카테고리 아카이브 : 보안

RFC 6189 : ZRTP 드디어 표준입니다!

마지막으로 ZRTP는 공식 RFC 할당, 할당되어 RFC6189 유니 캐스트 보안 RTP를위한 미디어 경로 키 계약 : ZRTP합니다.

그것은 종속성으로 가지고 SRTP 지금과 같이 정의되었습니다 256bit의 AES 키 크기와 RFC6188 .

그것은 훨씬과 같은 엔드 - 투 - 엔드 암호화를위한 공식 표준으로 ZRTP를 설정하는 중요한 이정표이기 때문에, RFC가 마침내 발표보고 재미있을 것 PGP는 이메일에 대해서도 있었다.

이제 세계 어느 조직이 공식적으로 엔드 - 투 - 엔드 프로토콜 음성 암호화를 위해 ZRTP를 구현할 수있을 것입니다

ZRTP 프로토콜의 현재 3 개의 대중 구현 존재합니다 :

그들의 각 프로토콜의 다양한 기능을 제공하지만, 가장 중요한는 상호 운용 가능한 것으로 알려져 있습니다.

새로운 파도 전화 암호화 시스템을하는 기업의 대부분은 사용자 지정 암호화를 구현되었습니다 회색 영역으로 irrupting, 음성 암호화 세계로 온다.

이제 표준이 설정되었습니다 먼가 다른 구현에두고 몇 가지 이유가 거기에 있습니다.

Hurra Zimmermann 모든 회사의 커뮤니티 (같은 PrivateWave ) 및 개인 (같은 베르너 Dittmann 그것에 근무)!

오늘 날씨가 좋은 날은, 그러한 기술의 종류 이제 여러 기존의 구현과 공식과 또한거야!

빌립, 당신은 순수한 마음과 결의 :-)로, 또 내 칭찬을 해냈다

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GSM에 대한 진행은 프라이 부르크 대학에서 균열

모바일 프로토콜 (GSM, GSM-R, TETRA, UMTS 등)의 흥미로운 세계는 해킹은 대학에서 공식적인 연구 활동을 받고있다.

크래킹 소프트웨어 opensource 코드 릴리스를 만들기 위해 투자, 그건 작업을 개선하고 강력한 연구를해야 할 대학의 학생들에게 기회를 제공하고 있습니다.

프라이 부르크 대학은 논문 발표 GSM 암호화 A5 / 1의 실천 운동 과 함께 gsmframencoder 장치 , 디코딩을 킁킁 및 크래킹 과정을 개선하기 위해 지원 도구를.

소프트웨어를 열고, 하드웨어 열기, 열기 프로토콜은 독점적인 방법이나 절차에 대한 빌드 - 업 통신 및 보안 기술의 모든 종류의 약점을 보여줍니다.

그것은 열려 접속 시도 및 통신 프로토콜을 설계하면서 업계는 호환성과 개방형 접근 방식만을 계속된다하도록하는 독점 폐쇄 기술의 모든 종류를 열게 할 모든 과학자의 목표 여야합니다.

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TETRA 해킹이오고있다 : OsmocomTETRA

그것의 릴리스 보는 것은 매우 흥미 진진한 OsmocomTETRA , 첫번째 opensource SDR ( 소프트웨어 정의 라디오 ) TETRA 복조기, PHY 및 MAC 하위 레이어의 구현.

그것의 TETRA 버전입니다 의 GSM airprobe 따라서 훌륭한 해킹 기회를 제공, 데이터 및 TETRA 통신 프로토콜의 프레임에 대한 액세스의 잠금을 해제!

또한 TETRA 기술은 우리가 opensource TETRA의 탐지기를보고,이 2011 중에있을 것입 개설되었으며, 대부분의 섹스 티 암호화 (Tetra 암호화 알고리즘)에 금이 지금 그런

TETRA도 네트워크 범위의 가용성 (단지 기지국없이 모바일 투 모바일)없이 작동하며 일부 특수 고가 용성 서비스를 제공할 수있는 다른 이동 통신 네트워크와 같이 경찰, 응급 서비스 및 Militaries 사용됩니다.

내 슬라이드에 TETRA에 대해 쓴 주요 음성 보안 프로토콜 검토 .

