平台。

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八史詩調節加密失敗

一個非常有啟發的文章八調節加密史詩失敗和政府監管部門的共同的誤解,認為不有技術的工作原理如何。

無知的政府監管機構不理解,嚴格的監管將有以下弊端:

  1. 這將創建安全風險
  2. 它不會停止壞人
  3. 它會損害創新
  4. 這將損害美國的業務
  5. 這將花費消費者
  6. 這將是違憲
  7. 這將是一個巨大的稅款支出

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PrivateGSM:黑莓/ iPhone的/諾基亞移動語音加密ZRTP或SRTP / SDES

我絕對避免用我自己的個人博客讓任何一種產品的推廣。

那個時候沒有什麼不同,但我想告訴你我沒有花哨的營銷工作的產品的事實,但停留的技術。

今天,在PrivateWave首席技術官和共同創始人 ,我們公開發布黑莓,iPhone和諾基亞的移動VoIP加密產品:

標誌 privatewave - colore.png

在PrivateWave我們使用有不同的方法方面最語音加密公司,請閱讀我們的安全方法

此產品相關的技術和產業的格局可以概括如下:

  • 它的第一個語音加密公司使用的唯一標準的安全協議(和我們預期市場會作何反應,因為它是明確的,專有的高科技,來自懲教署的遺產不能提供相同的值)
  • 它的語音加密的第一種方法只使用開源標準加密引擎
  • 它的第一個語音加密的方法來提供不同的安全模式,使用不同的技術(為最終 結束ZRTP年底現場為SRTP)

這些移動安全客戶端套件,只使用最好的電信和安全技術,提供高度的保護,以及良好的性能,在惡劣的網絡條件下使用的專業安全設計:

應用程序:

icona - pgsm.png

支持的移動設備是:

關於ZRTP ,我們決定應力和拉伸所有的安全和一些小除了協議的偏執特徵:

我們嚴格的通訊錄整合, 超越ZRTP RFC規範 ,可能會受到一定的攻擊時使用手機,因為用戶的行為不看手機屏幕。

我們的使用ZRTP減輕這種情況下paranoy方式,我們會寫稍後和/或添加的RFC列入具體細節。

有些話 PrivateGSM專業與最終結束ZRTP加密

有閱讀技術表

下載,點擊這裡,只要把您的電話號碼

這些更多的具有挑戰性的技術(語音加密)(16人在這 6個項目 3個不同的平台工作),在困難的經營環境(骯髒的移動網絡和骯髒的移動操作系統)我非常熟練的工作人員辛勤工作的結果超過 2年。

我很自豪我們的工作人員!

下一步是什麼?

在接下來的幾個星期,你會看到如星號,FreeSWITCH的和其他啟用安全性的PBX,以及與其他一些令人振奮的安全技術新聞,我肯定會注意到整合documentations的主要釋放;)

它一直辛勤工作,更要完成,但我相信,開放的重要版本和開源的集成,使一個非常政治中立的(後門)技術的安全性和開源社區會喜歡這樣的產品和我們的透明的方式也。

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幾個不錯的VPN提供商

有很多的原因,為什麼人會需要一個 VPN訪問 Internet槽。

例如,如果你住在一個阻塞的某些內容的國家(如當地反政府的網站,色情等)和/或協議(如SKYPE,VOIP),你可能會想阻止討厭的國外使用移動互聯網連接加密的VPN隧道。

我評估了幾種託管的VPN服務器和幾個他們之間的廣泛提供這種服務聽起來很不錯:

SwissVPN

從瑞士出口到Internet。

成本6瑞士法郎/月

可選的公共固定IP地址

有用的,如果你需要:

  • 只要繞過當地國家的過濾器,具有良好的高帶寬
  • 公開公共服務槽可選的固定公網 IP地址的VPN。

表演過火

在20個不同國家(每次連接)選擇退出互聯網。

如果你需要做的,有用的:

  • 對競爭對手的商業智能(出現連接時,他們從 X國)
  • 看電影 /電視片只允許從國家 IP網絡空間
  • 看到谷歌的結果,不同國家之間的

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並不是每一個橢圓曲線是相同的:ECC的安全槽

 我自己的ECC曲線的安全性和選擇分析

vn9jna1BdgrzDCYNBJHi09q09q.jpg

大多數現代密碼使用橢圓曲線加密(ECC),與一個更小的密鑰大小和降低的計算能力,相當於傳統的加密系統被稱為DH(的Diffie - Hellman)或RSA(Rivest,Shamir和Adleman)的安全強度。

不是每個人都知道,ECC加密被選中任何未來的加密應用和TLS / SSL(加密,確保網絡使用),即使是到ECC。

我發現很多所謂的“專有的加密產品”放棄 RSA和DH那張帶有 ECC的替代品,甚至沒有指定的ECC加密的一種習慣,往往任意使用ECC位密鑰大小。

但是有很多圍繞橢圓曲線的混亂 ,很多不同的名稱和困難非加密經驗豐富的用戶進行評估時,一些加密的東西,使自己的圖大小關鍵。

因為如此分散混亂,我決定把我自己的分析,找出這是最好的ECC加密曲線和正確的ECC密鑰大小使用。

這種分析,想提供一個安全,行業之間的各種曲線和密鑰大小的選擇,離開數學和密碼分析的考慮已已完成年期間,總結幾個標準和安全協議所採取的各種選擇。

首先得出的結論。

從我的分析,只有以下的 ECC曲線加密系統使用,因為只有一個選擇在不同的部門(ANSI,美國國家安全局,凹陷,NIST的,ECC的BrainPool),不同的安全協議標準(IPSEC, OpenPGP的,ZRTP的Kerberos,SSL / TLS),只有一個匹配的NSA Suite B的安全要求(事實上的標準也為北約的軍事環境):

  • 總理橢圓曲線256位- P - 256
  • 總理橢圓曲線384位- P - 384

與可選的,只是真的偏執,想要得到更關鍵的大小位,仍然不認為是有益的:

  • 總理橢圓曲線521位- P - 521

我想狀態,Koblitz曲線應避免在任何密鑰大小(163 / 283 / 409 / 571),因為他們沒有足夠保修密碼分析活動和有效它們是:

  • 不屬於NSA套房- B的加密選擇
  • 不屬於ECC Brainpool選擇
  • 不屬於ANSI X9.62的選擇
  • 不屬於OpenPGP的ECC擴展選擇
  • 不屬於Kerberos的擴展ECC曲線選擇

我邀請讀者遵循“低谷”我的分析,以了解可以理解,即使沒有深厚的技術背景,但至少有一個良好的技術背景的一些基本的加密位的基本面。

 在這裡,我們一起去分析
 

我的目標是分析什麼/如何公開的科學和安全社區選擇的ECC加密系統的用法在安全協議和由IETF RFC(那些定義在一個開放和同行評議的方式的互聯網標準)定義的標準。

下面的RFC引入現有系統得到分析,以了解什麼最好用的,什麼是更好的排除ECC:

  • RFC5639 :ECC Brainpool標準曲線及曲線生成
  • RFC4869 :NSA Suite B的IPsec加密套房
  • RFC5430 :NSA Suite B的配置文件的傳輸層安全(TLS
  • RFC5008 :NSA的套房乙在安全/多用途Internet郵件擴展(S / MIME)
  • RFC3766 :用於交換對稱密鑰使用的公共密鑰確定優勢
  • RFC5349 :橢圓曲線加密(ECC)支持公共密鑰加密在Kerberos初始驗證(PKINIT)
  • RFC4492 :橢圓曲線加密(ECC),傳輸層安全(TLS)加密套件
  • ZRTP由Philip Zimmermann的ECC曲線的語音加密
  • OpenPGP(ECC的吃水d筏jivsov的OpenPGP - ECC - 06
  • 微軟選擇的ECC曲線智能卡的Kerberos登錄

我們將使用定義互聯網安全協議,使我們的評估的一部分科學家所作出的選擇。
此外,必須了解,曲線選擇從不同的主管部門,使他們自己的選擇曲線告訴給業界使用和跳過:

我們將使用由科學家定義的標準化機構的安全要求,使我們的評估的一部分作出的選擇。
此外,一些大多數人不知道,但我們的分析,這是非常相關的,是有不同種類的ECC曲線加密和他們的“大小”的不同取決於曲線:

  • 比素域ECC曲線(通常被稱為橢圓曲線的P -密鑰大小代表)
  • 對二進制字段的ECC曲線(通常被稱為Koblitz曲線和K -密鑰大小代表

鑑於安全強度等效的橢圓曲線和Kobliz曲線有不同的密鑰大小,例如,當我們讀到的ECC 571,我們是指具有同等強度的ECC 521總理曲線Koblitz曲線。

橢圓曲線和Kotbliz曲線之間的實力比較現報告如下(從米瑯ECC Internet草案 ):

 | Koblitz | ECC |衛生署/ DS​​A / RSA
 | 163 | 192 | 1024
 | 283 | 256 | 3072
 | 409 | 384 | 7680
 | 571 | 521​​ | 15360

