Arquivo da categoria: Política de Privacidade

RFC 6189: ZRTP é finalmente um padrão!

Finalmente ZRTP foi atribuída uma missão oficial RFC, RFC6189 ZRTP: Media Key acordo Caminho para Unicast Seguro RTP.

Teve como uma dependência do SRTP com AES tamanho de chave de 256 bits, que agora foi definida como RFC6188 .

É emocionante ver o RFC finalmente lançado, já que é um marco importante para definir ZRTP como o padrão oficial para o fim-de-final muito parecido com criptografia PGP foi para e-mails.

Agora, qualquer organização no mundo será capaz de implementar oficialmente ZRTP para o fim-de-final criptografia de voz protocolo

Atualmente 3 diferentes implementações públicas de ZRTP protocolo existe:

Cada um deles oferecem recursos diferentes do protocolo, mas o mais importante são conhecidos por serem interoperáveis.

Uma nova onda está chegando ao mundo criptografia de voz, irromper em uma área cinzenta onde a maioria das empresas que fazem sistemas de criptografia de telefone tem vindo a implementar criptografia personalizado.

Agora, um padrão foi configurado e há poucas razões da esquerda para a implementação de algo diferente.

Hurra Sr. Zimmermann e toda a comunidade de empresas (como PrivateWave ) e indivíduos (como Werner Dittmann ) que trabalharam nele!

Hoje é um grande dia, esse tipo de tecnologia já é oficial e também com a implementação existente múltipla!

Philip, você fez de novo, os meus cumprimentos ao seu espírito puro e determinação :-)

Ação

Progress for GSM rachaduras na Universidade de Freiburg

O excitante mundo dos protocolos móveis (GSM, GSM-R, TETRA, UMTS, etc) pirataria está começando as atividades oficiais de pesquisa das universidades.

O investimento para fazer lançamentos de código de software opensource rachaduras está dando a oportunidade aos estudantes da universidade para trabalhar nele, melhorá-lo e fazer uma pesquisa forte.

A Universidade de Freiburg acaba de lançar o papel Exercício prático sobre a criptografia GSM A5 / 1 , juntamente com uma gsmframencoder ferramenta de apoio para melhorar o processo de sniffing, decodificação e rachaduras.

Abertura de hardware, abrindo software, protocolo de abertura demonstrar a fraqueza de qualquer tipo de método próprio ou processo de acumulação de tecnologias de comunicação e segurança.

Deve ser o objetivo de qualquer cientista para tentar abrir-se e quebrar qualquer tipo de tecnologia proprietária e fechada para forçar a indústria a se passa apenas com a abordagem interoperável e aberto, enquanto concepção de protocolos de telecomunicações.

Ação

Minha experiência nó TOR saída tentando filtrar o tráfego barulhento

No início deste ano eu decidi que é hora de executar um nó de saída TOR então eu trouxe um VPS em hetzner.de (porque eles são listados como Bom TOR ISP ) e configurar a saída do nó com apelido privacyresearch.infosecurity.ch com 100Mbit / s para a primeira conexão de 1 TB de dados mensais, em seguida, 10Mbit / s plana.

Ele também executar TOR2WEB software em http://tor.infosecurity.ch .

Eu configurei a saída política , tal como sugerido pela execução de saída do nó com o assédio mínimo e preparou um modelo de resposta abuso .

No primeiro dia eu fui correr o nó i recebeu imediatamente DMCA reclamar devido ao tráfego de peer to peer.

Então eu decidi filtrar-out algum tráfego P2P usando OpenDPI iptables módulo e DMCA queixam automaticamente desapareceu:

iptables-A OUTPUT-m opendpi-edonkey-gadugadu-fasttrack-gnutella-DirectConnect-bittorrent-winmx-j-soulseek REJECT

Então, porque eu sou italiano, eu decidi evitar meu nó TOR para se conectar à internet espacial italiana endereço, a fim de reduzir a chance de que um promotor estúpido me acordava de manhã porque não entendeu que eu estou correndo um nó TOR.

Eu tentei, com a ajuda de hellais que escreveu um script para fazer política de saída rejeitar declaração , para rejeitar todos os netblocks italianos com base em ioError do blockfinder mas descobrimos que as configuração torrc arquivos com +1000 linhas estava fazendo acidente TOR.

Fomos para abrir uma passagem para relatar o acidente sobre a nossa tentativa de bloquear o TOR política de saída por país e encontrou uma tentativa semelhante , onde contribuímos, mas ainda parece ser uma questão em aberto.

A conclusão é que não é possível fazer uma política de saída do país para TOR nó de saída de forma limpa e educada assim que eu decidi ir pelo caminho sujo usando iptables / GeoIP . Depois de lutar para compilá-la corretamente, era uma linha de iptables para bloquear o tráfego indo para a Itália:

iptables-A OUTPUT-p tcp-m state-state NEW-m geoip-dst-cc TI-j REJECT

Agora da minha saída do nó-sem conexão com redes italiano será feito e eu estou seguro contra, possivelmente, não os promotores estúpidas compreensão TOR (eu tenho uma exceção para todos os endereços TOR nó ip aplicada antes).

Depois de alguns dias outros eu comecei a receber queixas devido às atividades portscan origem dos meus nós tor.

Do meu próprio ponto de vista eu quero apoiar a rede de anonimato, e não tentativa de hacking anônimo e assim que eu quero filtrar-out e ataques de portscan proveniente de minha node.That é uma questão complexa que exige algum estudo, por isso, nesse meio tempo eu instalei scanlogd e cheirar porque eu quero avaliar quantos ataques, que tipo de ataques estão saindo do meu nó de saída TOR.
Mais tarde vou tentar arranjar algum tipo de filtragem para ter a certeza de ser capaz de filtrar grandes ataques.
Para o que está relacionado com portscan parece que não existem ferramentas públicas para detectar e filtrar portscan de saída, mas apenas para filtrar portscan de entrada, então provavelmente terá de escrever algo ad-hoc.
Vou me referir como as coisas estão indo e se haverá alguma maneira agradável para implementar de forma lightwave snort inline- a tentativa de ataque seletivamente filtrar-out principal origem da minha saída do nó.

Meu objetivo é manter um nó de saída em execução em longo prazo (pelo menos 1TB de tráfego por mês doados para TOR), reduzindo o esforço relacionado ao ISP reclamar e tentar fazer o meu melhor para executar a saída do nó com uma responsabilidade razoável.

Ação

Hackear TETRA está chegando: OsmocomTETRA

É muito emocionante ver o lançamento do OsmocomTETRA , a SDR primeiro opensource ( Rádio Definido por Software ) implementação de TETRA demodulador, PHY e MAC camadas inferiores.

É a versão do TETRA GSM airprobe que desbloquear o acesso aos dados e quadro de TETRA protocolo de comunicação, dando assim oportunidade de hacking grande!

Agora que a tecnologia TETRA também foi aberto devemos esperar que, durante este 2011, para ver sniffers opensource TETRA e muito provavelmente também encriptação TEA (o algoritmo de criptografia Tetra) rachada!

TETRA é usado pela polícia, Serviços de Emergência e militares, sendo uma rede de comunicação alternativa móvel que possa funciona mesmo sem a disponibilidade de cobertura de rede (apenas móvel-móvel, sem uma estação de base) e fornecer alguns serviços especiais de alta disponibilidade.

Eu escrevi sobre TETRA no meu slide major comentário Voz Protocol Security .

Em listas de discussão OsmocomBB já havia discussão sobre alguns status da rede TETRA:

  • Bélgica Polícia TETRA ASTRID rede: sem criptografia
  • Polícia alemã teste de rede TETRA em Aachen: sem criptografia
  • Alguns ex-jugoslawia TETRA rede: sem criptografia
  • Netherland C200 rede TETRA: TEA2 criptografados com chaves estáticas
  • Reino Unido Airwave rede TETRA: TEA2 criptografada com TEA2

Será muito divertido ver que a polícia nova e salvamento de volta hackers serviço proveniente velhos tempos analógicos para os novos rádios digitais :-)

Ação

Zorg, novo C + + e Java ZRTP lançamento público implementação

Oi tudo, hoje em PrivateWave Italia SpA, empresa italiana envolvidos em desenvolvimento de tecnologias para proteção de privacidade e segurança da informação no sector das telecomunicações de voz, onde eu sou CTO, nós liberamos Zorg, um novo open source ZRTP implementação do protocolo disponível para download a partir http://www. zrtp.org .

ZRTP [1] prevê end-to-end de troca de chaves com Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellmann 384bit e criptografia AES-256 SRTP.

Zorg foi originalmente desenvolvido e implementado em PrivateGSM PrivateWave de produtos de voz de criptografia disponíveis para as seguintes plataformas: Blackberry, Nokia e iOS (iPhone).

Zorg C + + foi integrado com PJSIP open source VoIP SDK [2] e é fornecida como patch de integração contra PJSIP 1.8.5. Ele foi testado no iPhone, Symbian, Windows, Linux e Mac OS X.

Zorg Java foi integrado dentro de uma versão personalizada do MJSIP [3] open source SDK na plataforma Blackberry e inclui otimizações de uso de memória necessários para reduzir ao mínimo a atividade do coletor de lixo.

Ambas as plataformas têm separado criptográfico e modular back-ends para que a implementação de algoritmos de criptografia podem ser facilmente trocados por outros.

. Zorg é licenciado sob a GNU AGPL e código fonte está disponível no github em https://github.com/privatewave/ZORG .

Estamos liberando-o em código aberto e em coerência com a nossa abordagem à segurança [4] como realmente esperamos que ele pode ser útil para o ecossistema de código aberto para criar novos sistemas de criptografia de voz em apoio à liberdade de expressão.

Mais de 20 pjsip baseado em open source software de criptografia de VoIP e vários escritos em Java podem beneficiar directamente de lançamento Zorg.

Ficaremos felizes de receber proposta de cooperação, nova integração, criptografia novo back-ends, aferição e qualquer bug útil para melhorar e deixar ZRTP afirmar como padrão de criptografia de voz.

Zorg está disponível a partir http://www.zrtp.org .

[1] ZRTP: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ZRTP
[2] PJSIP: http://www.pjsip.org
[3] MJSIP: http://www.mjsip.org
[4] abordagem de segurança: http://www.privatewave.com/security/approch.html

Ação

Encrypted móvel para chamadas de telefone fixo com Asterisk 1,8

Acabamos de lançar um howto técnico sobre como construir móvel seguro à infra-estrutura VoIP fixo com:

Na próxima semana outros howto como esse vai sair usando plataformas de servidor, tais como FreeSWITCH, tudo no espírito de transparência e de alavancagem de tecnologias de segurança de código aberto.

Ação

PrivateGSM: Blackberry / iPhone / Nokia criptografia de voz móvel com ZRTP ou SRTP / SDES

Estou absolutamente de evitar usar o meu próprio blog pessoal para fazer promoção de qualquer tipo de produto.

Esse tempo não é diferente, mas eu quero dizer-lhe fatos sobre os produtos que trabalho sem marketing fantasia, mas permanecendo técnica.