OsmocomBB 메일링리스트에서 일부 TETRA 네트워크의 상태에 대해 이미 논의가 있었다 :

  • 벨기에 경찰 TETRA 아스트 리드 네트워크 : 암호화되지 않은
  • 아헨에서 독일 경찰 시험 TETRA 네트워크 : 암호화되지 않은
  • 일부 전직 jugoslawia TETRA 네트워크 : 암호화되지 않은
  • Netherland C200 TETRA 네트워크 TEA2 정적 열쇠로 암호화
  • 영국 에어 웨이브 TETRA 네트워크 TEA2 TEA2로 암호화

그것은 새로운 디지털 라디오로 옛날 아날로그 시대에서 새로운 경찰과 구조 서비스 해킹 돌아오지 않고보고 정말 재밌을거야 :-)

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아스 테 리스크 1.8과 유선 전화에 암호화된 모바일

저희들이 기술 HOWTO를 발표 그냥 유선의 VoIP 인프라에 보안 모바일을 구축하는 방법 으로 :

다음 주 기타 HOWTO에 이것처럼 같은 FreeSWITCH, 투명성 및 opensource 보안 기술의 활용의 정신을 모든 같은 다른 서버 플랫폼을 사용하여 밖으로 올 것이다.

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암호화를 규제의 여덟 에픽 실패

에 아주 계몽 문서 암호화 규제의 여덟 에픽 실패 와 기술의 작동 방법에 대한 다양한 전망이없는 정부 규제에 의한 일반적인 오해를.

무식한 정부의 규제가 엄격한 규제는 다음과 같은 단점을 가지고 것이 이해되지 않습니다

  1. 그것은 보안 위험을 만듭니다
  2. 그것은 나쁜 놈들을 멈추지 않을거야
  3. 그것은 혁신을 해칠
  4. 그것은 미국 사업을 해칠
  5. 그것은 소비자가 비용을 부담해야
  6. 그것은 위헌이 될 것입니다
  7. 그것은 세금 엄청난 지출 될 것입니다

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PrivateGSM : ZRTP 또는 SRTP / SDES와 블랙베리 / 아이폰 / 노키아 모바일 음성 암호화

나는 절대적으로 제품의 모든 종류의 홍보를 만들기 위해 나의 개인 블로그를 사용하지 마십시오.

그 시간은 달라 아니지만, 내가 알 팬시 마케팅없이 작동 제품에 대한 사실을 얘기하고 싶지만, 기술 머물.

오늘날에 PrivateWave 어디 오전 CTO 및 공동 설립자 , 우리는 공개적으로 블랙베리, 아이폰과 노키아의 모바일 VoIP를 암호화 제품을 발표했다 :

  • 로 첫째도 블랙베리 암호화된 VoIP를 ZRTP - PrivateGSM의 VoIP 전문
  • 로 첫째도 아이폰 암호화된 VoIP를 ZRTP - PrivateGSM의 VoIP 전문
  • 로 첫째도 블랙베리 암호화의 VoIP 클라이언트가 SIP / TLS를 통한 SDES 키 교환과 SRTP - PrivateGSM VoIP를 엔터 프라이즈

로고 privatewave-colore.png

PrivateWave에서 우리 밖에 대부분의 음성 암호화 회사에 다른 접근법 존중을 사용하여 우리 읽어 보안 접근 방법 .

기술 및 산업 풍경이 제품의 관련 성은 다음과 같이 요약할 수 있습니다 :

  • 그것은 오직 표준 보안 프로토콜을 (그리고 그것이 CSD의 유산에서 오는 독점적인 기술은 동일한 가치를 제공할 수 없다는 점을 분명히로서 우리가 시장 반응 기대)를 사용하여 첫 번째 음성 암호화 회사인데
  • 그것은 오직 오픈 소스 및 표준 암호화 엔진을 사용하여 음성 암호화의 첫 번째 접근 방법입니다
  • 그것은 서로 다른 기술을 사용하여 서로 다른 보안 모델을 제공하는 최초의 음성 암호화 방식 (대한 엔드 - 투 - 엔드입니다 ZRTP엔드 - 투 - 사이트 를위한 SRTP )

전문적인 보안을위한 모바일 보안 클라이언트의 이러한 제품군, 최고의 통신 및 보안 기술, 좋은 성능에도 나쁜 네트워크 조건과 함께 보호의 높은 수준을 제공할을 사용에만 사용

응용 프로그램은 다음과 같습니다

icona-pgsm.png

지원되는 모바일 장치는 다음과 같습니다

에 대해서 ZRTP을 우리 모두는 보안과 같은 작은 외에있는 프로토콜의 편집증 기능을 강조하고 스트레칭 결정 :

우리의 엄격한 주소록 통합, 초월 ZRTP RFC 때문에 모바일 화면을 보지의 사용자 행동을 휴대폰에 사용되는 특정 공격에 취약 수도 사양.