下面還有一個所有選定的曲線,所有的各種實體和各自的名稱(從的比較ECC TLS使用的IETF RFC4492):

由不同的標準組織選擇的曲線名稱
 ------------+---------------+-------------
 SECG | ANSI X9.62 | NIST的
 ------------+---------------+-------------
 sect163k1 | | NIST的K - 163
 sect163r1 | |
 sect163r2 | | NIST的B - 163
 sect193r1 | |
 sect193r2 | |
 sect233k1 | | NIST的K - 233
 sect233r1 | | NIST的B - 233
 sect239k1 | |
 sect283k1 | | NIST的K - 283
 sect283r1 | | NIST的B - 283
 sect409k1 | | NIST的K - 409
 sect409r1 | | NIST的B - 409
 sect571k1 | | NIST的K - 571
 sect571r1 | | NIST的B - 571
 secp160k1 | |
 secp160r1 | |
 secp160r2 | |
 secp192k1 | |
 secp192r1 | prime192v1 | NIST的P - 192
 secp224k1 | |
 secp224r1 ​​| | NIST的P - 224
 secp256k1 | |
 secp256r1 | prime256v1 | NIST的P - 256
 secp384r1 | | NIST的P - 384
 secp521r1 | | NIST的P - 521
 ------------+---------------+-------------

立即出現的,是有所有當局只選擇兩條曲線,並有一個 ANSI.The koblitz曲線,一般只有3當局之間商定的傾銷有以下兩種 ECC的曲線:

  • secp192r1 / prime192v1 / NIST的P - 192
  • secp256r1 / prime256v1 / NIST的P - 256

選擇那些TLS的ECC曲線RFC5430完全跳過koblitz曲線和使用情況的唯一選擇:

  • P - 256 P - 384,P - 521

ECCBrainpool完全跳過Koblitz曲線和用法以下的ECC曲線選擇:

  • P - 160,P - 192,P - 224 P - 256,P - 320,P - 384,P - 512(,的的唯一的特別,因為它的不P - 521,但P - 512,的唯一鍵的大小所指ECC的brainpool。TNX伊恩西門子從雅典娜SCS

為ECC使用的OpenPGP互聯網在PGP ð草案筏jivsov的OpenPGP - ECC - 06完全跳過Koblitz曲線,並選擇了以下的ECC曲線

  • P - 256 P - 384,P - 521

ECC的使用,在RFC5349中定義,定義為微軟的智能卡登錄的Kerberos協議的擴展完全跳過Koblitz曲線,並選擇了以下的ECC曲線:

  • P - 256 P - 384,P - 521

因此,清晰的聲音,為 P - 256 P - 384和P - 521 ECC正確的選擇,而Koblitz曲線已絕密使用和跳過任何敏感安全協議(IPSEC,OpenPGP的,ZRTP,的Kerberos,SSL / TLS)。

為什麼我做了這個分析?

我這樣做了分析,以下的討論,我就一定的語音加密產品,全部基於自定義和專有協議,都在使用橢圓曲線 Diffie赫爾曼 571位/ ECDH第571 / 571位ECDH / Koblitz 571位。
他們正在使用的K - 571,如前所述,已從所有安全敏感的環境和協議,並正在自己的設計師,我認為他們的加密選擇是絕對不是最好的安全選擇的語音加密的東西。
可能已經做到了營銷的目的,因為 K - 571(Koblitz曲線)似乎比P - 521(基於素數的橢圓曲線)。 如果您有“位的”你的營銷人員可以算得上是“更安全”。 Koblitz橢圓曲線的速度比絕密啟用總理橢圓曲線等給產品經理一個機會,以提供“位”在它自己的產品,同時保持密鑰交換快速。

它的哲學選擇的問題。

我寧願遵循科學界的趨勢,不考慮自己的加密專家,有見地的整體安全和科學界本身謙遜。

我比較喜歡,而不是使用,只有在高度敏感的環境中使用(絕密分類),已選定所有的機關和工作組分析的加密算法,有存在和代表的幾乎所有標準的安全的選擇的批准的算法協議(IPSEC,OpenPGP的,ZRTP下,Kerberos,SSL / TLS等)。
我喜歡算量加密我所用,真正的安全,檢查,評估是否有一些弱點工作的大腦。

加密廣泛傳播工作brais幅度超過只是少數人(如Koblitz曲線)所使用的加密工作的大腦數量。
所以我不妖魔化使用ECDH 571使用Koblitz曲線,但肯定的,我可以肯定,他們沒有採取在安全方面,最好的選擇,做一個安全基準,會考慮任何安全專業人員的事實,橢圓曲線 Diffie赫爾曼 571位Koblitz曲線做是沒有廣泛傳播,它的傾銷標準安全協議,它不是絕密使用認證。

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ESSOR,歐洲安全軟件定義無線電(SDR)

我一看歐洲防務局網站,發現ESSOR項目,工作項目資助106mln歐元開發新的戰略防禦通信為基礎的產品的軟件定義無線電的方法。

特別提款權的辦法是一個革命性的的系統,這完全改變了科學家和方法的任何一種無線技術的行業。

而不是燃燒的硬件芯片實現大多數的射頻協議和技術,基本上是在“軟件”推到專門的無線電硬件,可以工作在很多不同的頻率,很多不同的無線協議無線接口。

例如從USRP(通用軟件無線電外設) Ettus的研究費用1000 - 2000USD滿載,槽的開源 GnuRadio框架,開源實施:

和更大量的協議和傳輸技術。

這種無線傳輸系統的新方法是destinated方式的轉變,實施無線電系統,給人以“無線協議本身”軟件升級,以提供“無線協議”改進的新功能。

在短期內,我們也看到了非常強大的安全性研究,使用的SDR技術,如GSM 開裂和藍牙嗅探。

我們可以預期,其他技術,設計弱,但由硬件設備的限制,攻擊​​低級別的協議的保護,將很快得到破解。 在第一個列表,我真的想看到的TETRA的黑客,封閉的思維定勢和秘密的加密算法出生的技術,這我真的不喜歡 ;-)

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遠程攔截SNOM VoIP電話

我建議讀,遠程竊聽VoIP電話“VoIP安全聯盟博客肖恩 Merdinger 。

目前的電話基礎設施越來越容易受到網絡攻擊的一個具體的例子。

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語音通信安全研討會

嗨,

我做了一個有趣的信息交換加密實驗室管理Massimiliano薩拉教授在特倫托大學關於語音通信的安全性技術談。

我建議感興趣的人閱讀,尤其是第二部分,由於目前的各種聲音,在多個行業得到中使用的加密技術的創新分類。

我試圖解釋,並通過提供廣泛的技術,通常是絕對無關的每個其他的,但實際上它們都適用於語音加密,分類概述從這種廣泛分散的技術部門:

  • 移動 TLC行業語音加密標準
  • 政府和軍隊的語音加密標準
  • 公共安全語音加密標準
  • IETF語音加密標準
  • 雜項專有的語音加密技術

這是一個巨大的slideware,122幻燈片,我建議去閱讀的第二部分,跳過攔截技術概覽介紹我2009年已經涵蓋。

語音通信的安全性


查看更多介紹 法比奧Pietrosanti

尤其是我喜歡的巧克力級加密的概念,希望能提供一些創新的蛇油加密概念。

但我需要得到更多有關巧克力級加密上下文的深度,可能會做年年底前提供上一門應用性課程的理解和評價幾乎各種語音加密技術的真正的安全上下文。

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27C3 - CCC國會CFP:我們在和平

We come in peace

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We come in peace, said the conquerers of the New World.

We come in peace, says the government, when it comes to colonise, regulate, and militarise the new digital world.

We come in peace, say the nation-state sized companies that have set out to monetise the net and chain the users to their shiny new devices.

We come in peace, we say as hackers, geeks and nerds, when we set out towards the real world and try to change it, because it has intruded into our natural habitat, the cyberspace…

Call for paper for participation to 27C3 CCC congress is open, and i never saw a so exciting payoff :-)

See you on 30 December 2010 in Berlin!

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GSM cracking in penetration test methodologies (OSSTMM) ?

As most of this blog reader already know, in past years there was a lot of activities related to public research for GSM auditing and cracking.

However when there was huge media coverage to GSM cracking research results, the tools to make the cracking was really early stage and still very inefficient.

Now Frank Stevenson , norwegian cryptanalyst that already broke the Content Scrambling System of DVD video disc, participating to the A51 cracking project started by Karsten Nohl , released Kraken , a new improved version of the A51 cracking system.

It's interesting to notice that WiFi cracking had a similar story, as the first WiFi wep cracking discovery was quite slow in earlier techniques but later Korek, an hacker working on cracking code, improve the attack system drammatically.

That's the story of security research cooperation, you start a research, someone follow it and improve it, some other follow it and improved it and at the end you get the result.

Read more on the Kraken GSM Cracking software release .

And stay tuned as next week at Blackhat Conference Karsten Nohl will explain the details of the required hardware setup and detailed instructions on how to do it :-)

I would really like to see those tools incorporated into Penetration Testing Linux Distribution BackTrack with OSSTMM methodology enforcing the testing of GSM interception and man in the middle :-)

If things proceed that way and Ettus Research (The producer of USRP2 software radio used for low cost GSM signal receiving) will not be taken down, we can still see this.