Hoje, no PrivateWave onde estou CTO e co-fundador , lançamos publicamente móveis produtos de criptografia de VoIP para BlackBerry, iPhone e Nokia:

  • A primeira vez Blackberry VoIP criptografado com ZRTP - PrivateGSM VoIP Profissional
  • O primeiro já iPhone VoIP criptografado com ZRTP - PrivateGSM VoIP Profissional
  • A primeira vez Blackberry cliente VoIP criptografado com SRTP com SDES troca de chaves sobre SIP / TLS - PrivateGSM VoIP Empresa

logo-privatewave-colore.png

No PrivateWave usamos uma abordagem diferente relativamente a empresa mais criptografia de voz lá fora, leia a nossa abordagem à segurança .

A importância destes produtos no cenário da tecnologia e da indústria podem ser resumidas como segue:

  • É a empresa primeiro criptografia de voz usando apenas os protocolos padrões de segurança (e esperamos que o mercado vai reagir, porque é claro que tecnologia proprietária que vem da herança da CSD não pode fornecer o mesmo valor)
  • É a primeira abordagem em criptografia de voz para usar apenas uma fonte aberta e mecanismo de criptografia padrão
  • É a primeira abordagem de criptografia de voz para fornecer modelo de segurança diferente, utilizando diferentes tecnologias (end-to-end para ZRTP e end-to-site para SRTP )

Aqueles conjunto de clientes móveis de segurança, projetado para a segurança profissional utilizar somente o uso de telecomunicações e melhores tecnologias de segurança, proporcionar um alto grau de proteção, juntamente com o bom desempenho também em más condições de rede:

As aplicações são:

icona-pgsm.png

Os dispositivos suportados são móveis:

Quanto ZRTP decidimos enfatizar e esticar toda a segurança e funcionalidade paranóico do protocolo com alguma adição pouco:

Nossa integração livro estrita endereço, vai além ZRTP RFC especificação, que pode ser vulnerável a determinados ataques quando usado em telefones móveis devido ao comportamento do usuário de não olhar para tela do celular.

Nossa maneira de usar paranoy ZRTP mitigar tais condições, vamos escrever sobre isso mais tarde e / ou irá adicionar detalhes específicos para a inclusão RFC.

Algumas palavras sobre PrivateGSM Professional com end-to-end encryption com ZRTP

Leia ficha técnica lá!

Para baixá-lo clique aqui e basta colocar o seu número de telefone

Esses são os resultados do trabalho duro de todo o pessoal meu muito hábil (16 pessoas trabalharam nesta 6 projetos para 3 plataformas diferentes) em tecnologias desafiadoras (criptografia de voz) em um ambiente operacional difícil (sujos redes móveis e sujos sistemas operacionais móveis) para obter mais de 2 anos.

Estou muito orgulhoso de nossa equipe!

Qual será a próxima?

Na próximas semanas você verá a liberação de grande conjunto de documentações, como a integração com asteriscos, freeswitch e Segurança outro PBX habilitado, juntamente com algumas notícias de outras tecnologias de segurança emocionante que eu tenho certeza que vai ser notado ;)

Tem sido um trabalho árduo e muito mais tem que ser feito, mas estou confiante de que a segurança ea comunidade opensource vai gostar desses produtos e nossa abordagem transparente também com abertas lançamentos importantes e integração de código aberto que fazem muito politicamente neutra tecnologia (backdoor livre) .

Ação

Um par de provedor de VPN agradável

Há muita razão pela qual seria preciso acessar Internet através de uma VPN.

Por exemplo, se você vive em um país bloquear certos conteúdos (como anti-local-governo porn website, etc) e / ou protocolos (como Skype, voip), você provavelmente quer mover sua conectividade com a Internet fora do país desagradável bloqueio usando criptografados túneis VPN.

Avaliei vários hospedado servidor VPN e um par deles soa muito bom entre a oferta generalizada de tais serviços:

SwissVPN

Sair para a internet a partir de Suíça.

Custo 6 CHF / mês

Endereço IP público fixo opcional

Útil se você precisa:

  • Basta passar pelos filtros dos países locais com alta largura de banda boa
  • Expor através de serviços públicos a VPN com o endereço IP opcional pública fixa.

Overplay

Sair para a internet, escolhendo entre os 20 países diferentes (cada vez que você conecta).

Útil se você precisa fazer:

  • inteligência de negócios no concorrente (que parece vir de país X ao conectá-los)
  • ver filme / telefilme permitida somente a partir de espaços nacionais web IP
  • ver os resultados do Google entre os diferentes países

Ação

Nem toda curva elíptica é a mesma: através de ECC segurança

 Minha segurança própria curva ECC e análise seleção

vn9jna1BdgrzDCYNBJHi09q09q.jpg

Mais moderno uso de criptografia criptografia de curva elíptica (ECC) que, com um tamanho de chave menor e reduzir o poder de computação, dar força de segurança equivalente de um sistema de criptografia tradicional conhecida como DH (Diffie-Hellman) ou RSA (Rivest, Shamir e Adleman).

Nem todo mundo sabe que a criptografia ECC é selecionado para todas as aplicações de criptografia futuras e que, mesmo TLS / SSL (criptografia usado para proteger a Internet) está se movendo para ECC.

Eu encontrei muitos dos chamados "produtos de criptografia de propriedade", que abandonaram a RSA e DH vai com alternativas ECC, que tendem a utilização arbitrária tamanho da chave bit ECC, mesmo sem especificar que tipo de criptografia ECC se acostumar.

No entanto, há uma grande confusão em torno de curvas elípticas, com um monte de nomes diferentes e tamanho da chave tornando difícil para um não-criptograficamente usuário experiente para fazer a sua própria figura, ao avaliar algumas coisas de criptografia.

Por causa da confusão tão difundido eu decidi fazer a minha própria análise para descobrir quais são as melhores curvas de criptografia e tamanho de chave ECC ECC direito de usar.

Esta análise gostaria de oferecer uma opção do setor de segurança baseada em curvas entre os vários tipos e tamanhos de chave, deixando as considerações matemáticas e cripto analíticas que já ter sido feito ao longo dos anos, resumindo as várias opções tomadas em vários padrões e protocolos de segurança.

Primeiro a conclusão.

Da minha análise apenas as curvas seguintes ECC devem ser considerados para utilização em sistemas de criptografia, porque é o único selecionado entre diferentes autoridades (ANSI, NSA, SAG, NIST, ECC Brainpool), normas de segurança diferentes protocolos (IPSec, OpenPGP, ZRTP, Kerberos, SSL / TLS) e apenas uma correspondência NSA Suite B requisitos de segurança (padrão de fato também que a OTAN ambiente militar):

  • Elliptic Curve de 256 bits Prime - P-256
  • Elliptic Curve de 384 bits Prime - P-384

com opcional, apenas para realmente paranóico que deseja obter pouco mais o tamanho de chave, ainda não consideradas úteis:

  • Elliptic Curve Prime 521 bit - P-521

Eu gostaria de afirmar que as curvas da Koblitz deve ser evitado, em qualquer tamanho de chave (163/283/409/571), como eles não têm garantia suficiente no crypto atividade analítica e eficaz são:

  • Não faz parte da seleção criptografia NSA Suite-B
  • Não faz parte do ECC seleção Brainpool
  • Não faz parte do ANSI X9.62 seleção
  • Não faz parte de OpenPGP seleção extensão ECC
  • Não faz parte da extensão Kerberos para ECC seleção curva

Convido o leitor a seguir pela minha análise para entender os fundamentos que poderiam ser entendidas mesmo sem conhecimento técnico profundo, mas pelo menos com uma boa base tecnológica um pouco alguns básico de criptografia.

 Aqui vamos nós com a análise
 

Meu objetivo é fazer uma análise sobre o que / como o científico aberto e segurança da comunidade escolhem ECC sistema de criptografia para uso em protocolos de segurança e padrões definidos pelo IETF RFC (os que definem padrões da Internet de uma forma aberta e peer-reviewed).

Abaixo um conjunto de RFC introduzindo ECC no sistema existente que se analisadas para entender o que é melhor usar eo que é melhor para excluir:

  • RFC5639 : ECC Brainpool Padrão Curves & Geração Curve
  • RFC4869 : NSA Suite B Suites criptográficos para IPsec
  • RFC5430 : NSA Suite B perfil para Transport Layer Security (TLS)
  • RFC5008 : NSA Suite B em no Mail Extensions Secure / Multipurpose Internet (S / MIME)
  • RFC3766 : Pontos fortes determinantes para chaves públicas utilizadas para a troca de chaves simétricas
  • RFC5349 : Elliptic Curve Cryptography Suporte (ECC) para criptografia de chave pública para autenticação inicial no Kerberos (PKINIT)
  • RFC4492 : criptografia de curva elíptica (ECC Suites) cifra para Transport Layer Security (TLS)
  • ZRTP criptografia de voz por Philip Zimmermann ECC curva
  • ECC em OpenPGP (projecto d jangada-jivsov-openpgp-ecc-06 )
  • Curvas ECC selecionados pela Microsoft para Smartcard Kerberos de login

Usaremos a escolha feita pelo cientista definir protocolos de segurança da Internet para fazer parte da nossa avaliação.
Além disso, deve ser entendido que a seleção Curve vem de diversas autoridades que fizeram a sua própria seleção de curvas, a fim de contar para a indústria o que usar eo que ignorar:

Usaremos a escolha feita pelo cientista a definição de requisitos de segurança nas agências de normalização para fazer parte da nossa avaliação.
Além disso, algo que a maioria das pessoas não sabe, mas que é extremamente relevante para nossa análise, é que existem diferentes tipos de ECC curva de criptografia e seu "tamanho" é diferente dependendo do tipo de curva:

  • Curvas ECC sobre o campo Prime (muitas vezes referida como curva elíptica e representado por P-tamanho de chave)
  • Curvas ECC sobre o campo binário (muitas vezes referida como Curva Koblitz e representado por K-tamanho de chave)

Dada uma força de segurança equivalência a curva elíptica ea Curva Kobliz têm tamanho de chave diferente, por exemplo, quando lemos ECC 571 estamos nos referindo a Curva Koblitz com uma força equivalente a ECC curva Prime 521.