ZRTP 이러한 조건을 완화 사용하는 우리 paranoy 방법은, 나중에 이것에 대해 작성 및 / 또는 RFC에 포함될 구체적인 내용을 추가할 것입니다.

ZRTP있는 엔드 - 투 - 엔드 암호화를 PrivateGSM 프로 페셔널의 일부 단어

읽기 기술 시트를 거기!

하기 위해 다운로드는 여기를 클릭하고 당신의 전화 번호를 넣어

그건 더 힘든 운영 환경 (더러운 모바일 네트워크와 더러운 모바일 운영 체제)에서 도전적인 기술 (음성 암호화)에 대한 모든 내 매우 숙련된 직원들의 근면 (16 명 3 다른 플랫폼에 대해이 6 프로젝트에 근무)의 결과입니다 이년보다.

나는 우리 직원이 자랑스러워!

다음 전략은?

다음 주안에 당신이 그토록 별표, freeswitch과 내가 확신하는 몇 가지 흥미로운 다른 보안 기술 관련 뉴스와 함께 PBX를 사용 기타 보안과 통합 등 documentations의 주요 세트로 발매가 표시됩니다 알게됩니다 ;)

그것은 힘든 일이되었습니다 등을 다해야하지만 내가 보안 및 opensource 커뮤니티는 매우 정치적으로 중립 (무료 백도어) 기술을 오픈 중요 릴리스와 오픈 소스 통합 또한 제품 및 투명한 접근 방식을 좋아하는 것이라고 확신합니다 .

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좋은 VPN 공급자의 커플

한 인터넷 여물에게 VPN을 액세스해야하는 이유를 이유로 많은 가지가 있습니다.

당신이 특정 내용 (안티 지방 정부 웹사이트, 포르노 등 등) 및 / 또는 프로토콜 (스카이 프 같은 VoIP)를 차단하는 나라에 살고있는 예를 들어 여러분은 아마도 사용하여 불쾌한 차단 국외 인터넷 연결을 이동하려는 것입니다 암호화된 VPN 터널.

제가 여러 호스팅 VPN 서버를 평가하고 그 중 몇은 서비스의 광범위한 제물 중에서 꽤 좋다 :

SwissVPN

스위스에서 인터넷에 종료합니다.

6 CHF / 개월 비용

옵션 공공 고정 IP 주소

필요한 경우에 유용합니다 :

  • 그냥 좋은 높은 대역폭을 가진 지역 국가 필터를 우회
  • 옵션으로 고정 공용 IP 주소로 공공 서비스 트로프에게 VPN을 쉽게받을 수 있습니다.

과장하여 연기하다

20 개의 다른 국가 (귀하가 연결할 때마다) 중 선택하여 인터넷에 종료합니다.

유용한 당신이 할 필요가있다면 :

  • 경쟁 업체에 대한 비즈니스 인텔리 전스 (그들을 연결할 때 국가 X에서 온 것처럼 위장)
  • 영화를보고 / 텔레비전 영화는 국내 IP를 웹 공간에서 사용할 수
  • 다른 나라 사이에 구글 결과를 볼

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모든 타원 곡선은 동일하지 : ECC 보안에 대한 트로프

 내 자신의 ECC 곡선 보안 및 선택 분석

vn9jna1BdgrzDCYNBJHi09q09q.jpg

대부분의 현대적인 암호 사용 타원 곡선 암호화 (ECC) 즉, 작은 키 크기와, 계산 능력을 감소 DH (Diffie-헬맨) 또는 RSA (Rivest, Shamir와 Adleman)로 알려진 기존의 암호화 시스템의 등가 보안 강도를주고있는.

모두가 ECC 암호화가 향후 암호화 애플 리케이션을 위해 심지어 TLS / SSL이 (암호화 웹 보안을위한 사용) ECC로 이동되는 선택되었는지 알아.