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Snake-oil security claims on crypto security product

Security market grow, more companies goes to the market, but how many of them are taking seriously what they do?

You know, doing security technology mean that you are personally responsible for the protection of the user's information. You must make them aware of what they need, exactly what your are doing and which kind of threat model your product protect.

A typical problem of product's security features is represented by the inability of the user to evaluate the security claims of the product itself.

So there's a lot companies doing a not-so-ethical marketing of security features, based on the facts that no user will be able to evaluate it.

The previously explained situation reside in the security topic of Snake Oil Encryption , an evolution in the scientific cryptographic environment that let us today use best of breed information protection technologies without having to worry too much about backdoors or insecurities.

Let's speak about Snake Oil Encryption

Snake Oil Cryptography : In cryptography , snake oil is a term used to describe commercial cryptographic methods and products which are considered bogus or fraudulent. Distinguishing secure cryptography from insecure cryptography can be difficult from the viewpoint of a user. Many cryptographers, such as Bruce Schneier and Phil Zimmermann , undertake to educate the public in how secure cryptography is done, as well as highlighting the misleading marketing of some cryptographic products.

The most referenced crypto security guru, Philip Zimmermann and Bruce Schneier, was the 1st to talk about Snake Oil Encryption:

Snake Oil by Philip Zimmermann

Snake Oil by Bruce Schneier

The Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review also made a very good analysis related to the Security Features of Security Products, SNAKE-OIL SECURITY CLAIMS” THE SYSTEMATIC MISREPRESENTATION OF PRODUCT SECURITY . They explain about the nasty marketing tricks used to tweak users inability to evaluate the security features, including economic and legal responsibility implication.

Several snake oil security product companies does not explain and are not clear about the threat model to which the product apply. Very famous is the sentence of Russ Nelson :

“Remember, crypto without a threat model is like cookies without milk. ….. Cryptography without a threat model is like motherhood without apple pie. Can't say that enough times. More generally, security without a threat model is by definition going to fail.”

So, how to spot snake oil security products?

Check a guideline of to spot Snake Oil Encryption Products: Snake Oil Warning Signs, Encryption Software to Avoid by Matt Curtin .

You can see this very good Cryptographic Snake Oil Examples by Emility Ratliff (IBM Architect at Linux Security), that tried to make clear example on how to spot Cryptographic Snake Oil.

Here represented the basic guideline from Matt Curtin paper:


By checking that points it's possible to evaluate how serious an encryption technology or product is.

But all in all how to fix that unethical security approach?

It's very significative and it would be really useful for each kind of security product category to make some strongly and independent evaluation guideline (like OSSTMM for Penetration testing) , to make this security evaluation process really in the hands of the user.

It would be also very nice to have someone making analysis and evaluation of security product companies, publishing reports about Snake Oil signs.

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Web2.0 privacy leak in Mobile apps

You know that web2.0 world it's plenty of leak of any kind (profiling, profiling, profiling) related to Privacy and users starts being concerned about it.

Users continuously download applications without knowing the details of what they do, for example iFart just because are cool, are fun and sometime are useful.

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On mobile phones users install from 1000% up to 10.000% more applications than on a PC, and those apps may contain malware or other unexpected functionalities.

Recently infobyte analyzed ubertwitter client and discovered that the client was leaking and sending to their server many personal and sensitive data such as:

- Blackberry PIN

- Phone Number

- Email Address

- Geographic positioning information

Read about UbertTwitter 'spyware' features discovery here by infoByte .

It's plenty of applications leaking private and sensitive information but just nobody have a look at it.

Should mandatory data retention and privacy policies became part of application development and submission guideline for mobile application?

Imho a users must not only be warned about the application capabilities and API usage but also what will do with which kind of information it's going to handle inside the mobile phone.

Capabilities means authorizing the application to use a certain functionalities, for example to use GeoLocation API, but what the application will do and to who will provide such information once the user have authorized it?

That's a security profiling level that mobile phone manufacturer does not provide and they should, because it focus on the information and not on the application authorization/permission respect to the usage of device capabilities.

ps yes! ok! I agree! This kind of post would require 3-4 pages long discussion as the topic is hot and quite articulated but it's saturday morning and i gotta go!

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AES algorithm selected for use in space

I encountered a nice paper regarding analysis and consideration on which encryption algorithm it's best suited for use in the space by space ship and equipments.

The paper has been done by the Consultative Committee for Space Data Systems that's a consortium of all space agency around that cumulatively handled more than 400 mission to space .

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Read the paper Encryption Algorithm Trade Survey as it gives interesting consideration and comparison between different encryption algorithms.

Obviously the finally selected algorithm is AES , while KASUMI (used in UMTS networks) was avoided.

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Blackberry Security and Encryption: Devil or Angel?

Blackberry have good and bad reputation regarding his security capability, depending from which angle you look at it.

This post it's a summarized set of information to let the reader the get picture, without taking much a position as RIM and Blackberry can be considered, depending on the point of view, an extremely secure platform or an extremely dangerous one .

bblock.jpg

Let's goes on.

On one side Blackberry it's a platform plenty of encryption features, security features everywhere, device encrypted (with custom crypto), communication encrypted (with custom proprietary protocols such as IPPP), very good Advanced Security Settings, Encryption framework from Certicom ( now owned by RIM ).

在另一邊,他們不提供設備,但覆蓋接入網絡,稱 ​​為BIS (BlackBerry Internet Service的),這是一個全球性的全球廣域網,您的BlackBerry進入當您瀏覽 checkmail使用blackberry.net AP。

當您或應用程序,使用blackberry.net的APN,你不只是連接到互聯網與運營商的互聯網連接,但你進入內RIM網絡,將作為代理和行為達到了互聯網的網關。

非常相同的發生,當你有一個企業使用的BB設備和企業的BES連接到RIM的網絡,作為這類行為VPN集中網絡。

因此,基本上所有的通訊跨槽RIM加密格式的服務基礎設施一套專有的加密和通信協議。

正如一個通知,認為谷歌提供超過blackberry.net APN的,每增加一個,為了BB的網絡內提供服務的BB用戶協議。 當您安裝,每增加一個,你增加了3個服務預訂點到GTALKNA01 GTALK RIM網絡內的網關的名稱,以便內雙的溝通和行為,作為一個GTALK Internet網關的。

移動運營商通常甚至不允許檢查 BlackBerry設備和BlackBerry網絡之間的流量。

因此,RIM和黑莓都以某種方式對於他們的做法是唯一的為他們提供一個平台,網絡和所有捆綁在一起服務和您不能只是“得到的設備和軟件”,但的用戶和企業都始終約束和連接到服務網絡。

那好,這是很糟糕,因為這意味著,RIM公司提供了極其良好的安全特性和功能,以保護在各個層面對第三方的信息,設備和信息的獲取。

但它總是很難估計與 RIM公司本身和政治壓力可能對 RIM的威脅和風險。

Please consider that i am not saying “RIM is looking at your data” but making an objective risk analysis: for how the platform is done RIM have authority on the device, on the information on-the-device and on the information that cross the network. (Read my Mobile Security Slides ).

For example let's consider the very same context for Nokia phones.

Once the Nokia device is sold, Nokia does not have authority on the device, nor on the information on-the-device nor on the information that cross the network. But it's also true that Nokia just provide the device and does not provide the value added services such as the Enterprise integration (The RIM VPN tunnel), the BIS access network and all the local and remote security provisioned features that Blackberry provide.

So it's a matter of considering the risk context in the proper way when choosing the platform, with an example very similar to choosing Microsoft Exchange Server (on your own service) or whether getting a SaaS service like Google Apps.

In both case you need to trust the provider, but in first example you need to trust Microsoft that does not put a backdoor on the software while in the 2nd example you need to trust Google, as a platform and service provider, that does not access your information.

So it's a different paradigm to be evaluated depending on your threat model.

If your threat model let you consider RIM as a trusted third party service provider (much like google) than it's ok. If you have a very high risk context, like top-secret one, then let's consider and evaluate carefully whether it's not better to keep the Blackberry services fully isolated from the device or use another system without interaction with manufacturer servers and services.

Now, let's get back to some research and some facts about blackberry and blackberry security itself.

First of all several governments had to deal with RIM in order to force them to provide access to the information that cross their service networks while other decided to directly ban Blackberry usage for high officials because of servers located in UK and USA, while other decided to install their own backdoors.

There's a lot of discussion when the topics are RIM Blackberry and Governments for various reasons.

Below a set of official Security related information on RIM blackberry platform:

And here a set of unofficial Security and Hacking related information on RIM Blackberry platform:

Because it's 23.32 (GMT+1), i am tired, i think that this post will end up here.

I hope to have provided the reader a set of useful information and consideration to go more in depth in analyzing and considering the overall blackberry security (in the good and in the bad, it always depends on your threat model!).