Uma comparação de força entre Curvas Elípticas e curvas Kotbliz é relatado abaixo (a partir de Mikey ECC internet Projecto ):

 | Koblitz | ECC | DH / DSA / RSA
 | 163 | 192 | 1024
 | 283 | 256 | 3072
 | 409 | 384 | 7680
 | 571 | 521 ​​| 15360

Abaixo há uma comparação de todas as curvas selecionadas por todas as diversas entidades e seu respectivo nome (da IETF RFC4492 para ECC uso de TLS ):

 Nomes curva escolhida por diferentes organizações de normalização
 ------------ + --------------- + -------------
 SECG | ANSI X9.62 | NIST
 ------------ + --------------- + -------------
 sect163k1 | | NIST K-163
 sect163r1 | |
 sect163r2 | | NIST B-163
 sect193r1 | |
 sect193r2 | |
 sect233k1 | | NIST K-233
 sect233r1 | | NIST B-233
 sect239k1 | |
 sect283k1 | | NIST K-283
 sect283r1 | | NIST B-283
 sect409k1 | | NIST K-409
 sect409r1 | | NIST B-409
 sect571k1 | | NIST K-571
 sect571r1 | | NIST B-571
 secp160k1 | |
 secp160r1 | |
 secp160r2 | |
 secp192k1 | |
 secp192r1 | prime192v1 | NIST P-192
 secp224k1 | |
 secp224r1 |​​ | NIST P-224
 secp256k1 | |
 secp256r1 | prime256v1 | NIST P-256
 secp384r1 | | NIST P-384
 secp521r1 | | NIST P-521
 ------------ + --------------- + -------------

O que imediatamente aparece é que existem apenas duas curvas selecionadas por todas as autoridades, e que há um general despejo de curvas Koblitz por ANSI.The apenas de comum acordo entre as 3 autoridades são os seguintes dois curva ECC:

  • secp192r1 / prime192v1 / NIST P-192
  • secp256r1 / prime256v1 / NIST P-256

Daqueles seleção de ECC curva para a TLS RFC5430 ignorado completamente curvas Koblitz e selecionado para o uso apenas:

  • P-256, P-384, P-521

O Brainpool ECC ignorado completamente curvas Koblitz e selecionado para o uso das curvas seguintes ECC:

  • P-160, P-192, P-224, P-256, P-320, P-384, P-512 (que é o particular só porque não é P-521, mas P-512, a única chave de tamanho referida por ECC Brainpool. Tnx Ian Simons de Athena SCS )

O projecto de Internet OpenPGP para o uso do ECC em PGP d jangada-jivsov-openpgp-ecc-06 ignorada completamente curvas Koblitz e selecionou o seguinte ECC curvas

  • P-256, P-384, P-521

A extensão Kerberos protocolo de utilização do ECC, definido no RFC5349 e definida pela Microsoft para logon de cartão inteligente ignorado completamente curvas Koblitz e selecionou os seguintes curvas ECC:

  • P-256, P-384, P-521

Assim, parece claro que a seleção correta da ECC é para P-256, P-384 e P-521, enquanto a curva de Koblitz foram ignorados para o uso secreto e para qualquer protocolo de segurança sensíveis (IPSec, OpenPGP, ZRTP, Kerberos, SSL / TLS).

Por que eu fiz esta análise?

Eu fiz esta análise após uma discussão que tive a respeito de produtos de voz certos de criptografia, todos baseados em protocolos personalizados e proprietários, que estão todos usando Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman 571 bit / ECDH 571/571 bits ECDH / Koblitz 571 bits.
Todos eles estão usando o K-571 que, como descrito anteriormente, foi removido todo o ambiente de segurança sensíveis e protocolos e sendo eu um designer de coisas criptografia de voz eu acho que sua escolha de criptografia não é absolutamente a melhor opção de segurança.
Provavelmente ele foi feito apenas para fins de comercialização, porque K-571 (Koblitz curva) parece mais forte do que P-521 (Curva elíptica com base no número Prime). Se você tem "pouco mais" caras de marketing pode pretender ser "mais seguro". Koblitz curva elíptica são mais rápidos do que o topo da curva secreto habilitado principal elíptica e assim dar o gerente de produto uma chance de fornecer "pouco mais" em seu próprio produto, mantendo o jejum de troca de chaves.

É uma questão de escolha filosófica.

Eu prefiro seguir a tendência da comunidade científica com a humildade de não me considerar um especialista em criptografia, mais conhecimentos do que a segurança geral e própria comunidade científica.

Eu prefiro, em vez de utilizar algoritmos únicos que foram aprovados para uso em ambientes altamente sensíveis (classificação ultra-secreto), que foram selecionados por todas as autoridades e grupos de trabalho analisando algoritmos de criptografia existentes lá fora e que representam a escolha de quase todos os padrões de segurança protocolos (IPSec, OpenPGP, ZRTP, Kerberos, SSL / TLS, etc).
Eu prefiro contar a quantidade de cérebros trabalhando na criptografia eu uso, que a verificação de que é realmente seguro, que avaliar se há alguma fraqueza.

O número de Brais que trabalham em Crypto amplamente difundido são de ordem de magnitude mais do que o número de cérebros de trabalho em cripto utilizados apenas por poucos (como curva de Koblitz).
Então eu não estou demonizando que usam ECDH 571 usando Curve Koblitz, mas com certeza posso afirmar que não tomou a melhor escolha em termos de segurança e que quaisquer profissionais de segurança que fazem um benchmarking de segurança seria considerar o fato de que Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman 571 pouco feito com Curve Koblitz não é amplamente difundido, é despejado de protocolos de segurança padrão e não é certificado para uso secreto.

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ESSOR, Software Defined Radio Europeia Seguro (SDR)

I had a look at European Defense Agency website and found the ESSOR project, a working project funded for 106mln EUR to develop strategic defense communication products based on new Software Defined Radio approach.

SDR approach is a revolutionary system that's completely changing the way scientist and industry is approach any kind of wireless technology.

Basically instead of burning hardware chip that implement most of the radio frequency protocols and techniques, they are pushed in “software” to specialized radio hardware that can work on a lot of different frequency, acting as radio interface for a lot of different radio protocols.

For example the USRP (Universal Software Radio Peripheral) from Ettus Research that cost 1000-2000USD fully loaded, trough the opensource GnuRadio framework, have seen opensource implementation of:

And a lot more protocols and transmission technologies.

That kind of new approach to Radio Transmission System is destinated to change the way radio system are implemented, giving new capability such as to upgrade the “radio protocol itself” in software in order to provide “radio protocol” improvements.

In the short terms we have also seen very strong security research using SDR technologies such as the GSM cracking and the Bluetooth Sniffing .

We can expect that other technologies, weak by design but protected by the restriction to hardware devices to hack the low level protocols, will be soon get hacked. In the first list i would really like to see the hacking of TETRA, a technology born with closed mindset and secret encryption algorithms, something i really dislike ;-)

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Remotamente interceptar snom telefones VoIP

I suggest reading remotely tapping VoIp phones ” on VoIP Security Alliance Blog by Shawn Merdinger .

A concrete example on how current telephony infrastructure are getting more vulnerable to cyber attacks.

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Voz de comunicação de segurança oficina

Oi,

i made a talk about voice communication security technologies at University of Trento following an interesting information exchange with Crypto Lab managed Professor Massimiliano Sala .

I suggest interested people to read it, especially the second part, as there is an innovative categorization of the various voice encryption technologies that get used in several sectors.

I tried to explain and get out from this widely fragmented technological sector by providing a wide overview on technologies that usually are absolutely unrelated one-each-other but practically they all apply to voice encryption following that categorization:

  • Mobile TLC Industry voice encryption standards
  • Government and Military voice encryption standards
  • Public safety voice encryption standards
  • IETF voice encryption standards
  • Misc proprietary voice encryption technologies

It's a huge slideware, 122 slides, i suggest to go reading the 2nd part skipping interception technologies overview already covered by my presentation of 2009.

Voice communication security


View more presentations from Fabio Pietrosanti .

Especially i like the concept of Chocolate grade encryption that want to provide some innovation on the Snake Oil Encryption concept.

But i need to get more in depth about the Chocolate grade encryption context, will probably do before end-of-year by providing an applied course on understanding and evaluating practically the real security context of various voice encryption technologies.

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27C3 – CCC Congress CFP: We come in peace

We come in peace

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We come in peace, said the conquerers of the New World.

We come in peace, says the government, when it comes to colonise, regulate, and militarise the new digital world.

We come in peace, say the nation-state sized companies that have set out to monetise the net and chain the users to their shiny new devices.

We come in peace, we say as hackers, geeks and nerds, when we set out towards the real world and try to change it, because it has intruded into our natural habitat, the cyberspace…

Call for paper for participation to 27C3 CCC congress is open, and i never saw a so exciting payoff :-)

See you on 30 December 2010 in Berlin!

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GSM craqueamento em metodologias de teste de penetração (OSSTMM)?

As most of this blog reader already know, in past years there was a lot of activities related to public research for GSM auditing and cracking.

However when there was huge media coverage to GSM cracking research results, the tools to make the cracking was really early stage and still very inefficient.

Now Frank Stevenson , norwegian cryptanalyst that already broke the Content Scrambling System of DVD video disc, participating to the A51 cracking project started by Karsten Nohl , released Kraken , a new improved version of the A51 cracking system.

It's interesting to notice that WiFi cracking had a similar story, as the first WiFi wep cracking discovery was quite slow in earlier techniques but later Korek, an hacker working on cracking code, improve the attack system drammatically.

That's the story of security research cooperation, you start a research, someone follow it and improve it, some other follow it and improved it and at the end you get the result.

Read more on the Kraken GSM Cracking software release .

And stay tuned as next week at Blackhat Conference Karsten Nohl will explain the details of the required hardware setup and detailed instructions on how to do it :-)

I would really like to see those tools incorporated into Penetration Testing Linux Distribution BackTrack with OSSTMM methodology enforcing the testing of GSM interception and man in the middle :-)

If things proceed that way and Ettus Research (The producer of USRP2 software radio used for low cost GSM signal receiving) will not be taken down, we can still see this.

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Óleo de cobra segurança afirma em crypto produto de segurança

Security market grow, more companies goes to the market, but how many of them are taking seriously what they do?

You know, doing security technology mean that you are personally responsible for the protection of the user's information. You must make them aware of what they need, exactly what your are doing and which kind of threat model your product protect.

A typical problem of product's security features is represented by the inability of the user to evaluate the security claims of the product itself.

So there's a lot companies doing a not-so-ethical marketing of security features, based on the facts that no user will be able to evaluate it.

The previously explained situation reside in the security topic of Snake Oil Encryption , an evolution in the scientific cryptographic environment that let us today use best of breed information protection technologies without having to worry too much about backdoors or insecurities.

Let's speak about Snake Oil Encryption

Snake Oil Cryptography : In cryptography , snake oil is a term used to describe commercial cryptographic methods and products which are considered bogus or fraudulent. Distinguishing secure cryptography from insecure cryptography can be difficult from the viewpoint of a user. Many cryptographers, such as Bruce Schneier and Phil Zimmermann , undertake to educate the public in how secure cryptography is done, as well as highlighting the misleading marketing of some cryptographic products.

The most referenced crypto security guru, Philip Zimmermann and Bruce Schneier, was the 1st to talk about Snake Oil Encryption:

Snake Oil by Philip Zimmermann

Snake Oil by Bruce Schneier

The Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review also made a very good analysis related to the Security Features of Security Products, SNAKE-OIL SECURITY CLAIMS” THE SYSTEMATIC MISREPRESENTATION OF PRODUCT SECURITY . They explain about the nasty marketing tricks used to tweak users inability to evaluate the security features, including economic and legal responsibility implication.

Several snake oil security product companies does not explain and are not clear about the threat model to which the product apply. Very famous is the sentence of Russ Nelson :

“Remember, crypto without a threat model is like cookies without milk. ….. Cryptography without a threat model is like motherhood without apple pie. Can't say that enough times. More generally, security without a threat model is by definition going to fail.”

So, how to spot snake oil security products?

Check a guideline of to spot Snake Oil Encryption Products: Snake Oil Warning Signs, Encryption Software to Avoid by Matt Curtin .

You can see this very good Cryptographic Snake Oil Examples by Emility Ratliff (IBM Architect at Linux Security), that tried to make clear example on how to spot Cryptographic Snake Oil.

Here represented the basic guideline from Matt Curtin paper:


By checking that points it's possible to evaluate how serious an encryption technology or product is.

But all in all how to fix that unethical security approach?

It's very significative and it would be really useful for each kind of security product category to make some strongly and independent evaluation guideline (like OSSTMM for Penetration testing) , to make this security evaluation process really in the hands of the user.