나는 많이도 익숙해 ECC 암호 중 어떤 종류의 지정하지 않고 임의 사용 ECC 비트 키 크기 경향 ECC 대안, 어울려으로 RSA와 DH를 버리고 소위 "독점적인 암호화 제품"의 발견.

그러나이 타원 곡선 주위에 혼란 많은, 일부 암호화 물건을 평가할 때 자신의 몸매를 만들기 위해 비 암호 - 숙련된 사용자를 위해 어렵게 만드는 다른 이름과 키 크기의 여러가지 이유로.

있기 때문에 확산 혼란 내가 사용하는 것이 가장 좋습니다 ECC 암호화 곡선과 오른쪽 ECC 키 크기인지 파악해야 내 자신의 분석을하기로 결정했습니다.

이 분석은 몇 가지 표준과 보안 프로토콜에서 촬영된 다양한 선택 사항을 요약하기, 이미 몇 년 동안 해본 적이되어 수학과 암호 분석 고려 사항을두고 다양한 곡선 및 키 크기 간의 보안 산업의 기반 선택권을 제공하고 싶습니다.

먼저 결론.

나의 분석에서 오직 다음의 ECC 곡선은 다른 자치 단체 중에서 선택된 하나 (ANSI, 국가 안보국, 처짐, NIST, ECC BrainPool), 다른 보안 프로토콜 표준 (IPSec을, OpenPGP, ZRTP, 때문에 암호화 시스템에서 사용하기 위해 고려되어야하는 것입니다 Kerberos를, SSL / TLS)과 일치하는 유일한 국가 안보국 스위트 B 보안 요구 사항 (드 - 사실상의 나토 군사 환경에도 표준) :

  • 타원 곡선 프라임 256 비트 - P-256
  • 타원 곡선 프라임 384 비트 - P-384

선택 사항으로 그냥 더 키 크기의 비트를 원한다면 그게 정말 편집증 환자를 위해 여전히 유용으로 간주되지 않음 :

  • 타원 곡선 프라임 521 비트 - P-521

나는 그들이 암호 분석 활동에 충분한 보증도하지 않으며 효과적으로 그들이 누구로 Koblitz 곡선은 (283분의 163 / 571분의 409) 어떤 키 크기에 피해야한다고 명시하고 싶습니다 :

  • 국가 안보국 스위트-B 암호화 선택이 아니 랍니다
  • ECC Brainpool 선택이 아니 랍니다
  • ANSI X9.62 선택이 아니 랍니다
  • OpenPGP ECC 확장 선택이 아니 랍니다
  • ECC 곡선 선택에 Kerberos 확장이 아니 랍니다

난 깊은 기술적 배경을하지 않고 있지만 최소 암호 기법의 몇 가지 기본적인 약간 좋은 기술적인 배경과 이해 수있는 기초를 이해하고 나의 분석 여물을 따라 독자를 초대합니다.

 여기 분석가는
 

나의 목표는 무엇을 / 어떻게 분석을하게하는 것입니다 열린 과학 및 IETF RFC (개방 및 피어 리뷰 방식으로 인터넷 표준을 정의하는 것들)에 의해 정의된 보안 프로토콜 및 표준의 사용에 대한 보안 커뮤니티를 선택 ECC 암호화 시스템입니다.

사용하는 것이 좋습니다과 제외하는 것이 좋습니다 이해하기 위해 분석 당할 기존 시스템에 RFC 소개 ECC의 집합 아래 :

  • RFC5639 : ECC Brainpool 표준 곡선 및 곡선 생성
  • RFC4869 : IPSec이에 대한 NSA의 스위트의 B 암호화 스위트
  • RFC5430 : 전송 계층 보안 (TLS)에 대한 NSA의 스위트 B 프로필
  • RFC5008 : 보안 / 다목적 인터넷 메일 확장의에서 국가 안보국 스위트 B (S / MIME)
  • RFC3766 : 대칭 키 교환에 사용 공개 키의 결정 강점
  • RFC5349 : Kerberos의 초기 인증을위한 공개 키 암호화 (PKINIT)에 타원 곡선 암호화 (ECC) 지원
  • RFC4492 : 전송 계층 보안 (TLS)에 타원 곡선 암호화 (ECC) 암호화 스위트
  • ZRTP 음성 암호화 필립 Zimmermann ECC 곡선에 의한
  • OpenPGP의 ECC (초안 D 뗏목-jivsov-openpgp-ECC-06 )
  • 을 위해 마이크로 소프트가 선택한 ECC 곡선 스마트 Kerberos를 로그인