乾杯

Fabio Pietrosanti (naif)

ps i am managing security technology development (voice encryption tech) on Blackberry platform, and i can tell you that from the development point of view it's absolutely better than Nokia in terms of compatibility and speed of development, but use only RIMOS 5.0+ !

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Celebrating “Hackers” after 25 years

A cult book , ever green since 25 years.

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It's been 25 years since “Hackers” was published. Author Steven Levy reflects on the book and the movement.

http://radar.oreilly.com/2010/06/hackers-at-25.html Steven Levy wrote a book in the mid-1980s that introduced the term "hacker" -- the positive connotation -- to a wide audience. In the ensuing 25 years, that word and its accompanying community have gone through tremendous change. The book itself became a mainstay in tech libraries.O'Reilly recently released an updated 25th anniversary edition of "Hackers," so I checked in with Levy to discuss the book's development, its influence, and the role hackers continue to play.
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Botnet for RSA cracking?

I read an interesting article about putting 1.000.000 computers, given the chance for a serious botnet owner to get it, to crack RSA.

The result is that in such context attacking an RSA 1024bit key would take only 28 years, compared to theoretical 19 billion of years.

Reading of this article , is extremely interesting because it gives our very important consideration on the cryptography strength respect to the computation power required to carry on cracking attempt, along with industry approach to “default security level”.

I would say a must read .

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China Encryption Regulations

大家好,

i found this very interesting paper on China Encryption Import/Export/Domestic Regulations done by Baker&Mckenzie in the US.

It's strongly business and regulatory oriented giving a very well done view on how china regulations works and how it may behave in future.

Read here Decrypting China Encryption's Regulations (form Bakernet website) .

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IOScat – a Port of Netcat to Cisco IOS

A porting of famous netcat to Cisco IOS router operating system: IOSCat

The only main limit is that it does not support UDP, but that's a very cool tool!

A very good txt to read is Netcat hacker Manual .

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The (old) Crypto AG case and some thinking about it

In the '90, closed source and proprietary cryptography was ruling the world.

That's before open source and scientifically approved encrypted technologies went out as a best practice to do crypto stuff.

I would like to remind when, in 1992, USA along with Israel was, together with switzerland, providing backdoored (proprietary and secret) technologies to Iranian government to tap their communications, cheating them to think that the used solution was secure , making also some consideration on this today in 2010.

caq63crypto.t.jpg

That's called The Crypto AG case , an historical fact involving the United States National Security Agency along with Signal Intelligence Division of Israel Ministry of Defense that are strongly suspected to had made an agreement with the Swiss cryptography producer company Crypto AG .

Basically those entities placed a backdoor in the secure crypto equipment that they provided to Iran to intercept Iranian communications.

Their crypto was based on secret and proprietary encryption algorithms developed by Crypto AG and eventually customized for Iranian government.

You can read some other facts about Crypto AG backdoor related issues:

The demise of global telecommunication security

The NSA-Crypto AG sting

Breaking codes: an impossible task? By BBC

Der Spiegel Crypto AG (german) article

Now, in 2010, we all know and understand that secret and proprietary crypto does not work.

Just some reference by top worldwide cryptographic experts below:

Secrecy, Security, Obscurity by Bruce Schneier

Just say No to Proprietary cryptographic Algorithms by Network Computing (Mike Fratto)

Security Through Obscurity by Ceria Purdue University

Unlocking the Secrets of Crypto: Cryptography, Encryption and Cryptology explained by Symantec

Time change the way things are approached.

I like very much the famous Philip Zimmermann assertion:

“Cryptography used to be an obscure science, of little relevance to everyday life. Historically, it always had a special role in military and diplomatic communications. But in the Information Age, cryptography is about political power, and in particular, about the power relationship between a government and its people. It is about the right to privacy, freedom of speech, freedom of political association, freedom of the press, freedom from unreasonable search and seizure, freedom to be left alone.”

Any scientist today accept and approve the Kerckhoffs' Principle that in 1883 in the Cryptographie Militaire paper stated:

The security of a cryptosystem should not depend on keeping the algorithm secret, but only on keeping the numeric key secret.

It's absolutely clear that the best practice for doing cryptography today obbly any serious person to do open cryptography, subject to public review and that follow the Kerckhoff principle.

So, what we should think about closed source, proprietary cryptography that's based on security trough obscurity concepts?

I was EXTREMELY astonished when TODAY, in 2010, in the age of information society i read some paper on Crypto AG website.

I invite all to read the Crypto AG security paper called Sophisticated Security Architecture designed by Crypto AG of which you can get a significant excerpt below:

The design of this architecture allows Crypto AG to provide a secret proprietary algorithm that can be specified for each customer to assure the perfect degree of cryptographic security and optimum support for the customer's security policy. In turn, the Security Architecture gives you the influence you need to be fully independent in respect of your encryption solution. You can determine all areas that are covered by cryptography and verify how the algorithm works. The original secret proprietary algorithm of Crypto AG is the foundation of the Security Architecture .

I have to say that their architecture is absolutely good from TLC point of view. Also they have done a very good job in making the design of the overall architecture in order to make a tamper-proof resistant crypto system by using dedicated crypto processor .
However there is still something missing:

T he overall cryptographic concept is misleading, based on wrong encryption concepts .

You may think that i am a troll telling this, but given the history of Crypto AG and given the fact that all the scientific and security community does not approve security trough obscurity concepts , it would legitimate to ask ourself:

Why they are still doing security trough obscurity cryptography with secret and proprietary algorithms ?



Hey, i think that they have very depth knowledge on telecommunication and security, but given that the science tell us not to follow the secrecy of algorithms, i really have serious doubt on why they are still providing proprietary encryption and does not move to standard solutions (eventually with some kind of custom enhancement).

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Missiles against cyber attacks?

The cyber conflicts are really reaching a point where war and cyberwar merge together.

NATO countries have the right to use the force against attacks on computer networks .

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Mobile Security talk at WHYMCA conference

I want to share some slides i used to talk about mobile security at whymca mobile conference in Milan.

Read here my slides on mobile security .

The slides provide a wide an in-depth overview of mobile security related matters, i should be doing some slidecast about it putting also audio. Maybe will do, maybe not, it depends on time that's always a insufficient resource.

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iPhone PIN: useless encryption

I recently switched one of my multiple mobile phones with which i go around to iPhone.

I am particularly concerned about data protection in case of theft and so started having a look around about the iPhone provided protection system.

There is an interesting set of iPhone Business Security Features that make me think that iPhone is moving in the right path for security protection of the phone, but still a lot of things has to be done, especially for serious Enterprise and Government users.

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For example it turned out that the iPhone PIN protection is useless and it can be broken just plugging the iPhone to a Linux machine and accessing the device like a USB stick.

That's something disturbing my paranoid mindset that make me think not to use sensitive data on my iPhone if i cannot protect my data.

Probably an iPhone independent disk encryption product would be very useful in order to let the market create protection schemas that fit the different risk contexts that different users may have.

Probably a general consumer is not worried about this PIN vulnerability but for me, working within highly confidential envirnonment such as intelligence, finance and military, it's something that i cannot accept.

I need strong disk encryption on my mobile phone.

I do strong voice encryption for it , but it would be really nice to have also something to protect the whole iPhone data and not just phone calls.

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Who extract Oil in Iran? Business and UN sanction together

I like geopolitic and i am following carefully iran issues.

I went to National Iranian Oil Company website and have seen “ Exploration & Production ” section where are listed all the companies and their country of origin that are allowed to make Exploration of oil in Iran.

On that list we find the list of countries along with the data of signing of exploration agreement:

  • Norway/Russia (2000)
  • Australia/Spain/Chile (2001)
  • India (2002)
  • China (2001)
  • Brazil (2004)
  • Spain (2004)
  • Thailand (2005)
  • China x 2 (2005)
  • Norway (2006)
  • Italy (2008)
  • Vietnam (2008)

Those countries's oil companies are allowed to do oil extraction in Iran and i would like to point out that Iran is the 2nd world Oil Reserve just after Saudi Arabia.

As you can see there's NO USA company doing extraction.

Of European Countries the only one doing business with IRAN are:

IRAN Norway Relationship

IRAN ITALY Relationship

IRAN SPAIN Relationship

While of the well known non-US-simpatizing countries, the one doing Oil business with Iran are:

IRAN RUSSIA Relationship

IRAN BRAZIL Relationship

IRAN China Relationship

Don't missing some Asian involvement.

IRAN India Relationship

IRAN Vietnam Relationship

As you can see Iran is doing Oil business with most big south America and Far Asia countries, with some little exception in Europe for what apply to Norway, Italy and Spain.

To me it sounds that those European countries are going to face serious trouble whether they will accept and subscribe UN sanction against Iran.

Or some of them, like Italy, are protected by the strenghtening cooperation they are doing with Russia on Energy matters?

Well, i don't know how things will end up, but it's possible the most hypocrit countries like the European ones doing business in Iran while applying Sanctions will be the only European winning in the international competition for Iran Oil (Unless France did not drop a nuclear bomb on theran ;) ).