It would be also very nice to have someone making analysis and evaluation of security product companies, publishing reports about Snake Oil signs.

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Web2.0 vazamento de privacidade em aplicativos móveis

You know that web2.0 world it's plenty of leak of any kind (profiling, profiling, profiling) related to Privacy and users starts being concerned about it.

Users continuously download applications without knowing the details of what they do, for example iFart just because are cool, are fun and sometime are useful.

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On mobile phones users install from 1000% up to 10.000% more applications than on a PC, and those apps may contain malware or other unexpected functionalities.

Recently infobyte analyzed ubertwitter client and discovered that the client was leaking and sending to their server many personal and sensitive data such as:

- Blackberry PIN

- Phone Number

- Email Address

- Geographic positioning information

Read about UbertTwitter 'spyware' features discovery here by infoByte .

It's plenty of applications leaking private and sensitive information but just nobody have a look at it.

Should mandatory data retention and privacy policies became part of application development and submission guideline for mobile application?

Imho a users must not only be warned about the application capabilities and API usage but also what will do with which kind of information it's going to handle inside the mobile phone.

Capabilities means authorizing the application to use a certain functionalities, for example to use GeoLocation API, but what the application will do and to who will provide such information once the user have authorized it?

That's a security profiling level that mobile phone manufacturer does not provide and they should, because it focus on the information and not on the application authorization/permission respect to the usage of device capabilities.

ps yes! ok! I agree! This kind of post would require 3-4 pages long discussion as the topic is hot and quite articulated but it's saturday morning and i gotta go!

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Algoritmo AES seleccionado para uso no espaço

I encountered a nice paper regarding analysis and consideration on which encryption algorithm it's best suited for use in the space by space ship and equipments.

The paper has been done by the Consultative Committee for Space Data Systems that's a consortium of all space agency around that cumulatively handled more than 400 mission to space .

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Read the paper Encryption Algorithm Trade Survey as it gives interesting consideration and comparison between different encryption algorithms.

Obviously the finally selected algorithm is AES , while KASUMI (used in UMTS networks) was avoided.

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Blackberry Security and Encryption: Devil or Angel?

Blackberry have good and bad reputation regarding his security capability, depending from which angle you look at it.

This post it's a summarized set of information to let the reader the get picture, without taking much a position as RIM and Blackberry can be considered, depending on the point of view, an extremely secure platform or an extremely dangerous one .

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Let's goes on.

On one side Blackberry it's a platform plenty of encryption features, security features everywhere, device encrypted (with custom crypto), communication encrypted (with custom proprietary protocols such as IPPP), very good Advanced Security Settings, Encryption framework from Certicom ( now owned by RIM ).

On the other side they does not provide only a device but an overlay access network, called BIS ( Blackberry Internet Service ), that's a global worldwide wide area network where your blackberry enter while you browse or checkmail using blackberry.net AP.

When you, or an application, use the blackberry.net APN you are not just connecting to the internet with the carrier internet connection, but you are entering inside the RIM network that will proxy and act as a gateway to reach the internet.

The very same happen when you have a corporate use: Both the BB device and the corporate BES connect to the RIM network that act as a sort of vpn concentration network .

So basically all the communications cross trough RIM service infrastructure in encrypted format with a set proprietary encryption and communication protocols.

Assim como um aviso, acho que o Google forneça gtalk sobre blackberry.net APN, fez um acordo a fim de oferecer um serviço dentro da rede do BB para os usuários do BB. Quando você instala o gtalk que são adicionados 3 cadernos de serviços que apontam para GTALKNA01 que é o nome do GTALK gateway dentro da rede da RIM para permitir intra-BIS comunicação e atuar como um gateway GTALK à internet.

Os operadores móveis normalmente não são sequer autorizados a inspecionar o tráfego entre o dispositivo Blackberry e da Rede Blackberry.

Então, RIM e Blackberry são de alguma forma única para a sua abordagem como eles fornecem uma plataforma, uma rede e um serviço de todos juntos e você não pode simplesmente "tirar o aparelho eo software", mas o usuário eo corporativo são sempre ligado e conectado ao serviço rede.

Isso é bom e isso é ruim, porque significa que a RIM fornece recursos de segurança extremamente boas e capacidades para proteger dispositivo de informação e acesso à informação a nível vário contra terceiros.

But it's always difficult to estimate the threat and risk related to RIM itself and who could make political pressure against RIM.

Please consider that i am not saying “RIM is looking at your data” but making an objective risk analysis: for how the platform is done RIM have authority on the device, on the information on-the-device and on the information that cross the network. (Read my Mobile Security Slides ).

For example let's consider the very same context for Nokia phones.

Once the Nokia device is sold, Nokia does not have authority on the device, nor on the information on-the-device nor on the information that cross the network. But it's also true that Nokia just provide the device and does not provide the value added services such as the Enterprise integration (The RIM VPN tunnel), the BIS access network and all the local and remote security provisioned features that Blackberry provide.

So it's a matter of considering the risk context in the proper way when choosing the platform, with an example very similar to choosing Microsoft Exchange Server (on your own service) or whether getting a SaaS service like Google Apps.

In both case you need to trust the provider, but in first example you need to trust Microsoft that does not put a backdoor on the software while in the 2nd example you need to trust Google, as a platform and service provider, that does not access your information.

So it's a different paradigm to be evaluated depending on your threat model.

If your threat model let you consider RIM as a trusted third party service provider (much like google) than it's ok. If you have a very high risk context, like top-secret one, then let's consider and evaluate carefully whether it's not better to keep the Blackberry services fully isolated from the device or use another system without interaction with manufacturer servers and services.

Now, let's get back to some research and some facts about blackberry and blackberry security itself.

First of all several governments had to deal with RIM in order to force them to provide access to the information that cross their service networks while other decided to directly ban Blackberry usage for high officials because of servers located in UK and USA, while other decided to install their own backdoors.

Há muita discussão quando os temas são RIM Blackberry e Governos, por diversas razões.

Abaixo um conjunto de informações de segurança relacionadas oficial em plataforma RIM BlackBerry:

E aqui um conjunto de Segurança não oficial e informações relacionadas Hacking na plataforma Blackberry RIM:

Because it's 23.32 (GMT+1), i am tired, i think that this post will end up here.

I hope to have provided the reader a set of useful information and consideration to go more in depth in analyzing and considering the overall blackberry security (in the good and in the bad, it always depends on your threat model!).

Saúde

Fabio Pietrosanti (naif)

ps i am managing security technology development (voice encryption tech) on Blackberry platform, and i can tell you that from the development point of view it's absolutely better than Nokia in terms of compatibility and speed of development, but use only RIMOS 5.0+ !

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Botnet for RSA cracking?

I read an interesting article about putting 1.000.000 computers, given the chance for a serious botnet owner to get it, to crack RSA.

The result is that in such context attacking an RSA 1024bit key would take only 28 years, compared to theoretical 19 billion of years.

Reading of this article , is extremely interesting because it gives our very important consideration on the cryptography strength respect to the computation power required to carry on cracking attempt, along with industry approach to “default security level”.

I would say a must read .

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Patent rights and opensource: can they co-exist?

How many of you had to deal with patented technologies?

How many of the patented technologies you dealed with was also “secrets” in their implementation?

Well, there's a set of technologies whose implementation is open source ( copyright) but that are patented ( intellectual property right) .

A very nice paper about the topic opensource & patents that i suggest to read is from Fenwick & West and can be downloaded here (pdf) .

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China Encryption Regulations

Hi all,

i found this very interesting paper on China Encryption Import/Export/Domestic Regulations done by Baker&Mckenzie in the US.

It's strongly business and regulatory oriented giving a very well done view on how china regulations works and how it may behave in future.

Read here Decrypting China Encryption's Regulations (form Bakernet website) .

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The (old) Crypto AG case and some thinking about it

In the '90, closed source and proprietary cryptography was ruling the world.

That's before open source and scientifically approved encrypted technologies went out as a best practice to do crypto stuff.

I would like to remind when, in 1992, USA along with Israel was, together with switzerland, providing backdoored (proprietary and secret) technologies to Iranian government to tap their communications, cheating them to think that the used solution was secure , making also some consideration on this today in 2010.

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That's called The Crypto AG case , an historical fact involving the United States National Security Agency along with Signal Intelligence Division of Israel Ministry of Defense that are strongly suspected to had made an agreement with the Swiss cryptography producer company Crypto AG .

Basically those entities placed a backdoor in the secure crypto equipment that they provided to Iran to intercept Iranian communications.

Their crypto was based on secret and proprietary encryption algorithms developed by Crypto AG and eventually customized for Iranian government.

You can read some other facts about Crypto AG backdoor related issues:

The demise of global telecommunication security

The NSA-Crypto AG sting

Breaking codes: an impossible task? By BBC

Der Spiegel Crypto AG (german) article

Now, in 2010, we all know and understand that secret and proprietary crypto does not work.

Just some reference by top worldwide cryptographic experts below:

Secrecy, Security, Obscurity by Bruce Schneier

Just say No to Proprietary cryptographic Algorithms by Network Computing (Mike Fratto)

Security Through Obscurity by Ceria Purdue University

Unlocking the Secrets of Crypto: Cryptography, Encryption and Cryptology explained by Symantec

Time change the way things are approached.

I like very much the famous Philip Zimmermann assertion:

“Cryptography used to be an obscure science, of little relevance to everyday life. Historically, it always had a special role in military and diplomatic communications. But in the Information Age, cryptography is about political power, and in particular, about the power relationship between a government and its people. It is about the right to privacy, freedom of speech, freedom of political association, freedom of the press, freedom from unreasonable search and seizure, freedom to be left alone.”

Any scientist today accept and approve the Kerckhoffs' Principle that in 1883 in the Cryptographie Militaire paper stated:

The security of a cryptosystem should not depend on keeping the algorithm secret, but only on keeping the numeric key secret.

It's absolutely clear that the best practice for doing cryptography today obbly any serious person to do open cryptography, subject to public review and that follow the Kerckhoff principle.

So, what we should think about closed source, proprietary cryptography that's based on security trough obscurity concepts?

I was EXTREMELY astonished when TODAY, in 2010, in the age of information society i read some paper on Crypto AG website.

I invite all to read the Crypto AG security paper called Sophisticated Security Architecture designed by Crypto AG of which you can get a significant excerpt below:

The design of this architecture allows Crypto AG to provide a secret proprietary algorithm that can be specified for each customer to assure the perfect degree of cryptographic security and optimum support for the customer's security policy. In turn, the Security Architecture gives you the influence you need to be fully independent in respect of your encryption solution. You can determine all areas that are covered by cryptography and verify how the algorithm works. The original secret proprietary algorithm of Crypto AG is the foundation of the Security Architecture .

I have to say that their architecture is absolutely good from TLC point of view. Also they have done a very good job in making the design of the overall architecture in order to make a tamper-proof resistant crypto system by using dedicated crypto processor .
However there is still something missing:

T he overall cryptographic concept is misleading, based on wrong encryption concepts .

You may think that i am a troll telling this, but given the history of Crypto AG and given the fact that all the scientific and security community does not approve security trough obscurity concepts , it would legitimate to ask ourself:

Why they are still doing security trough obscurity cryptography with secret and proprietary algorithms ?