우리는 과학자가 우리 평가의 일부를 만들기 위해 인터넷 보안 프로토콜을 정의하여 만든 선택을 사용합니다.
또한 그것은 곡선 선택 생략하는 것을 사용하고 어떤 산업에 이야기하기 위해서는 곡선의 자신의 선택을 만들어 다른 자치 단체에서 나오는 것을 이해해야합니다

우리는 평가의 일부를 만들기 위해 표준화 기관에서 보안 요구 사항을 정의하는 과학자가 만든 선택을 사용합니다.
또한, 뭔가 대부분의 사람들이 잘 모른다고하지만, 그것이 우리의 분석에 매우 관련이 있는지, ECC 곡선 암호화하고 "크기"는 곡선의 종류에 따라 다르다고 여러 종류가있다는 것입니다 :

  • 프라임 필드 이상의 ECC 곡선 (종종 타원 곡선으로 함 및 P-keysize로 표시)
  • 바이너리 필드 이상의 ECC 곡선 (종종 Koblitz 곡선으로 추천하고 K-keysize로 표시)

보안 강도 타원 곡선 동등한 그리고 우리가 ECC 521 프라임 곡선에 상응하는 강도와 Koblitz 곡선를 참조하고 ECC 571을 읽을 때 Kobliz 곡선 예를 들어 서로 다른 키 크기를 감안할 때.

타원 곡선 및 Kotbliz 곡선 사이의 강도의 비교 (아래에서보고되는 마이키 ECC 인터넷 초안 ) :

 | Koblitz | ECC | DH / DSA / RSA
 | 163 | 192 | 1024
 | 283 | 256 | 3072
 | 409 | 384 | 7680
 | 571 | 521​​ | 15,360

아래의 모든 다양한 엔티티와 각각의 이름 (에서하여 선택한 모든 곡선의 비교가있어 TLS를위한 ECC 사용에 대한 IETF RFC4492 ) :

 다른 표준 단체로 선정 곡선 이름
 ------------ + --------------- + -------------
 SECG | ANSI X9.62 | NIST
 ------------ + --------------- + -------------
 sect163k1 | | NIST K-163
 sect163r1 | |
 sect163r2 | | NIST B-163
 sect193r1 | |
 sect193r2 | |
 sect233k1 | | NIST K-233
 sect233r1 | | NIST B-233
 sect239k1 | |
 sect283k1 | | NIST K-283
 sect283r1 | | NIST B-283
 sect409k1 | | NIST K-409
 sect409r1 | | NIST B-409
 sect571k1 | | NIST K-571
 sect571r1 | | NIST B-571
 secp160k1 | |
 secp160r1 | |
 secp160r2 | |
 secp192k1 | |
 secp192r1 | prime192v1 | NIST P-192
 secp224k1 | |
 secp224r1 ​​| | NIST P-224
 secp256k1 | |
 secp256r1 | prime256v1 | NIST P-256
 secp384r1 | | NIST P-384
 secp521r1 | | NIST P-521
 ------------ + --------------- + -------------

무엇 즉시 나타나는 것은 모두 당국에 의해 선택된 두 곡선이있다는 것을, 그리고에만 일반적으로 3 당국 간의 합의에 의한 ANSI.The koblitz 곡선의 덤핑 일반가있다는 것을하면 다음과 같은 두 ECC 곡선입니다

  • secp192r1 / prime192v1 / NIST P-192
  • secp256r1 / prime256v1 / NIST P-256

TLS를위한 ECC 곡선의 이러한 선택의 RFC5430은 완전히 koblitz 곡선을 월반만을 사용으로 선택 :

  • P-256, P-384, P-521

ECC Brainpool은 완전히 Koblitz 곡선을 월반 및 사용은 다음 ECC 곡선으로 선택 :

  • P-160, P-192, P-224, P-256, P-320, P-384, P-512 (그것이 P-521하지만 P-512, 아니라서 그것만이 특정있어 의해 참조되는 키 크기만을 에서 ECC brainpool. Tnx 이안 Simon 씨의 아테나 SCS )

PGP D의 ECC 사용에 대한 OpenPGP 인터넷 초안 뗏목-jivsov-openpgp-ECC-06은 완전히 Koblitz 곡선을 건너뛰고 다음 ECC 곡선을 선택