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Exploit code against SecurStar DriveCrypt published

It seems that the hacking community somehow like to target securstar products, maybe because hacking community doesn't like the often revealed unethical approach already previously described in this blog by articles and user's comments.

In 2004 a lot of accusation against Hafner of SecurStar went out because of alleged intellectual property theft regarding opensource codes such as Encryption 4 the masses and legal advert also against the Free and opensource TrueCrypt project .

In 2008 there was a pre-boot authentication hacking against DriveCrypt Plus posted on Full-Disclosure.

Early 2010 it was the time of the fake infosecurity research secretly sponsored by securstar at http://infosecurityguard.com (that now they tried to remove from the web because of embarrassing situation, but backup of the story are available, hacking community still wait for apologies) .

Now, mid 2010, following a research published in December 2009 about Disk Encryption software vulnerabilities made by Neil Kettle (mu-b), Security researcher at digit-labs and Penetration tester at Convergent Network Solutions , DriveCrypt was found to be vulnerable and exploitable breaking on-device security of the system and exploit code has been just released.

Exploit code reported below (thanks Neil for the code release!):

  • Arbitrary kernel code execution security exploit of DriveCrypt: drivecrypt-dcr.c
  • Arbitrary file reading/writing security exploit via unchecked user-definable parameters to ZxCreateFile/ReadFile/ WriteFile: drivecrypt-fopen.c

The exploit code has been tested against DriveCrypt 5.3, currently released DriveCrypt 5.4 is reported to be vulnerable too as it has just minor changes related to win7 compatibility. Can anyone make a double check and report a comment here?

Very good job Neil!

In the meantime the Free Truecrypt is probably the preferred choice for disk encryption, given the fact that it's difficult to trust DriveCrypt, PGP has been acquired by Symantec and there are very bad rumors about the trust that people have in Symantec and there are not many widely available alternatives.

Rumors say that also PhoneCrypt binaries are getting analyzed and the proprietary encryption system could reveal something fun…

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Quantum cryptography broken

Quantum cryptography it's something very challenging, encryption methods that leverage the law of phisycs to secure communications over fiber lines.

To oversimplify the system is based on the fact that if someone cut the fiber, put a tap in the middle, and joint together the other side of the fiber, the amount of “errors” that will be on the communications path will be higher than 20% .

So if QBER (Quantum Bit Error Rate) goes above 20% then it's assumed that the system is intercepted.

Researcher at university of toronto was able to cheat the system with a staying below the 20%, at 19.7% , thus tweaking the threshold used by the system to consider the communication channel secure vs compromised.

The product found vulnerable is called Cerberis Layer2 and produced by the Swiss ID Quantique .

Some possibile approach to detect the attack has been provided but probably, imho, such kind of systems does not have to be considered 100% reliable until the technology will be mature enough.

Traditional encryption has to be used together till several years, eventually bundled with quantum encryption whether applicable.

When we will see a quantum encryption systems on an RFC like we have seen for ZRTP , PGP and SSL ?

-naif

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FUN! Infosecurity consideration on some well known films

Please read it carefully Film that needed better infosec .

One the the review, imho the most fun one on film Star Wars :

The scene

Death star getting blown up

Infosec Analysis

Darth Vader must be heralded as the prime example of a chief executive who really didn't care about information security. The entire board was unapproachable and clearly no system testing was undertaken. The network security was so poor that it was hacked into and the designs for the death star were stolen without anyone knowing.

Even worse than that, the death star had a major design flaw where by dropping a bomb thingy into a big hole on the outside, it actually blew up the entire thing!

Darth Vader needed to employ a good Security Consultant to sit on the executive board and promise not to force choke him. Should have commissioned a full risk assessment of the death star followed by a full penetration test. Only then should the death star have been released into the production environment.

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great point of view

Because security of a cryptographic system it's not a matter of “how many bits do i use” but using the right approach to do the right thing to mitigate the defined security risk in the most balanced way.

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Encryption is not scrambling: be aware of scrambler!

Most of us know about voice scrambler that can be used across almost any kind of voice based communication technology.

Extremely flexible approach: works everything

Extreme performance: very low latency

but unfortunately…

Extremely weak: Scrambling cannot be considered secure.

Only encryption can be considered secure under the Kerckoff's principle .

So please don't even consider any kind of analog scrambler if you need real security.

Read deeply the paper Implementation of a real-time voice encryption system ” by Markus Brandau, especially the cryptoanalysis paragraph.

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Evidence that infosecurityguard.com/notrax is SecurStar GmbH Phonecrypt – A fake independent research on voice crypto

Below evidence that the security review made by an anonymous hacker on http://infosecurityguard.com is in facts a dishonest marketing plan by the SecurStar GmbH to promote their voice crypto product.

I already wrote about that voice crypto analysis that appeared to me very suspicious.

Now it's confirmed, it's a fake independent hacker security research by SecurStar GmbH, its just a marketing trick!

How do we know that Infosecurityguard.com, the fake independent security research, is a marketing trick from SecurStar GmbH?

1) I posted on http://infosecurityguard.com a comments to a post with a link to my blog to that article on israelian ministry of defense certification

2) The author of http://infosecurityguard.com went to approve the comment and read the link on my own blog http://infosecurity.ch

3) Reaching my blog he leaked the IP address from which he was coming 217.7.213.59 (where i just clicked on from wordpress statistic interface)

4) On http:// 217.7.213.59/panel there is the IP PBX interface of the SecurStar GmbH corporate PBX (openly reachable trough the internet!)

5) The names of the internal PBX confirm 100% that it's the SecurStar GmbH:

6) There is 100% evidence that the anonymous hacker of http://infosecurityguard.com is from SecurStar GmbH

Below the data and reference that let us discover that it's all but a dishonest marketing tips and not an independent security research.

Kudos to Matteo Flora for it's support and for his article in Debunking Infosecurityguard identity !

The http referral tricks

When you read a link going from a website to another one there is an HTTP protocol header, the “Referral”, that tell you from which page someone is going to another webpage.

The referral demonstrated that the authors of http://infosecurityguard.com read my post, because it was coming from http://infosecurityguard.com/wp-admin/edit-comments.php that's the webpage you use as a wordpress author/editor to approve/refuse comments. And here there was the link.

That's the log entry:

217.7.213.59 – - [30/Jan/2010:02:56:37 -0700] “GET /20100129/licensed-by-israel-ministry-of-defense-how-things-really-works/ HTTP/1.0″ 200 5795 “ http://infosecurityguard.com/wp-admin/edit-comments.php ” “Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.1; Trident/4.0; GTB6.3; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; InfoPath.2)”

The PBX open on the internet tell us that's SecurStar GmbH

The SecurStar GmbH PBX is open on the internet, it contains all the names of their employee and confirm us that the author of http:/infosecurityguard.com is that company and is the anonymous hacker called Notrax.

Here there is their forum post where the SecurStar GmbH guys are debugging IPCOPfirewall & Asterisk together (so we see also details of what they use) where there is the ip 217.7.213.59 .

SecurStarproof.png

That's also really fun!

They sell secure telephony but their company telephony system is openly vulnerable on the internet . :-)

I was thinking to call the CEO, Hafner, via SIP on his internal desktop PBX to announce we discovered him tricks.. :->

They measured their marketing activity

Looking at the logs of my website i found that they was sensing the google distribution of information for the following keywords, in order to understand how effectively they was able to attack competing products. It's reasonable, if you invest money in a marketing campaign you want to see the results :-)

They reached my blog and i logged their search:

infosecurityguard+cryptophone

infosecurityguard+gold-lock

217.7.213.59 – - [30/Jan/2010:02:22:42 -0700] “GET / HTTP/1.0″ 200 31057 “Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.1; Trident/4.0; GTB6.3; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; InfoPath.2)”

217.7.213.59 – - [30/Jan/2010:04:15:07 -0700] “GET HTTP/1.0″ 200 15774 “Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.1; Trident/4.0; GTB6.3; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; InfoPath.2)”


The domain registration data

The domain have been registered on 1st December 2009, just two months to start preparing the dishonest marketing campaign:

Domain Name: INFOSECURITYGUARD.COM

Registrar: GODADDY.COM, INC.

Updated Date: 01-dec-2009

Creation Date: 01-dec-2009

The domain is anonymously privacy protected trough a whois privacy service:

Administrative Contact: Private, Registration INFOSECURITYGUARD.COM@domainsbyproxy.com , Domains by Proxy, Inc. DomainsByProxy.com

Notrax hacker does not exist on google
As you know any hacker that get public usually have presence of it's activity on google, attending mailinglists, forum, homepage, past research, participation to conferences, etc, etc.
The fake hacker that they wanted us to to think was writing an independent blog does NOT have any trace on google. Only some hit about an anonymous browser called Notrax but nothing about that hacker.
Maybe when SecurStar provided the anonymity tool to their marketing agency, to help them protecting anonymity for the fake research, their provided them the anonymous browser notrax.So the marketing guy thinking about the nickname of this fake hackers used what? Notrax! :-)

The “independent review”completely oriented in publicizing PhoneCrypt

Of the various review don the phonecrypt review is only positive and amazing good feedback, while the other are only bad feedback and no single good point.