Hey, i think that they have very depth knowledge on telecommunication and security, but given that the science tell us not to follow the secrecy of algorithms, i really have serious doubt on why they are still providing proprietary encryption and does not move to standard solutions (eventually with some kind of custom enhancement).

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Mobile Security talk at WHYMCA conference

I want to share some slides i used to talk about mobile security at whymca mobile conference in Milan.

Read here my slides on mobile security .

The slides provide a wide an in-depth overview of mobile security related matters, i should be doing some slidecast about it putting also audio. Maybe will do, maybe not, it depends on time that's always a insufficient resource.

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iPhone PIN: useless encryption

I recently switched one of my multiple mobile phones with which i go around to iPhone.

I am particularly concerned about data protection in case of theft and so started having a look around about the iPhone provided protection system.

There is an interesting set of iPhone Business Security Features that make me think that iPhone is moving in the right path for security protection of the phone, but still a lot of things has to be done, especially for serious Enterprise and Government users.

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For example it turned out that the iPhone PIN protection is useless and it can be broken just plugging the iPhone to a Linux machine and accessing the device like a USB stick.

That's something disturbing my paranoid mindset that make me think not to use sensitive data on my iPhone if i cannot protect my data.

Probably an iPhone independent disk encryption product would be very useful in order to let the market create protection schemas that fit the different risk contexts that different users may have.

Probably a general consumer is not worried about this PIN vulnerability but for me, working within highly confidential envirnonment such as intelligence, finance and military, it's something that i cannot accept.

I need strong disk encryption on my mobile phone.

I do strong voice encryption for it , but it would be really nice to have also something to protect the whole iPhone data and not just phone calls.

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Exploit code against SecurStar DriveCrypt published

It seems that the hacking community somehow like to target securstar products, maybe because hacking community doesn't like the often revealed unethical approach already previously described in this blog by articles and user's comments.

In 2004 a lot of accusation against Hafner of SecurStar went out because of alleged intellectual property theft regarding opensource codes such as Encryption 4 the masses and legal advert also against the Free and opensource TrueCrypt project .

In 2008 there was a pre-boot authentication hacking against DriveCrypt Plus posted on Full-Disclosure.

Early 2010 it was the time of the fake infosecurity research secretly sponsored by securstar at http://infosecurityguard.com (that now they tried to remove from the web because of embarrassing situation, but backup of the story are available, hacking community still wait for apologies) .

Now, mid 2010, following a research published in December 2009 about Disk Encryption software vulnerabilities made by Neil Kettle (mu-b), Security researcher at digit-labs and Penetration tester at Convergent Network Solutions , DriveCrypt was found to be vulnerable and exploitable breaking on-device security of the system and exploit code has been just released.

Exploit code reported below (thanks Neil for the code release!):

  • Arbitrary kernel code execution security exploit of DriveCrypt: drivecrypt-dcr.c
  • Arbitrary file reading/writing security exploit via unchecked user-definable parameters to ZxCreateFile/ReadFile/ WriteFile: drivecrypt-fopen.c

The exploit code has been tested against DriveCrypt 5.3, currently released DriveCrypt 5.4 is reported to be vulnerable too as it has just minor changes related to win7 compatibility. Can anyone make a double check and report a comment here?

Very good job Neil!

In the meantime the Free Truecrypt is probably the preferred choice for disk encryption, given the fact that it's difficult to trust DriveCrypt, PGP has been acquired by Symantec and there are very bad rumors about the trust that people have in Symantec and there are not many widely available alternatives.

Rumors say that also PhoneCrypt binaries are getting analyzed and the proprietary encryption system could reveal something fun…

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Quantum cryptography broken

Quantum cryptography it's something very challenging, encryption methods that leverage the law of phisycs to secure communications over fiber lines.

To oversimplify the system is based on the fact that if someone cut the fiber, put a tap in the middle, and joint together the other side of the fiber, the amount of “errors” that will be on the communications path will be higher than 20% .

So if QBER (Quantum Bit Error Rate) goes above 20% then it's assumed that the system is intercepted.

Researcher at university of toronto was able to cheat the system with a staying below the 20%, at 19.7% , thus tweaking the threshold used by the system to consider the communication channel secure vs compromised.

The product found vulnerable is called Cerberis Layer2 and produced by the Swiss ID Quantique .

Some possibile approach to detect the attack has been provided but probably, imho, such kind of systems does not have to be considered 100% reliable until the technology will be mature enough.

Traditional encryption has to be used together till several years, eventually bundled with quantum encryption whether applicable.

When we will see a quantum encryption systems on an RFC like we have seen for ZRTP , PGP and SSL ?

-naif

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great point of view

Because security of a cryptographic system it's not a matter of “how many bits do i use” but using the right approach to do the right thing to mitigate the defined security risk in the most balanced way.

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Encryption is not scrambling: be aware of scrambler!

Most of us know about voice scrambler that can be used across almost any kind of voice based communication technology.

Extremely flexible approach: works everything

Extreme performance: very low latency

but unfortunately…

Extremely weak: Scrambling cannot be considered secure.

Only encryption can be considered secure under the Kerckoff's principle .

So please don't even consider any kind of analog scrambler if you need real security.

Read deeply the paper Implementation of a real-time voice encryption system ” by Markus Brandau, especially the cryptoanalysis paragraph.

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SecurStar GmbH Phonecrypt answers on the Infosecurityguard/Notrax case: absolutely unreasonable! :-)

UPDATE 20.04.2010: http://infosecurityguard.com has been disabled. Notrax identity became known to several guys in the voice security environments (cannot tell, but you can imagine, i was right!) and so our friends decided to trow away the website because of legal responsibility under UK and USA laws.

UPDATE: Nice summary of the whole story (i know, it's long and complicated to read at 1st time) on SIPVicious VoIP security blog by Sandro Gauci .

Following my discoveries, Mr. Hafner, SecurStar chief exec, tried to ultimately defend their actions, citing absolutely unreasonable excuses to The Reg instead of publicly apologizing for what they have done: creating a fake independent security research to promote their PhoneCrypt product .

He tried to convince us that the person behind IP 217.7.213.59, used by the author of infosecurityguard.com and pointing to their office DSL line, was this hacker Notrax, using their anonymous surfing service and not one of their employees at their office:

“SecurStar chief exec Wilfried Hafner denied any contact with Notrax. Notrax, he said, must have been using his firm's anonymous browsing service, SurfSolo, to produce the results reported by Pietrosanti”

Let's reflect a moment on this sentence… Would really an hacker looking for anonymity spend 64 EUR to buy their anonymity surfing service called surfsolo instead of using the free and much more secure TOR (the onion router) ?Then let's reflect on this other piece of information:

  • The IP 217.7.213.59 is SecurStar GmbH's office DSL line
  • On 217.7.213.59 they have installed their VoIP/Asterisk PBX and internet gateway
  • They promote their anonymous proxy service for “Anonymous p2p use” ( http://www.securstar.com/products_ssolo.php ). Who would let users do p2p from the office dsl line where they have installed their corporate VoIP PBX ? If you do VoIP you can't let third party flood your line w/ p2p traffic, your phone calls would became obviously unreliable (yes, yes, you can do QoS, but you would not place an anonymous navigation proxy on your company office DSL line…).
  • Which company providing an anonymous navigation service would ever use their own office IP address? Just think how many times you would have the police knocking at your door and your employees as the prime suspects. (In past i used to run a TOR node, i know the risks…). Also think how many times you would find yourself blacklisted on google as a spyware bot.
  • Mr. Hafner also says “We have two million people using this product. Or he may have been an old customer of ours”. 2M users on a DSL line, really?
  • I don't use Surfsolo service, however their proxies are probably these ones:

surfsolo.securstar.net – 67.225.141.74

surfsolo.securstar.com – 69.16.211.133

Frankly speaking I can easily understand that Mr. Hafner is going do whatever he can to protect his company from the scandal, but the “anonymous proxy” excuse is at the very least suspicious.

How does the fact that the “independent research” was semantically a product review of PhoneCrypt, along with the discovery that the author come from the SecurStar GmbH IP address offices, along with the anonymity of this Notrax guy (SecurStar calls him a “well known it security professional” in their press release..) sound to you?

It's possible that earth will get an attack from outer space that's going to destroy our life?

Statistically extremely difficult, but yes, possible. More or less like the “anonymous proxy” story told by Mr. Hafner to cover the fact that they are the ones behind the infosecurityguard.com fake “independent security review”.

Hey, I don't need anything else to convince myself or to let the smart person have his own thoughts on this.

I just think that the best way for SecurStar to get out of this mess would probably be to provide public excuses to the hacking community for abusing the name and reputation of real independent security researches, for the sake of a marketing stunt.

Atenciosamente,

Fabio Pietrosanti

ps I am currently waiting for some other infos that will more precisely confirm that what Mr. Hafner is saying is not properly true. Fique atento.

Ação

Evidence that infosecurityguard.com/notrax is SecurStar GmbH Phonecrypt – A fake independent research on voice crypto

Below evidence that the security review made by an anonymous hacker on http://infosecurityguard.com is in facts a dishonest marketing plan by the SecurStar GmbH to promote their voice crypto product.

I already wrote about that voice crypto analysis that appeared to me very suspicious.

Now it's confirmed, it's a fake independent hacker security research by SecurStar GmbH, its just a marketing trick!

How do we know that Infosecurityguard.com, the fake independent security research, is a marketing trick from SecurStar GmbH?

1) I posted on http://infosecurityguard.com a comments to a post with a link to my blog to that article on israelian ministry of defense certification

2) The author of http://infosecurityguard.com went to approve the comment and read the link on my own blog http://infosecurity.ch

3) Reaching my blog he leaked the IP address from which he was coming 217.7.213.59 (where i just clicked on from wordpress statistic interface)

4) On http:// 217.7.213.59/panel there is the IP PBX interface of the SecurStar GmbH corporate PBX (openly reachable trough the internet!)

5) The names of the internal PBX confirm 100% that it's the SecurStar GmbH:

6) There is 100% evidence that the anonymous hacker of http://infosecurityguard.com is from SecurStar GmbH

Below the data and reference that let us discover that it's all but a dishonest marketing tips and not an independent security research.

Kudos to Matteo Flora for it's support and for his article in Debunking Infosecurityguard identity !

The http referral tricks

When you read a link going from a website to another one there is an HTTP protocol header, the “Referral”, that tell you from which page someone is going to another webpage.

The referral demonstrated that the authors of http://infosecurityguard.com read my post, because it was coming from http://infosecurityguard.com/wp-admin/edit-comments.php that's the webpage you use as a wordpress author/editor to approve/refuse comments. And here there was the link.

That's the log entry:

217.7.213.59 – - [30/Jan/2010:02:56:37 -0700] “GET /20100129/licensed-by-israel-ministry-of-defense-how-things-really-works/ HTTP/1.0″ 200 5795 “ http://infosecurityguard.com/wp-admin/edit-comments.php ” “Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.1; Trident/4.0; GTB6.3; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; InfoPath.2)”

The PBX open on the internet tell us that's SecurStar GmbH

The SecurStar GmbH PBX is open on the internet, it contains all the names of their employee and confirm us that the author of http:/infosecurityguard.com is that company and is the anonymous hacker called Notrax.

Here there is their forum post where the SecurStar GmbH guys are debugging IPCOPfirewall & Asterisk together (so we see also details of what they use) where there is the ip 217.7.213.59 .