  • P-256, P-384, P-521

ECC를 사용하는 Kerberos 프로토콜 확장에 정의된 RFC5349 및 Microsoft에 의해 정의된 스마트 카드 로그온이 완전히 Koblitz 곡선을 건너뛰고 다음 ECC 곡선을 선택 :

  • P-256, P-384, P-521

그래서, Koblitz 곡선은 (IPSec을, OpenPGP, ZRTP, Kerberos가, SSL 톱 시크릿 용도 및 보안에 민감한 프로토콜에 대한 생략되어있는 동안 ECC의 오른쪽 선택 P-256, P-384 및 P-521에 대해인지 맑은 소리 / TLS).

왜이 분석을 만든거야?

난 내가 어떤 음성 암호화 제품, 모든 타원 곡선에게 Diffie 헬맨 571 비트 / ECDH 571분의 571 비트 ECDH / Koblitz 571 비트를 사용하는 사용자 지정 및 독점적인 프로토콜을 기반으로 모두와 관련 있었다 논의에 따라이 분석을 완료했습니다.
모든 이들은 전에 설명한 바와 같이, 모든 보안에 민감한 환경과 프로토콜에서 제거하고 나 자신에게 내가 그들의 암호 선택은 절대적으로 최고의 보안 선택이 아니라고 생각하는 음성 암호화 물건 디자이너가되고있다, 그렇게 K-571를 사용하고 있습니다.
Probably it has been done just for marketing purpose, because K-571 (Koblitz curve) seems stronger than P-521 (Elliptic curve based on Prime number). If you have “more bit” your marketing guys can claim to be “more secure”. Koblitz elliptic curve are faster than the top secret enabled prime elliptic curve and so give the product manager a chance to provide “more bit” in it's own product while keeping the key exchange fast.

It's a matter of philosophical choice.

I prefer to follow the trend of scientific community with the humility of not to considering myself a cryptographic expert, knowledgable more than the overall security and scientific community itself.

I prefer instead to use only algorithms that are approved for use in highly sensitive environments (top secret classification), that have been selected by all the authorities and working group analyzing encryption algorithms existing out-there and that represent the choice of almost all standard security protocols (IPSec, OpenPGP, ZRTP, Kerberos, SSL/TLS, etc).
I prefer to count the amount of brains working on the crypto i use, that check that's really secure, that evaluate whether there's some weakness.

The number of brais working on Crypto widely diffused are of order of magnitude more than the number of brains working on crypto used by just few people (like Koblitz curve).
So i am not demonizing who use ECDH 571 using Koblitz Curve, but for sure i can affirm that they did not taken the best choice in terms of security and that any security professionals doing a security benchmarking would consider the fact that Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman 571 bit done with Koblitz Curve is not widely diffused, it's dumped from standard security protocols and it's not certified for top secret use.

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ESSOR, European Secure Software Defined Radio (SDR)

I had a look at European Defense Agency website and found the ESSOR project, a working project funded for 106mln EUR to develop strategic defense communication products based on new Software Defined Radio approach.

SDR approach is a revolutionary system that's completely changing the way scientist and industry is approach any kind of wireless technology.

Basically instead of burning hardware chip that implement most of the radio frequency protocols and techniques, they are pushed in “software” to specialized radio hardware that can work on a lot of different frequency, acting as radio interface for a lot of different radio protocols.

For example the USRP (Universal Software Radio Peripheral) from Ettus Research that cost 1000-2000USD fully loaded, trough the opensource GnuRadio framework, have seen opensource implementation of:

And a lot more protocols and transmission technologies.

That kind of new approach to Radio Transmission System is destinated to change the way radio system are implemented, giving new capability such as to upgrade the “radio protocol itself” in software in order to provide “radio protocol” improvements.

In the short terms we have also seen very strong security research using SDR technologies such as the GSM cracking and the Bluetooth Sniffing .

We can expect that other technologies, weak by design but protected by the restriction to hardware devices to hack the low level protocols, will be soon get hacked. In the first list i would really like to see the hacking of TETRA, a technology born with closed mindset and secret encryption algorithms, something i really dislike ;-)

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Remotely intercepting snom VoIP phones

나는 독서 제안 원격 VoIP 전화를 도청 에서 " VoIP를 보안 얼라이언스 에 의해 블로그 숀 Merdinger .