As you can imagine, in any kind of independent product evaluation, for all products there are goods and bad points. No. In this one there are only product that are good and product that are bad.

They missed to consider the security of the technology used by the products

They completely avoided to speak about cryptography and security of the products.

They do not evaluated basic security features that must be in that kind of products.That's in order not to let anyone see that they did not followed basic security rules in building up their PhoneCrypt.
The technology is closed source, no transparency on algorithms and protocols, no peer review.Read my new comparison (from the basic cryptographic requirement point of view) About the voice encryption analysis (criteria, errors and different results) .
The results are somehow different than their one .

UPDATE: Who's Wilfried Hafner (SecurStar founder) ?

I got a notice from a reader regarding Wilfred Hafner, SecurStar founder, CEO and security expert.

He was arrested in 1997 for telephony related fraud (check 2nd article on Phrack) earning from telephony fraud 254.000 USD causing damages to local telcos trough blueboxing for 1.15 Million USD.

He was not doing “Blueboxing” for the pleasure of phreaking and connecting with other hackers, but to earn money.

Hacking for profit (and not for fun) in 1997… brrr…. No hacker's ethic at all!

All in all, is that lawful?

Badmouthing a competitor amounts to an unfair competition practice in most jurisdictions, so it is arguable (to say the least) that SecurStar is right on a legally sound ground here.
Moreover, there are some specific statutes in certain jurisdictions which provide for a straightforward ban on the practice we are talking about. For example in the UK the British Institute of Practitioners in Advertising - in compliance with the Consumer protection from Unfair Trading regulation – ruled that:

”falsely claiming or creating the impression that the trader is not acting for the purposes relating to his trade, business, craft or profession, or falsely representing oneself as a consumer” is a criminal offense .

We have no doubt that PRPR (which is the UK-based *PR company for SecurStar GmbH, led by Peter Rennison and Allie Andrews as stated in SecurStar Press Release ) did provide their client with this information. Heck, they *are* in the UK, they simply cannot ignore that!

IANAL, but I would not be surpised if someone filed a criminal complaint or start civil litigation for unfair competition against SecurStar GmbH.
Whether this is going to be a matter for criminal and/or civil Courts or not is not that important. However, it is clear enough that SecurStar GmbH appears to be at least ethically questionable and not really worth of trust.

Nice try, gentlemen… however, next time just do it right (whether “right” for them means “in a honest manner” or “in a fashion not to be caught” I will let them choose)”

Fabio Pietrosanti (naif)

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Dishonest security: The SecurStart GmbH Phonecrypt case

I would like to provide considerations on the concept of ethics that a security company should have respect to the users, the media and the security environment.

SecurStar GmbH made very bad things making that infosecuriguard.com fake independent research.

It's unfair approach respect to hacking community.

It's unfair marketing to end user. They should not be tricking by creating fake independent review.

It's unfair competition in the security market.

Let's make some more important consideration on this.

Must be serious on cryptographic products. They are not toys

When you do cryptographic tools you should be really aware of what you are doing, you must be really serious.

If you do bad crypto people could die.

If you don't follow basic security rules for transparency and security for cryptography you are putting people life at risk.

You are taking the responsibility of this. (I want to sleep at night, don't think SecurStar CEO/CTO care about this…)

Security research need reference and transparency

Security research have to be public, well done, always subject to public discussion and cooperation.
Security research should not be instrumentally used for marketing purpose.Security research should be done for awareness and grow of the knowledge of the worldwide security environment.

Hacking environment is neutral, should not be used instrumentally

Hackers are considered neutral, nerds, doing what they do for their pleasure and passion.

If you work in the security market you work with hackers.

If you use hackers and hacking environment for your own marketing purposes you are making something very nasty.

Hackers give you the technology and knowledge and you use them for your own commercial purpose.

Consideration on the authority of the information online

That's something that pose serious consideration on the authority of information online.An anonymous hacker, with no reference online, made a product security review that appear like an independent one. I have to say that the fake review was very well prepared, it always posed good/bad things in an indirect way. It did not appeared to me at 1st time like a fake. But going deeply i found what's going on.

However Journalists, news media and blogger went to the TRAP and reviewed their fake research. TheRegister, NetworkWorld and a lot of blogs reported it. Even if the author was completely anonymous.

What they have done is already illegal in UK

SecurStar GmbH is lucky that they are not in the UK, where doing this kind of things is illegal .

Fabio Pietrosanti (naif)

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About the SecurStar GmbH Phonecrypt voice encryption analysis (criteria, errors and different results)

This article want to clarify and better explain the finding at infosecurityguard.com regaring voice encryption product evaluation.
This article want to tell you a different point of view other than infosecurityguard.com and explaining which are the rational with extensive explaination from security point of view.
Today i read news saying: “PhoneCrypt: Basic Vulnerability Found in 12 out of 15 Voice Encryption Products and went to read the website infosecurityguard .

Initially it appeared to my like a great research activity but then i started reading deeply the read about it.I found that it's not properly a security research but there is are concrete elements that's a marketing campaign well done in order to attract public media and publicize a product.
Imho they was able to cheat journalists and users because the marketing campaign was absolutely well done not to be discovered on 1st read attempt. I personally considered it like a valid one on 1st ready (they cheated me initially!).

But if you go deeply… you will understand that:
- it's a camouflage marketing initiative arranged by SecurStar GmbH and not a independent security research
- they consider a only security context where local device has been compromised (no software can be secured in that case, like saying SSL can be compromised if you have a trojan!)
- they do not consider any basic security and cryptographic security criteria

However a lot of important website reported it:

This article is quite long, if you read it you will understand better what's going on around infosecurityguard.com research and research result.

I want to to tell you why and how (imho) they are wrong.

The research missed to consider Security, Cryptography and Transparency!

Well, all this research sound much like being focused on the marketing goal to say that their PhoneCrypt product is the “super” product best of all the other ones.
Any security expert that would have as duty the “software evaluation” in order to protect the confidentiality of phone calls will evaluate other different characteristics of the product and the technology.

Yes, it's true that most of the product described by SecurStar in their anonymous marketing website called http://infosecurityguard.com have some weakness.
But the relevant weakness are others and PhoneCrypt unfortunately, like most of the described products suffer from this.
Let's review which characteristics are needed basic cryptography and security requirement (the best practice, the foundation and the basics!)

a – Security Trough Obscurity does not work

A basic rule in cryptography cames from 1883 by Auguste Kerckhoffs:

In a well-designed cryptographic system, only the key needs to be secret; there should be no secrecy in the algorithm.
Modern cryptographers have embraced this principle, calling anything else “security by obscurity.”
Read what Bruce Schneir, recognized expert and cryptographer in the world say about this
Any security expert will tell you that's true. Even a novice university student will tell you that's true. Simply because that's the only way to do cryptography.
Almost all product described in the review by SecurStar GmbH, include PhoneCrypt, does not provide precise details about their cryptographic technologies.
Precise details are:
  • Detailed specification of cryptographic algorithm (that's not just saying “we use AES “)
  • Detailed specification of cryptographic protocol (that's not just saying “we use Diffie Hellman ” )
  • Detailed specification of measuring the cryptographic strenght (that's not just saying “we have 10000000 bit key size “)

Providing precise details means having extensive documentation with theoretical and practical implications documenting ANY single way of how the algorithm works, how the protocol works with precise specification to replicate it for interoperability testing.
It means that scientific community should be able to play with the technology, audit it, hack it.
If we don't know anything about the cryptographic system in details, how can we know which are the weakness and strength points?

Mike Fratto, Site editor of Network Computing, made a great article on “Saying NO to proprietary cryptographic systems” .
Cerias Purdue University tell this .

b – NON peer reviewed and NON scientifically approved Cryptography does not work

In any case and in any condition you do cryptography you need to be sure that someone else will check, review, analyze, distruct and reconstract from scratch your technology and provide those information free to the public for open discussion.
That's exactly how AES was born and like US National Institute of Standard make crypto does (with public contest with public peer review where only the best evaluated win).
A public discussion with a public contest where the a lot of review by most famous and expert cryptographer in the world, hackers (with their name,surname and face, not like Notrax) provide their contribution, tell what they thinks.
That's called “peer review”.

If a cryptographic technology has an extended and important peer review, distributed in the world coming from universities, private security companies, military institutions, hackers and all coming from different part of the world (from USA to Europe to Russia to South America to Middle east to China) and all of them agree that a specific technology it's secure…
Well, in that case we can consider the technology secure because a lot of entities with good reputation and authority coming from a lot of different place in the world have publicly reviewed, analyzed and confirmed that a technology it's secure.