SecurStarproof.png

That's also really fun!

They sell secure telephony but their company telephony system is openly vulnerable on the internet . :-)

I was thinking to call the CEO, Hafner, via SIP on his internal desktop PBX to announce we discovered him tricks.. :->

They measured their marketing activity

Looking at the logs of my website i found that they was sensing the google distribution of information for the following keywords, in order to understand how effectively they was able to attack competing products. It's reasonable, if you invest money in a marketing campaign you want to see the results :-)

They reached my blog and i logged their search:

infosecurityguard+cryptophone

infosecurityguard+gold-lock

217.7.213.59 – - [30/Jan/2010:02:22:42 -0700] “GET / HTTP/1.0″ 200 31057 “Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.1; Trident/4.0; GTB6.3; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; InfoPath.2)”

217.7.213.59 – - [30/Jan/2010:04:15:07 -0700] “GET HTTP/1.0″ 200 15774 “Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.1; Trident/4.0; GTB6.3; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; InfoPath.2)”


The domain registration data

The domain have been registered on 1st December 2009, just two months to start preparing the dishonest marketing campaign:

Domain Name: INFOSECURITYGUARD.COM

Registrar: GODADDY.COM, INC.

Updated Date: 01-dec-2009

Creation Date: 01-dec-2009

The domain is anonymously privacy protected trough a whois privacy service:

Administrative Contact: Private, Registration INFOSECURITYGUARD.COM@domainsbyproxy.com , Domains by Proxy, Inc. DomainsByProxy.com

Notrax hacker does not exist on google
As you know any hacker that get public usually have presence of it's activity on google, attending mailinglists, forum, homepage, past research, participation to conferences, etc, etc.
The fake hacker that they wanted us to to think was writing an independent blog does NOT have any trace on google. Only some hit about an anonymous browser called Notrax but nothing about that hacker.
Maybe when SecurStar provided the anonymity tool to their marketing agency, to help them protecting anonymity for the fake research, their provided them the anonymous browser notrax.So the marketing guy thinking about the nickname of this fake hackers used what? Notrax! :-)

The “independent review”completely oriented in publicizing PhoneCrypt

Of the various review don the phonecrypt review is only positive and amazing good feedback, while the other are only bad feedback and no single good point.

As you can imagine, in any kind of independent product evaluation, for all products there are goods and bad points. No. In this one there are only product that are good and product that are bad.

They missed to consider the security of the technology used by the products

They completely avoided to speak about cryptography and security of the products.

They do not evaluated basic security features that must be in that kind of products.That's in order not to let anyone see that they did not followed basic security rules in building up their PhoneCrypt.
The technology is closed source, no transparency on algorithms and protocols, no peer review.Read my new comparison (from the basic cryptographic requirement point of view) About the voice encryption analysis (criteria, errors and different results) .
The results are somehow different than their one .

UPDATE: Who's Wilfried Hafner (SecurStar founder) ?

I got a notice from a reader regarding Wilfred Hafner, SecurStar founder, CEO and security expert.

He was arrested in 1997 for telephony related fraud (check 2nd article on Phrack) earning from telephony fraud 254.000 USD causing damages to local telcos trough blueboxing for 1.15 Million USD.

He was not doing “Blueboxing” for the pleasure of phreaking and connecting with other hackers, but to earn money.

Hacking for profit (and not for fun) in 1997… brrr…. No hacker's ethic at all!

All in all, is that lawful?

Badmouthing a competitor amounts to an unfair competition practice in most jurisdictions, so it is arguable (to say the least) that SecurStar is right on a legally sound ground here.
Moreover, there are some specific statutes in certain jurisdictions which provide for a straightforward ban on the practice we are talking about. For example in the UK the British Institute of Practitioners in Advertising - in compliance with the Consumer protection from Unfair Trading regulation – ruled that:

”falsely claiming or creating the impression that the trader is not acting for the purposes relating to his trade, business, craft or profession, or falsely representing oneself as a consumer” is a criminal offense .

We have no doubt that PRPR (which is the UK-based *PR company for SecurStar GmbH, led by Peter Rennison and Allie Andrews as stated in SecurStar Press Release ) did provide their client with this information. Heck, they *are* in the UK, they simply cannot ignore that!

IANAL, but I would not be surpised if someone filed a criminal complaint or start civil litigation for unfair competition against SecurStar GmbH.
Whether this is going to be a matter for criminal and/or civil Courts or not is not that important. However, it is clear enough that SecurStar GmbH appears to be at least ethically questionable and not really worth of trust.

Nice try, gentlemen… however, next time just do it right (whether “right” for them means “in a honest manner” or “in a fashion not to be caught” I will let them choose)”

Fabio Pietrosanti (naif)

Ação

Dishonest security: The SecurStart GmbH Phonecrypt case

I would like to provide considerations on the concept of ethics that a security company should have respect to the users, the media and the security environment.

SecurStar GmbH made very bad things making that infosecuriguard.com fake independent research.

It's unfair approach respect to hacking community.

It's unfair marketing to end user. They should not be tricking by creating fake independent review.

It's unfair competition in the security market.

Let's make some more important consideration on this.

Must be serious on cryptographic products. They are not toys

When you do cryptographic tools you should be really aware of what you are doing, you must be really serious.

If you do bad crypto people could die.

If you don't follow basic security rules for transparency and security for cryptography you are putting people life at risk.

You are taking the responsibility of this. (I want to sleep at night, don't think SecurStar CEO/CTO care about this…)

Security research need reference and transparency

Security research have to be public, well done, always subject to public discussion and cooperation.
Security research should not be instrumentally used for marketing purpose.Security research should be done for awareness and grow of the knowledge of the worldwide security environment.

Hacking environment is neutral, should not be used instrumentally

Hackers are considered neutral, nerds, doing what they do for their pleasure and passion.

If you work in the security market you work with hackers.

If you use hackers and hacking environment for your own marketing purposes you are making something very nasty.

Hackers give you the technology and knowledge and you use them for your own commercial purpose.

Consideration on the authority of the information online

That's something that pose serious consideration on the authority of information online.An anonymous hacker, with no reference online, made a product security review that appear like an independent one. I have to say that the fake review was very well prepared, it always posed good/bad things in an indirect way. It did not appeared to me at 1st time like a fake. But going deeply i found what's going on.

However Journalists, news media and blogger went to the TRAP and reviewed their fake research. TheRegister, NetworkWorld and a lot of blogs reported it. Even if the author was completely anonymous.

What they have done is already illegal in UK

SecurStar GmbH is lucky that they are not in the UK, where doing this kind of things is illegal .

Fabio Pietrosanti (naif)

Ação

About the SecurStar GmbH Phonecrypt voice encryption analysis (criteria, errors and different results)

This article want to clarify and better explain the finding at infosecurityguard.com regaring voice encryption product evaluation.
This article want to tell you a different point of view other than infosecurityguard.com and explaining which are the rational with extensive explaination from security point of view.
Today i read news saying: “PhoneCrypt: Basic Vulnerability Found in 12 out of 15 Voice Encryption Products and went to read the website infosecurityguard .

Initially it appeared to my like a great research activity but then i started reading deeply the read about it.I found that it's not properly a security research but there is are concrete elements that's a marketing campaign well done in order to attract public media and publicize a product.
Imho they was able to cheat journalists and users because the marketing campaign was absolutely well done not to be discovered on 1st read attempt. I personally considered it like a valid one on 1st ready (they cheated me initially!).

But if you go deeply… you will understand that:
- it's a camouflage marketing initiative arranged by SecurStar GmbH and not a independent security research
- they consider a only security context where local device has been compromised (no software can be secured in that case, like saying SSL can be compromised if you have a trojan!)
- they do not consider any basic security and cryptographic security criteria

However a lot of important website reported it:

This article is quite long, if you read it you will understand better what's going on around infosecurityguard.com research and research result.

I want to to tell you why and how (imho) they are wrong.

The research missed to consider Security, Cryptography and Transparency!

Well, all this research sound much like being focused on the marketing goal to say that their PhoneCrypt product is the “super” product best of all the other ones.
Any security expert that would have as duty the “software evaluation” in order to protect the confidentiality of phone calls will evaluate other different characteristics of the product and the technology.

Yes, it's true that most of the product described by SecurStar in their anonymous marketing website called http://infosecurityguard.com have some weakness.
But the relevant weakness are others and PhoneCrypt unfortunately, like most of the described products suffer from this.
Let's review which characteristics are needed basic cryptography and security requirement (the best practice, the foundation and the basics!)

a – Security Trough Obscurity does not work

A basic rule in cryptography cames from 1883 by Auguste Kerckhoffs:

In a well-designed cryptographic system, only the key needs to be secret; there should be no secrecy in the algorithm.
Modern cryptographers have embraced this principle, calling anything else “security by obscurity.”
Read what Bruce Schneir, recognized expert and cryptographer in the world say about this
Any security expert will tell you that's true. Even a novice university student will tell you that's true. Simply because that's the only way to do cryptography.
Almost all product described in the review by SecurStar GmbH, include PhoneCrypt, does not provide precise details about their cryptographic technologies.
Precise details are:
  • Detailed specification of cryptographic algorithm (that's not just saying “we use AES “)
  • Detailed specification of cryptographic protocol (that's not just saying “we use Diffie Hellman ” )
  • Detailed specification of measuring the cryptographic strenght (that's not just saying “we have 10000000 bit key size “)

Providing precise details means having extensive documentation with theoretical and practical implications documenting ANY single way of how the algorithm works, how the protocol works with precise specification to replicate it for interoperability testing.
It means that scientific community should be able to play with the technology, audit it, hack it.
If we don't know anything about the cryptographic system in details, how can we know which are the weakness and strength points?

Mike Fratto, Site editor of Network Computing, made a great article on “Saying NO to proprietary cryptographic systems” .
Cerias Purdue University tell this .

b – NON peer reviewed and NON scientifically approved Cryptography does not work

In any case and in any condition you do cryptography you need to be sure that someone else will check, review, analyze, distruct and reconstract from scratch your technology and provide those information free to the public for open discussion.
That's exactly how AES was born and like US National Institute of Standard make crypto does (with public contest with public peer review where only the best evaluated win).
A public discussion with a public contest where the a lot of review by most famous and expert cryptographer in the world, hackers (with their name,surname and face, not like Notrax) provide their contribution, tell what they thinks.
That's called “peer review”.

If a cryptographic technology has an extended and important peer review, distributed in the world coming from universities, private security companies, military institutions, hackers and all coming from different part of the world (from USA to Europe to Russia to South America to Middle east to China) and all of them agree that a specific technology it's secure…
Well, in that case we can consider the technology secure because a lot of entities with good reputation and authority coming from a lot of different place in the world have publicly reviewed, analyzed and confirmed that a technology it's secure.

How a private company can even think to invent on it's own a secure communication protocol when it's scientifically stated that it's not possible to do it in a “proprietary and closed way” ?
IBM tell you that peer review it's required for cryptography .
Bruce Schneier tell you that “Good cryptographers know that nothing substitutes for extensive peer review and years of analysis.”
Philip Zimmermann will tell you to beware of Snake Oil where the story is: “Every software engineer fancies himself a cryptographer, which has led to the proliferation of really bad crypto software.”

c – Closed source cryptography does not work

As you know any kind of “serious” and with “good reputation” cryptographic technology is implemented in opensource.
There are usually multiple implementation of the same cryptographic algorithm and cryptographic protocol to be able to review all the way it works and certify the interoperability.
Supposing to use a standard with precise and extended details on “how it works”, that has been “peer reviewed” by the scientific community BUT that has been re-implemented from scratch by a not so smart programmer and the implementation it's plenty of bugs.