현재 텔레포니 인프라가 사이버 공격에 더 취약 해지고 방법에 대한 구체적인 예.

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음성 통신 보안 워크숍

안녕하세요,

내가 가진 흥미로운 정보 교환에 따라 트렌토 대학에서 음성 통신 보안 기술에 대한 이야기를 만들어 암호화 연구소 교수 관리 는 Massimiliano Sala을 .

나는 여러 분야에 익숙해 다양한 음성 암호화 기술의 혁신적인 분류가로서, 특히 두 번째 부분을 읽어볼 관심있는 사람을 제안한다.

나는 보통 한 각 - 기타 절대적으로 무관하지만, 실질적으로 그들이 모두 그 분류에 따라 암호화를 음성을 적용할 수 있습니다 기술에 광범위한 개요를 제공하여 설명하고이 널리 조각 기술 분야에서 나가려고 :

  • 모바일 TLC 산업 음성 암호화 표준
  • 정부와 군사 음성 암호화 표준
  • 공공 안전 음성 암호화 표준
  • IETF 음성 암호화 표준
  • 기타 독점적인 음성 암호화 기술

그것은 거대한 slideware, 122 슬라이드이지 .. 나는 이미 2009 년 제 프레 젠 테이션에 포함 차단 기술 개요을 빼먹는 두번째 부분을 읽는가는 것이 좋습니다.

음성 통신 보안


자세히보기 프레 젠 테이션 에서 파비오 Pietrosanti .

특히 내가 만병 암호화 개념을 몇 가지 혁신을 제공하려면 초콜릿 등급 암호화의 개념을 좋아해요.

그러나 내가 초콜릿 등급 암호화 컨텍스트에 대해 심도있게 더 받아야 아마 이해를 적용 과정을 제공하고 다양한 음성 암호화 기술의 사실상 실제 보안 컨텍스트를 평가하여 연말 전에 할 것입니다.

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27C3 - CCC 의회 CFP : 우리는 평화를 원해요

우리는 평화를 원해요

189322778_8cb9af1365_m.jpg

우리가 평화로와, 신세계 conquerers했다.

그것은 식민지로 조절하고, 새로운 디지털 세계를 militarise 데 있어서는 우리 정부가 말하는 평화로 왔습니다.

우리가 평화로와, 그들의 반짝 이는 새 장치로 사용자가 그물과 사슬을 monetise하기 위해 밖으로 설정한 민족 국가 규모의 회사를 말한다.

우리가 평화로와, 우리는 현실을 향해 출발하고 우리의 자연 서식지, 사이버 공간에 방해 된것했기 때문에, 그것을 변경하려고 해커, 괴짜와 바보로 말하는 ...

에 참여 신문에 전화 27C3 CCC 의회가 열려, 난 정말 흥분 귀결 :-)을 본 적이 없다고

30 베를린 2010년 12월에서 다시 만나요!

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GSM은 침투 테스트 방법론 (OSSTMM)에 균열?

이 블로그 독자의 대부분이 이미 아시다시피 과거 년 동안의 GSM 감사 및 균열에 대한 공공 연구와 관련된 활동을 많이있었습니다.

그러나 GSM 균열 연구 결과에 거대한 미디어의 주목이 때, 도구 균열 여전히 매우 비효율적 아주 초기 단계이고 있도록하고 있습니다.

이제 프랭크 스티븐슨 은 이미 파산 노르웨이어 cryptanalyst 컨텐츠 스크램블링 시스템 에 의해 시작 A51 균열 프로젝트에 참여하고, DVD 비디오 디스크를 카르 스텐 Nohl가 발표 켄을 깨워서 말이다 , A51 균열 시스템의 새로운 향상된 버전을.

그것은 그 첫 번째 와이파이 WEP의 균열 발견은 이전 기술의 매우 느린했지만 나중 Korek, 크래킹 코드 작업 해커, drammatically 공격 시스템 개선으로 무선랜 균열이 비슷한 이야기​​를했다 알아채지 흥미 롭군요.

그건 보안 연구 협력의 이야기에요, 당신은 연구를 시작, 누군가가 그것을 따라하고 그것을 개선, 다른 그것을 따라하고 그것을 개선하고 마지막에 당신이 결과를 얻을.

에서 자세히보기 켄을 깨워서 말이다의 GSM 균열 소프트웨어 릴리스 .