How a private company can even think to invent on it's own a secure communication protocol when it's scientifically stated that it's not possible to do it in a “proprietary and closed way” ?
IBM tell you that peer review it's required for cryptography .
Bruce Schneier tell you that “Good cryptographers know that nothing substitutes for extensive peer review and years of analysis.”
Philip Zimmermann will tell you to beware of Snake Oil where the story is: “Every software engineer fancies himself a cryptographer, which has led to the proliferation of really bad crypto software.”

c – Closed source cryptography does not work

As you know any kind of “serious” and with “good reputation” cryptographic technology is implemented in opensource.
There are usually multiple implementation of the same cryptographic algorithm and cryptographic protocol to be able to review all the way it works and certify the interoperability.
Supposing to use a standard with precise and extended details on “how it works”, that has been “peer reviewed” by the scientific community BUT that has been re-implemented from scratch by a not so smart programmer and the implementation it's plenty of bugs.

Well, if the implementation is “opensource” this means that it can be reviewed, improved, tested, audited and the end user will certaintly have in it's own had a piece of technology “that works safely” .

Google release opensource crypto toolkit
Mozilla release opensource crypto toolkit
Bruce Schneier tell you that Cryptography must be opensource .

Another cryptographic point of view

I don't want to convince anyone but just provide facts related to science, related to cryptography and security in order to reduce the effect of misinformation done by security companies whose only goes is to sell you something and not to do something that make the world a better.

When you do secure products, if they are not done following the proper approach people could die.
It's absolutely something irresponsible not to use best practice to do crypto stuff.

To summarize let's review the infosecurityguard.com review from a security best pratice point of view.

Product name Security Trough Obscurity Public peer review Open Source Compromise locally?
Caspertec Obscurity No public review Closed
CellCrypt Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Cryptophone Transparency Limited public review Public
Gold-Lock Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Illix Obscurity
No public review
Closed
No1.BC Obscurity No public review
Closed
PhoneCrypt Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Rode&Swarz Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Secure-Voice Obscurity
No public review
Closed
SecuSmart Obscurity
No public review
Closed
SecVoice Obscurity
No public review
Closed
SegureGSM Obscurity
No public review
Closed
SnapCell Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Tripleton Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Zfone Transparency Public review
Open
ZRTP Transparency Public review
Open

*Green means that it match basic requirement for a cryptographic secure system

* Red / Broken means that it does not match basic requirement for a cryptographic secure system
That's my analysis using a evaluation method based on cryptographic and security parameters not including the local compromise context that i consider useless.

However, to be clear, those are only basic parameters to be used when considering a voice encryption product (just to avoid being in a situation that appears like i am promoting other products). So it may absolutely possible that a product with good crypto ( transparency, peer reviewed and opensource) is absolutely a not secure product because of whatever reason (badly written, not usable causing user not to use it and use cleartext calls, politically compromised, etc, etc).
I think i will prepare a broader criteria for voice crypto technologies and voice crypto products, so it would be much easier and much practical to have a full transparent set of criterias to evaluate it.

But those are really the basis of security to be matched for a good voice encryption system!
Read some useful past slides on security protocols used in voice encryption systems (2nd part).

Now read below some more practical doubt about their research.

The security concept of the review is misleading: any hacked device can be always intercepted!

I think that the guys completely missed the point: ANY KIND OF SOFTWARE RUNNING ON A COMPROMISED OPERATING SYSTEM CAN BE INTERCEPTED

Now they are pointing out that also Zfone from Philip Zimmermann is broken (a pc software), just because they install a trojan on a PC like in a mobile phone?
Any security software rely on the fact that the underlying operating system is somehow trusted and preserve the integrity of the environment where the software run.

  • If you have a disk encryption system but your PC if infected by a trojan, the computer is already compromised.
  • If you have a voice encryption system but your PC is infected by a trojan, the computer is already compromised.
  • If you have a voice encryption system but your mobile phone is infected by a trojan, the mobile phone is already compromised.

No matter which software you are running, in such case the security of your operating environment is compromised and in one way or another way all the information integrity and confidentiality is compromised.

Like i explained above how to intercept PhoneCrypt.

The only things that can protect you from this threat is running in a closed operating system with Trust Computing capability, implementing it properly.
For sure on any “Open” operating system such us Windows, Windows Mobile, Linux, iPhone or Android there's no chance to really protect a software.
On difficult operating system such as Symbian OS or RimOS maybe the running software can be protected (at least partially)

That's the reason for which the security concept that guys are leveraging to carry on their marketing campaign has no clue.
It's just because they control the environment, they know Flexispy software and so they adjusted their software not to be interceptable when Flexispy is installed.
If you develop a trojan with the other techniques i described above you will 100% intercept PhoneCrypt.

On that subject also Dustin Tamme l, Security researcher of BreakPoint Systems , pointed on on VoIP Security Alliance mailing lists that the security analysis is based on wrong concepts .

The PhoneCrypt can be intercepted: it's just that they don't wanted to tell you!

PhoneCrypt can be intercepted with “on device spyware”.
為什麼呢?
Because Windows Mobile is an unsecure operating environment and PhoneCrypt runs on Windows Mobile.
Windows Mobile does not use Trusted Computing and so any software can do anything.
The platform choice for a secure telephony system is important.
怎麼樣?
I quickly discussed with some knowledgeable windows mobile hackers about 2 different way to intercept PhoneCrypt with an on-device spyware (given the unsecure Windows Mobile Platform).

a) Inject a malicious DLL into the software and intercept from within the Phonecrypt itself.
In Windows Mobile any software can be subject to DLL code injection.
What an attacker can do is to inject into the PhoneCrypt software (or any software running on the phone), hooking the Audio related functions acting as a “function proxy” between the PhoneCrypt and the real API to record/play audio.
It's a matter of “hooking” only 2 functions, the one that record and the one that play audio.
Read the official Microsoft documentation on how to do DLL injection on Windows Mobile processes. or forum discussing the technique of injecting DLL on windows mobile processes.
That's simple, any programmer will tell you to do so.
They simply decided that's better not to make any notice about this.
b) Create a new audio driver that simply act as a proxy to the real one and intercept PhoneCrypt
In Windows Mobile you can create new Audio Drivers and new Audio Filters.
What an attacker can do is to load a new audio driver that does not do anything else than passing the real audio driver function TO/FROM the realone. In the meantime intercept everything recorded and everything played :-)
Here there is an example on how to do Audio driver for Windows Mobile .
Here a software that implement what i explain here for Windows “Virtual Audio Cable” .
The very same concept apply to Windows Mobile. Check the book “Mobile Malware Attack and Defense” at that link explaining techniques to play with those techniques.
They simply decided that's better not to make any notice to that way of intercepting phone call on PhoneCrypt .
Those are just 2 quick ideas, more can be probably done.

Sounds much like a marketing activity – Not a security research.

I have to tell you. I analyzed the issue very carefully and on most aspects. All this things about the voice encryption analisys sounds to me like a marketing campaign of SecurStar GmbH to sell PhoneCrypt and gain reputation. A well articulated and well prepared campaign to attract the media saying, in an indirect way cheating the media, that PhoneCrypt is the only one secure. You see the press releases of SecurStar and of the “Security researcher Notrax telling that PhoneCrypt is the only secure product” . SecurStar PhoneCrypt is the only product the anonymous hacker “Notrax” consider secure of the “software solutions”.
The only “software version” in competition with:

SnapCell – No one can buy it. A security company that does not even had anymore a webpage. The company does not almost exist anymore.
rohde-schawarz – A company that have in his list price and old outdated hardware secure phone . No one would buy it, it's not good for genera use.

Does it sounds strange that only those other products are considered secure along with PhoneCrypt .

Also… let's check the kind of multimedia content in the different reviews available of Gold-Lock, Cellcrypt and Phonecrypt in order to understand how much the marketing guys pressed to make the PhoneCrypt review the most attractive:

應用 Screenshots of application Video with demonstration of interception Network demonstration
PhoneCrypt 5 0 1
CellCrypt 0 2 0
GoldLock 1 2 0

It's clear that PhoneCrypt is reviewed showing more features explicitly shown and major security features product description than the other.

Too much difference between them, should we suspect it's a marketing tips?

But again other strange things analyzing the way it was done…
If it was “an impartial and neutral review” we should see good and bad things on all the products right?

Ok, see the table below regarding the opinion indicated in each paragraph of the different reviews available of Gold-Lock, CellCrypt and Phonecrypt (are the only available) to see if are positive or negative.