Well, if the implementation is “opensource” this means that it can be reviewed, improved, tested, audited and the end user will certaintly have in it's own had a piece of technology “that works safely” .

Google release opensource crypto toolkit
Mozilla release opensource crypto toolkit
Bruce Schneier tell you that Cryptography must be opensource .

Another cryptographic point of view

I don't want to convince anyone but just provide facts related to science, related to cryptography and security in order to reduce the effect of misinformation done by security companies whose only goes is to sell you something and not to do something that make the world a better.

When you do secure products, if they are not done following the proper approach people could die.
It's absolutely something irresponsible not to use best practice to do crypto stuff.

To summarize let's review the infosecurityguard.com review from a security best pratice point of view.

Product name Security Trough Obscurity Public peer review Open Source Compromise locally?
Caspertec Obscurity No public review Closed Sim
CellCrypt Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Sim
Cryptophone Transparency Limited public review Public Sim
Gold-Lock Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Sim
Illix Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Sim
No1.BC Obscurity No public review
Closed
Sim
PhoneCrypt Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Sim
Rode&Swarz Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Sim
Voz-Secure Obscuridade
No public review
Closed
Sim
SecuSmart Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Sim
SecVoice Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Sim
SegureGSM Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Sim
SnapCell Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Sim
Tripleton Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Sim
Zfone Transparency Public review
Open Sim
ZRTP Transparency Public review
Open Sim

*Green means that it match basic requirement for a cryptographic secure system

* Red / Broken means that it does not match basic requirement for a cryptographic secure system
That's my analysis using a evaluation method based on cryptographic and security parameters not including the local compromise context that i consider useless.

However, to be clear, those are only basic parameters to be used when considering a voice encryption product (just to avoid being in a situation that appears like i am promoting other products). So it may absolutely possible that a product with good crypto ( transparency, peer reviewed and opensource) is absolutely a not secure product because of whatever reason (badly written, not usable causing user not to use it and use cleartext calls, politically compromised, etc, etc).
I think i will prepare a broader criteria for voice crypto technologies and voice crypto products, so it would be much easier and much practical to have a full transparent set of criterias to evaluate it.

But those are really the basis of security to be matched for a good voice encryption system!
Read some useful past slides on security protocols used in voice encryption systems (2nd part).

Now read below some more practical doubt about their research.

The security concept of the review is misleading: any hacked device can be always intercepted!

I think that the guys completely missed the point: ANY KIND OF SOFTWARE RUNNING ON A COMPROMISED OPERATING SYSTEM CAN BE INTERCEPTED

Now they are pointing out that also Zfone from Philip Zimmermann is broken (a pc software), just because they install a trojan on a PC like in a mobile phone?
Any security software rely on the fact that the underlying operating system is somehow trusted and preserve the integrity of the environment where the software run.

  • If you have a disk encryption system but your PC if infected by a trojan, the computer is already compromised.
  • If you have a voice encryption system but your PC is infected by a trojan, the computer is already compromised.
  • If you have a voice encryption system but your mobile phone is infected by a trojan, the mobile phone is already compromised.

No matter which software you are running, in such case the security of your operating environment is compromised and in one way or another way all the information integrity and confidentiality is compromised.

Like i explained above how to intercept PhoneCrypt.

The only things that can protect you from this threat is running in a closed operating system with Trust Computing capability, implementing it properly.
For sure on any “Open” operating system such us Windows, Windows Mobile, Linux, iPhone or Android there's no chance to really protect a software.
On difficult operating system such as Symbian OS or RimOS maybe the running software can be protected (at least partially)

That's the reason for which the security concept that guys are leveraging to carry on their marketing campaign has no clue.
It's just because they control the environment, they know Flexispy software and so they adjusted their software not to be interceptable when Flexispy is installed.
If you develop a trojan with the other techniques i described above you will 100% intercept PhoneCrypt.

On that subject also Dustin Tamme l, Security researcher of BreakPoint Systems , pointed on on VoIP Security Alliance mailing lists that the security analysis is based on wrong concepts .

The PhoneCrypt can be intercepted: it's just that they don't wanted to tell you!

PhoneCrypt can be intercepted with “on device spyware”.
Why?
Because Windows Mobile is an unsecure operating environment and PhoneCrypt runs on Windows Mobile.
Windows Mobile does not use Trusted Computing and so any software can do anything.
The platform choice for a secure telephony system is important.
Como?
I quickly discussed with some knowledgeable windows mobile hackers about 2 different way to intercept PhoneCrypt with an on-device spyware (given the unsecure Windows Mobile Platform).

a) Inject a malicious DLL into the software and intercept from within the Phonecrypt itself.
In Windows Mobile any software can be subject to DLL code injection.
What an attacker can do is to inject into the PhoneCrypt software (or any software running on the phone), hooking the Audio related functions acting as a “function proxy” between the PhoneCrypt and the real API to record/play audio.
It's a matter of “hooking” only 2 functions, the one that record and the one that play audio.
Read the official Microsoft documentation on how to do DLL injection on Windows Mobile processes. or forum discussing the technique of injecting DLL on windows mobile processes.
That's simple, any programmer will tell you to do so.
They simply decided that's better not to make any notice about this.
b) Create a new audio driver that simply act as a proxy to the real one and intercept PhoneCrypt
In Windows Mobile you can create new Audio Drivers and new Audio Filters.
What an attacker can do is to load a new audio driver that does not do anything else than passing the real audio driver function TO/FROM the realone. In the meantime intercept everything recorded and everything played :-)
Here there is an example on how to do Audio driver for Windows Mobile .
Here a software that implement what i explain here for Windows “Virtual Audio Cable” .
The very same concept apply to Windows Mobile. Check the book “Mobile Malware Attack and Defense” at that link explaining techniques to play with those techniques.
They simply decided that's better not to make any notice to that way of intercepting phone call on PhoneCrypt .
Those are just 2 quick ideas, more can be probably done.

Sounds much like a marketing activity – Not a security research.

I have to tell you. I analyzed the issue very carefully and on most aspects. All this things about the voice encryption analisys sounds to me like a marketing campaign of SecurStar GmbH to sell PhoneCrypt and gain reputation. A well articulated and well prepared campaign to attract the media saying, in an indirect way cheating the media, that PhoneCrypt is the only one secure. You see the press releases of SecurStar and of the “Security researcher Notrax telling that PhoneCrypt is the only secure product” . SecurStar PhoneCrypt is the only product the anonymous hacker “Notrax” consider secure of the “software solutions”.
The only “software version” in competition with:

SnapCell – No one can buy it. A security company that does not even had anymore a webpage. The company does not almost exist anymore.
rohde-schawarz – A company that have in his list price and old outdated hardware secure phone . No one would buy it, it's not good for genera use.

Does it sounds strange that only those other products are considered secure along with PhoneCrypt .

Also… let's check the kind of multimedia content in the different reviews available of Gold-Lock, Cellcrypt and Phonecrypt in order to understand how much the marketing guys pressed to make the PhoneCrypt review the most attractive:

Aplicação Screenshots of application Video with demonstration of interception Network demonstration
PhoneCrypt 5 0 1
CellCrypt 0 2 0
GoldLock 1 2 0

It's clear that PhoneCrypt is reviewed showing more features explicitly shown and major security features product description than the other.

Too much difference between them, should we suspect it's a marketing tips?

But again other strange things analyzing the way it was done…
If it was “an impartial and neutral review” we should see good and bad things on all the products right?

Ok, see the table below regarding the opinion indicated in each paragraph of the different reviews available of Gold-Lock, CellCrypt and Phonecrypt (are the only available) to see if are positive or negative.

Aplicação Number of paragraphs Positive paragraphs Negative paragraphs Neutral paragraphs
PhoneCrypt 9 9 0 0
CellCrypt 12 0 10 2
GoldLock 9 0 8 1

Detailed paragraphs opinion analysis of Phonecrypt
Paragraph of review Opinion expressed
From their website Positive Marketing feedback
Apple iPhone Positive Marketing feedback
Disk Encryption or voice Encryption Positive Marketing feedback
PBX Compatibility? Really Positive Marketing feedback
Cracking <10. Not. Positive Marketing feedback
Good thinking! Positive Marketing feedback
A little network action Positive Marketing feedback
UI Positive Marketing feedback
Good Taste Positive Marketing feedback
Detailed paragraphs opinion analysis of Gold-Lock 3G
Paragraph of review Opinion expressed
From their website Negative Marketing feedback
Licensed by The israeli Ministry of Denfese Negative Marketing feedback
Real Company or Part Time hobby Negative Marketing feedback
16.000 bit authentication Negative Marketing feedback
DH 256 Negative Marketing feedback
Downad & Installation! Neutral Marketing feedback
Cracking it <10 Negative Marketing feedback
Marketing BS101 Negative Marketing feedback
Cool video stuff Negative Marketing feedback
Detailed paragraphs opinion analysis of CellCrypt
Paragraph of review Opinion expressed
From their website Neutral Marketing feedback
A little background about cellcrypt Negative Marketing feedback
Master of Marketing Negative Marketing feedback
Secure Voice calling Negative Marketing feedback
Who's buying their wares Negative Marketing feedback
Downad & Installation! Neutral Marketing feedback
My Demo environment Negative Marketing feedback
Did they forget some code Negative Marketing feedback
Cracking it <5 Negative Marketing feedback
Room Monitoring w/ FlexiSpy Negative Marketing feedback
Cellcrypt unique features.. Negative Marketing feedback
Plain old interception Negative Marketing feedback
The Haters out there Negative Marketing feedback

Now it's clear that from their point of view on PhoneCrypt there is no single bad point while the other are always described in a negative way.
No single good point. Strange?
All those considerations along with the next ones really let me think that's very probably a marketing review and not an independent review.

Other similar marketing attempt from SecurStar

SecurStar GmbH is known to have used in past marketing activity leveraging this kind of “technical speculations”, abusing of partial information and fake unconfirmed hacking stuff to make marketing/media coverage.
Imho a rare mix of unfairness in leveraging the difficult for people to really understand the complexity of security and cryptography.

They already used in past Marketing activities like the one about creating a trojan for Windows Mobile and saying that their software is secure from the trojan that they wrote.
Read about their marketing tricks of 2007

They developed a Trojan (RexSpy) for Windows Mobile, made a demonstration capability of the trojan and later on told that they included “Anti-Trojan” capability to their PhoneCrypt software.They never released informations on that trojan, not even proved that it exists.

The researcher Collin Mulliner told at that time that it sounds like a marketing tips (also because he was not able to get from SecurStar CEO Hafner any information about that trojan):

“This makes you wonder if this is just a marketing thing.”

Now, let's try to make some logical reassignment.
It's part of the way they do marketing, an very unfriendly and unpolite approach with customers, journalist and users trying to provide wrong security concepts for a market advantage. Being sure that who read don't have all the skills to do in depth security evaluation and find the truth behind their marketing trips.

Who is the hacker notrax?

It sounds like a camouflage of a fake identity required to have an “independent hacker” that make an “independent review” that is more strong on reputation building.
Read about his bio:

¾ Human, ¼ Android (Well that would be cool at least.) I am just an enthusiast of pretty much anything that talks binary and if it has a RS232 port even better. During the day I masquerade as an engineer working on some pretty cool projects at times, but mostly I do the fun stuff at night. I have been thinking of starting an official blog for about 4.5 years to share some of the things I come across, can't figure out, or just cross my mind. Due to my day job and my nighttime meddling, I will update this when I can. I hope some find it useful, if you don't, well you don't.

There are no information about this guy on google.
Almost any hacker that get public have articles online, post in mailing archive and/or forum or some result of their activity.
For notrax, nothing is available.

Additionally let's look at the domain…
The domain infosecurityguard.com is privacy protected by domainsbyproxy to prevent understanding who is the owner.
The domain has been created 2 months ago on 01-Dec-09 on godaddy.com registrar.

What's also very interesting to notice that this “unknown hacker with no trace on google about him that appeared on December 2009 on the net” is referred on SecurStar GmbH Press Release as a “An IT security expert”.

Maybe they “know personally” who's this anonymous notrax? :)

Am i following my own conspiracy thinking or maybe there's some reasonable doubt that everything was arrange in that funny way just for a marketing activity?

Social consideration

If you are a security company you job have also a social aspects, you should also work to make the world a better place (sure to make business but “not being evil”). You cannot cheat the skills of the end users in evaluating security making fake misleading information.

You should do awareness on end users, to make them more conscious of security issues, giving them the tools to understand and decide themselves.

Hope you had fun reading this article and you made your own consideration about this.

Fabio Pietrosanti (naif)

ps Those are my personal professional opinion, let's speak about technology and security, not marketing.
pps i am not that smart in web writing, so sorry for how the text is formatted and how the flow of the article is unstructured!

Ação

Licensed by Israel Ministry of Defense? How things really works!

You should know that Israel is a country where if a company need to develop encryption product they must be authorized by the government.

The government don't want that companies doing cryptography can do anything bad to them and what they can do of good for the government, so they have to first be authorized.

Companies providing interception and encryptio n m ust apply to a license because Israel law on this is so restrictive to be similar to china law .

That's because those kind of technologies are considered fundamental for the intelligence and espionage capabilities of Israel country.

To give some example of “Licensed by Israel Ministry of Defense” companies:

GSM encryption products “Licensed by Israel Ministry of Defense” – Gold-lock

Interception of communication products “Licensed by Israel Ministry of Defense” – Verint

HF encrypted Radio “Licensed by Israel Ministry of Defense” – Kavit

Surveillance services and equipment “Licensed by Israel Ministry of Defense” – Multi Tier Solutions

For example how to apply for a “License by Israel Ministry of Defense” if you do encryption technologies in Israel?

Be sure to be an israeli company, click here and fill the forms.

Someone will contact you from encryption-control@mod.gov.il and will discuss with you whether to give you or not the license to sell.

What does the department of defense will require from an israeli company in order to provide them the authorization to make and sell interception and encryption products?

Well, what they want and what they really ask nobody knows.

It's a secret dealing of Israel Ministry of Defense with each “licensed” company.

What we know for sure is that Verint, a “Licensed by Israel Ministry of Defense”, placed a backdoor to intercept companies and governments in the US and Netherland into the interception systems they was selling.

Verint, a Licensed by Israel Ministry of Defense Company, provided to Israel government eavesdropped communications of private and government users in the United States and in the Netherland .

CIA officier reported that Israel Ministry of Defense was known to pay Verint a reimbursement of 50% of their costs in order to have from Verint espionage services trough their commercial activity on selling “backdoored” interception equipment to spy foreign users.


It can be a legitimate doubt that the cooperation within the Israeli Ministry of Defense may be problematic for an Israeli company that want to sell interception and encryption product abroad.

Those companies may be forced to make the interests of Israel Ministry of Defense and not the interests of the customers (like Verint scandal is a real-world example).

So, how would a “Licensed by Israel Ministry of Defense” be a good things to promote?

It represent the risk that the “Israel Ministry of Defense”, like is publicly known that it has already have done with Verint, will interfere with what the company do.

It represent the risk that the “Israel Ministry of Defense” may reasonably provide “reimbursement” of costs paying the company and get what they would likely would like to get.

So, what does really “Israel Ministry of Defense” want from Israel companies doing encryption and interception technologies?

Should we ask ourself whether Israeli companies doing encryption and interception businesses are more interested to do business or to do “outsourced espionage services” for their always paying customer, the “Israel Ministry of Defense”.

For sure, in the age of financial crisis, the Israel Ministry of Defense is a paying customer that does not have budget problem…

Strict control, strict rules, strong government strategic and military cooperation.

Be careful.

If you want to read more about this matters, about how technologies from certain countries is usually polluted with their governments military and secret services strategies stay tuned as i am preparing a post about this .

You will much better understand about that subjects on the “Licensed by Israel Ministry of Defense”.

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O3B Networks: a new satellite broadband approach

That's something amazing, “other 3 billion” broadband coverage not trough fiber but trough satellite.

A project where also google is one of the shareholder, covering 3 billion persons trough low orbit, low latency broadband (10GBit) satellite network.

Check here technical infrastructure details on ITU website.

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Location Based Services: the big brother thanks you ;-)

Do you use your iphone, google phone, blackberry or nokia smartphone with cool built-in GPS?

Well law enforcement can now know even better where you are, at any time, even with historical data and much better than BTS based location systems.

Sprint has given 8 million times customer's GPS information to law enforcement (sound something like a semi-automatic request).

Read here .

Nice extract is:

Sprint Nextel provided law enforcement agencies with its customers' (GPS) location information over 8 million times between September 2008 and October 2009. This massive disclosure of sensitive customer information was made possible due to the roll-out by Sprint of a new, special web portal for law enforcement officers.

The informations was provided at wiretapping and interception industry conference ISS WASH in Washingtown.

If you want see directly the video:


Sprint: 50 million customers, 8 million law enforcement GPS requests in 1 year from Christopher Soghoian on Vimeo .


Then you know that “big brother” is watching you only because you let him to watch you.

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Gold-Lock Security Encryption Contest: be careful!

This post is to talk about the “unfair” marketing approach of Gold-Lock, an israeli company doing mobile voice encryption authorized by Israeli Ministry of Defence .

Following an announcement seen on Linkedin “Information Security Community” group:

GoldLock is offering US$ 100.000 and a job for an unencryption

GoldLock, an israeli encryption and security company is offering US$ 100.000 and a job to anyone capable to decrypt a cellular conversation contained in a file provided in their site ( https://www.gold-lock.com/app/en/?wicket:interface=:8 ::::).
The transcription must be sent back to GoldLock until February 1st, 2010.
The contest is open to all and any tools or technology may be used.
Good luck to all!!!

I commented:

Not having a public protocol specification is not even scientifically serious to make a marketing tricks like this.
I would say to gold-lock, let's release the source code and let anyone compile the cryptographic engine if you trust not to to have something nasty inside… ;)

Toni Koivunen from F-secure said:

So… They will pay $100k if you get through the AES and the hassle with keys.
If someone would pull it off they would certainly make a truckload more money elsewhere. Plus they would retain the rights to the code/technology that they created, which isn't the case if they go for the $100k since the License pretty clearly says that:
# An assignment letter to Gold Line, in a form satisfactory to Gold Line of your technology and the Work Plan (the “Technology”). Such assignment form shall enable Gold Line to transfer the rights on the Technology to Gold Line, including the right to register patents and all other rights.
# A release and waiver form, in a form satisfactory to Gold Line, duly executed by you and any other participant of any rights to the Technology.
Plus of course Gold Line retains the right to change the rules of the game with prior notice. Or needing to notify afterwards either.
Sounds fair :)

Michel Scovetta from Computer Associates said:

It sounds like the purpose of this is to get some cheap testing out of it, and to be able to say something like, “The best crypto experts in the world tried to break it, and were unable to.”

According to some of the docs on Gold Lock's website, they use ECC-256 and a “modified DH key exchange” (which tingles my spidey senses), SHA-256, and then XOR for the actual data encryption. They use practically blasphemous language like, “Each component of the Gold Lock Enterprise solution is tested and proven secure against any conceivable attack.”

*Proven* secure? *Any conceivable* attack? Caramba!

In another doc on their site, they talk about their first layer relying on 1024-bit RSA. GoDaddy doesn't even allow 1024-bit keys to be used anymore when generating $20 SSL certificates. They quote 300 billion MIPS-years to break, but if my math is correct, that comes down to about 52 days on the top supercomputer right now. Not trivial, but this is an offline attack, so time is on the side of the attacker.

The description then talks about the device generating 16k keys when you register the device. If the protocol is “secure”, then it should be “secure” with only a single key. If it's not secure with a single key, then generating 16k keys could only make it 16k times more secure, which is far off from a proof of security.

I agree with Fabio – a fair contest would be to include source code and the cryptographic specification. Also, as other contests have proven (eg SecureWebMail), the weakest point isn't usually the cryptography. It's all of the other stuff, and it doesn't look like any of it is being disclosed for the contest.

http://xkcd.com/538/

Microfone

I would say that all those considerations from security experts from well known and established security companies bring us to consider that:

  • Gold-lock is not transparent on their encryption at all and they work trough bad practice of Security Trough Obscurity (no one know what's inside the product)
  • Gold-lock is not playing a fair game by proposing this 'security contest'
  • Gold-lock being certified by Israeli ministry of defence may raise doubt related to possible relationship with the intelligence… Read by post Certified by Israeli MInistry of Defense .

Voice security is a sensible matters and lacks of transparency and governmental relationship for cryptographic choices usually does not provide anything good…

Think about it…

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Disk encryption sometimes 'works'

I am one of the person convinced that a computer disk encryption system will not protect you from public authorities if they are convinced enough and the case is very important.

There are a lot of way to convince a person to release a password.

However there's a case in Australia where not revealing the disk password resulted in a successful way to avoid going in jail:

Secret code saves man who spied on flatmates

My opinion is just that spying flatmates is not a so relevant and particular crime and that law enforcement did not used 'convincing systems' to get the password of encrypted disk.

UPDATE 29.06.2010: It also worked for Daniel Dantas against FBI .

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Political conflict in Turkey between Prosecutors and Wiretappers

It seems that in Turkey the Telecommunication Directorate (TIB), in charge of managing the wiretapping, intercepted the president of the Judge and Prosecutors Associations.

Prosecutors and Judge usually does not like being tapped, and so the 1st High Criminal Court ordered an audit of all the recording done by the TIB since 2006.

Read more here .

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Hackers Hacking Hackers

Hackers hacking hackers are always pretty fun.

And I am not talking about ZF0 5 (which was cool reading, even if not as cool as ~El8 was), I am talking about this .

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This is big business, this is the American way

43 years old “UFO eccentric” hacker Gary McKinnon just loses appeal against his extradition to the States for computer crimes he committed 7 years ago.

If you've lived under a rock during the last few years what this dude did was basically break into .gov computers looking for UFO related material.

Probably the last case of recreational hacking I've heard about.

So his case is obviously going to be a classical “Strike one to educate one hundred” kind of message to every hacker attacking american computer systems: we can reach you everywhere you live and have you extradited to our country where we will sentence you to life in prison.

Unless you are a multi millionaire cyber criminal living in Russia or a chinese spy, of course.

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