應用 Number of paragraphs Positive paragraphs Negative paragraphs Neutral paragraphs
PhoneCrypt 9 9 0 0
CellCrypt 12 0 10 2
GoldLock 9 0 8 1

Detailed paragraphs opinion analysis of Phonecrypt
Paragraph of review Opinion expressed
From their website Positive Marketing feedback
Apple iPhone Positive Marketing feedback
Disk Encryption or voice Encryption Positive Marketing feedback
PBX Compatibility? Really Positive Marketing feedback
Cracking <10. Not. Positive Marketing feedback
Good thinking! Positive Marketing feedback
A little network action Positive Marketing feedback
UI Positive Marketing feedback
Good Taste Positive Marketing feedback
Detailed paragraphs opinion analysis of Gold-Lock 3G
Paragraph of review Opinion expressed
From their website Negative Marketing feedback
Licensed by The israeli Ministry of Denfese Negative Marketing feedback
Real Company or Part Time hobby Negative Marketing feedback
16.000 bit authentication Negative Marketing feedback
DH 256 Negative Marketing feedback
Downad & Installation! Neutral Marketing feedback
Cracking it <10 Negative Marketing feedback
Marketing BS101 Negative Marketing feedback
Cool video stuff Negative Marketing feedback
Detailed paragraphs opinion analysis of CellCrypt
Paragraph of review Opinion expressed
From their website Neutral Marketing feedback
A little background about cellcrypt Negative Marketing feedback
Master of Marketing Negative Marketing feedback
Secure Voice calling Negative Marketing feedback
Who's buying their wares Negative Marketing feedback
Downad & Installation! Neutral Marketing feedback
My Demo environment Negative Marketing feedback
Did they forget some code Negative Marketing feedback
Cracking it <5 Negative Marketing feedback
Room Monitoring w/ FlexiSpy Negative Marketing feedback
Cellcrypt unique features.. Negative Marketing feedback
Plain old interception Negative Marketing feedback
The Haters out there Negative Marketing feedback

Now it's clear that from their point of view on PhoneCrypt there is no single bad point while the other are always described in a negative way.
No single good point. Strange?
All those considerations along with the next ones really let me think that's very probably a marketing review and not an independent review.

Other similar marketing attempt from SecurStar

SecurStar GmbH is known to have used in past marketing activity leveraging this kind of “technical speculations”, abusing of partial information and fake unconfirmed hacking stuff to make marketing/media coverage.
Imho a rare mix of unfairness in leveraging the difficult for people to really understand the complexity of security and cryptography.

They already used in past Marketing activities like the one about creating a trojan for Windows Mobile and saying that their software is secure from the trojan that they wrote.
Read about their marketing tricks of 2007

They developed a Trojan (RexSpy) for Windows Mobile, made a demonstration capability of the trojan and later on told that they included “Anti-Trojan” capability to their PhoneCrypt software.They never released informations on that trojan, not even proved that it exists.

The researcher Collin Mulliner told at that time that it sounds like a marketing tips (also because he was not able to get from SecurStar CEO Hafner any information about that trojan):

“This makes you wonder if this is just a marketing thing.”

Now, let's try to make some logical reassignment.
It's part of the way they do marketing, an very unfriendly and unpolite approach with customers, journalist and users trying to provide wrong security concepts for a market advantage. Being sure that who read don't have all the skills to do in depth security evaluation and find the truth behind their marketing trips.

Who is the hacker notrax?

It sounds like a camouflage of a fake identity required to have an “independent hacker” that make an “independent review” that is more strong on reputation building.
Read about his bio:

¾ Human, ¼ Android (Well that would be cool at least.) I am just an enthusiast of pretty much anything that talks binary and if it has a RS232 port even better. During the day I masquerade as an engineer working on some pretty cool projects at times, but mostly I do the fun stuff at night. I have been thinking of starting an official blog for about 4.5 years to share some of the things I come across, can't figure out, or just cross my mind. Due to my day job and my nighttime meddling, I will update this when I can. I hope some find it useful, if you don't, well you don't.

There are no information about this guy on google.
Almost any hacker that get public have articles online, post in mailing archive and/or forum or some result of their activity.
For notrax, nothing is available.

Additionally let's look at the domain…
The domain infosecurityguard.com is privacy protected by domainsbyproxy to prevent understanding who is the owner.
The domain has been created 2 months ago on 01-Dec-09 on godaddy.com registrar.

What's also very interesting to notice that this “unknown hacker with no trace on google about him that appeared on December 2009 on the net” is referred on SecurStar GmbH Press Release as a “An IT security expert”.

Maybe they “know personally” who's this anonymous notrax? :)

Am i following my own conspiracy thinking or maybe there's some reasonable doubt that everything was arrange in that funny way just for a marketing activity?

Social consideration

If you are a security company you job have also a social aspects, you should also work to make the world a better place (sure to make business but “not being evil”). You cannot cheat the skills of the end users in evaluating security making fake misleading information.

You should do awareness on end users, to make them more conscious of security issues, giving them the tools to understand and decide themselves.

Hope you had fun reading this article and you made your own consideration about this.

Fabio Pietrosanti (naif)

ps Those are my personal professional opinion, let's speak about technology and security, not marketing.
pps i am not that smart in web writing, so sorry for how the text is formatted and how the flow of the article is unstructured!

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Licensed by Israel Ministry of Defense? How things really works!

You should know that Israel is a country where if a company need to develop encryption product they must be authorized by the government.

The government don't want that companies doing cryptography can do anything bad to them and what they can do of good for the government, so they have to first be authorized.

Companies providing interception and encryptio n m ust apply to a license because Israel law on this is so restrictive to be similar to china law .

That's because those kind of technologies are considered fundamental for the intelligence and espionage capabilities of Israel country.

To give some example of “Licensed by Israel Ministry of Defense” companies:

GSM encryption products “Licensed by Israel Ministry of Defense” – Gold-lock

Interception of communication products “Licensed by Israel Ministry of Defense” – Verint

HF encrypted Radio “Licensed by Israel Ministry of Defense” – Kavit

Surveillance services and equipment “Licensed by Israel Ministry of Defense” – Multi Tier Solutions

For example how to apply for a “License by Israel Ministry of Defense” if you do encryption technologies in Israel?

Be sure to be an israeli company, click here and fill the forms.

Someone will contact you from encryption-control@mod.gov.il and will discuss with you whether to give you or not the license to sell.

What does the department of defense will require from an israeli company in order to provide them the authorization to make and sell interception and encryption products?

Well, what they want and what they really ask nobody knows.

It's a secret dealing of Israel Ministry of Defense with each “licensed” company.

What we know for sure is that Verint, a “Licensed by Israel Ministry of Defense”, placed a backdoor to intercept companies and governments in the US and Netherland into the interception systems they was selling.

Verint, a Licensed by Israel Ministry of Defense Company, provided to Israel government eavesdropped communications of private and government users in the United States and in the Netherland .

CIA officier reported that Israel Ministry of Defense was known to pay Verint a reimbursement of 50% of their costs in order to have from Verint espionage services trough their commercial activity on selling “backdoored” interception equipment to spy foreign users.


It can be a legitimate doubt that the cooperation within the Israeli Ministry of Defense may be problematic for an Israeli company that want to sell interception and encryption product abroad.

Those companies may be forced to make the interests of Israel Ministry of Defense and not the interests of the customers (like Verint scandal is a real-world example).

So, how would a “Licensed by Israel Ministry of Defense” be a good things to promote?

It represent the risk that the “Israel Ministry of Defense”, like is publicly known that it has already have done with Verint, will interfere with what the company do.

It represent the risk that the “Israel Ministry of Defense” may reasonably provide “reimbursement” of costs paying the company and get what they would likely would like to get.

So, what does really “Israel Ministry of Defense” want from Israel companies doing encryption and interception technologies?

Should we ask ourself whether Israeli companies doing encryption and interception businesses are more interested to do business or to do “outsourced espionage services” for their always paying customer, the “Israel Ministry of Defense”.

For sure, in the age of financial crisis, the Israel Ministry of Defense is a paying customer that does not have budget problem…

Strict control, strict rules, strong government strategic and military cooperation.

要小心。

If you want to read more about this matters, about how technologies from certain countries is usually polluted with their governments military and secret services strategies stay tuned as i am preparing a post about this .

You will much better understand about that subjects on the “Licensed by Israel Ministry of Defense”.

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Recuva: Nice windows data recovery tool

Not a professional tool but an easy, quick and free one.

If you just accidently deleted some files on windows or your employee leave the company deleting all his data, well that you get out from trouble quickly.

It also came out in a 'portable' version to be loaded from an usb stick drive.

Check Recuva recovery tool

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Military contractors going commercial

Most military contractors are suffering from the restriction of government's budgets for military expenses and are moving into commercial markets, still they have to adjust a lot of things.

Read here a nice analysis from rochtel on how military contractors should adapt their strategy.

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Brazilian Electrical Blackout: preview of cyberwar

In 2005 and 2007 in Brazil million of people was targetted by a blackout.

Initially it appeared like an accident.

Now it's known that was caused by a cyber attack against electricity control systems.

That was just a preview of what a cyber attack in a cyberwar means.

In near future we'll probably see something like 'virtual custom offices' at internet borders, defining what get in and what get out like several “not so democratic” countries are doing.

Does the cyberwar will affect digital rights? Probably yes, even i hope not.

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Conventionality is not morality.

During my daily RSS OCD reading I had to deal with this article : it has been written by a “senior anti-virus researcher at Kaspersky Lab's “. Talk about personal interest.

I wont comment on the practical implications of useless signature based AV's and how cyber criminals will never need amateur-ish projects to carry on their malicious tactics.

But what is always interesting is watching the very same people who use billion dollar scare tactics to sell you a perfectly useless piece of software (which will give you a false sense of security, hence will make you more insecure), talking about ethics.

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Hackers Hacking Hackers

Hackers hacking hackers are always pretty fun.

And I am not talking about ZF0 5 (which was cool reading, even if not as cool as ~El8 was), I am talking about this .

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