그리고 Blackhat 컨퍼런스 카르 스텐 Nohl에서 다음주으로 지켜봐 주시기이 필요한 상세한 설명 하드웨어 설정과 그것을 수행하는 방법에 대한 자세한 지침 :-)를

정말에 통합 도구들을보고 싶은데요 삽입 테스트 리눅스 배포판 뒤로 함께 OSSTMM의 중간 :-)의 GSM 차단과 인간의 테스트를 시행 방법론을

가지 방법으로하고 있는지 진행하면 Ettus 연구 (수신 저비용 GSM 신호에 사용 USRP2 소프트웨어 라디오의 프로듀서)이 내려올되지 않습니다, 우리는 여전히 이것을 볼 수 있습니다.

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뱀 - 오일 보안은 암호화 보안 제품에 대한 주장

보안 시장은 성장, 더 많은 기업들이 시장에 나가지만, 몇 명이 심각하게 그들이하는 짓을 데려가는거야?

당신은 보안 기술에서는 사용자가 사용자의 정보 보호를 위해 개인 책임을 의미하고, 알아. 당신은 일을하고 위협 모델의 어떤 종류에 제품 보호 정확히 그들이 필요한것들을 알고해야합니다.

제품의 보안 기능의 일반적인 문제는 제품 자체의 보안 요구를 평가하기 위해 사용자의 무능력으로 표시됩니다.

그래서 어떤 사용자가 그것을 평가할 수 없을 것이라는 사실을 바탕으로 보안 기능하지 - 너무 - 윤리 마케팅을하고 많은 회사가있다.

이전에 설명한 상황은 만병 암호화, 저희들이 오늘 백도어 또는 불안에 대해 너무 많은 신경을 쓰지 않고, 품종 정보 보호 기술의 최고를 사용하게 과학적인 암호화 환경의 진화의 보안 항목에 거주.

자에 대한 만병 암호화를 바꿔주세요

만병 암호화 :에서 암호화 , 만병 상업 암호화 방법과 위조하거나 허위로 간주됩니다 제품을 설명하는 데 사용하는 용어입니다. 안전하지 않은 암호화에서 안전한 암호화를 구별하는 것은 사용자의 관점에서 어려울 수 있습니다. 등 많은 cryptographers, 브루스 Schneier필 Zimmermann은 , 암호화는 얼마나 안전 이루어집니다 년 대중 교육을 실시뿐만 아니라 몇 가지 암호화 제품의 오해의 소지가 마케팅을 강조 있습니다.

가장 참조된 암호화 보안 전문가, 필립 Zimmermann과 브루스 Schneier는 만병 암호화에 대해 이야기하는 첫번째이었다 :

만병 필립 Zimmermann에 의해

만병 브루스 Schneier에 의해

미시간 통신 및 기술 법률 검토 도 보안 제품의 보안 기능에 관한 아주 좋은 분석을했고, 스네이크-OIL 보안 제품의 보안 "체계적인 허위 진술을 주장 . 그들을 평가하는 사용자 무능력을 조정할 때 사용 불쾌한 마케팅 트릭에 대해 설명 경제적 및 법적 책임 암시를 포함한 보안 기능.

Very famous is the sentence of Russ Nelson : 여러 만병 보안 제품 회사 설명되지 않고 제품이 적용되는 위협 모델에 대해 취소되지 않는 아주 유명한 문장입니다. 러스 넬슨 :

"위협 모델없이 암호 기억 우유없이 과자 같다. ..... 위협 모델이없는 암호문 애플파이없이 어머니와 같습니다. 충분한 시간을 말할 수 없습니다. 보다 일반적으로, 위협 모델이없는 보안 정의가 실패 될 것입니다. "

따라서 만병 보안 제품을 탐지하는 방법?

: 만병 암호화 제품 행적의 지침 확인 피하기 위해 만병 징후, 암호화 소프트웨어를 하여 매트 커틴을 .

You can see this very good Cryptographic Snake Oil Examples by Emility Ratliff (IBM Architect at Linux Security), that tried to make clear example on how to spot Cryptographic Snake Oil.

Here represented the basic guideline from Matt Curtin paper:


By checking that points it's possible to evaluate how serious an encryption technology or product is.

But all in all how to fix that unethical security approach?

It's very significative and it would be really useful for each kind of security product category to make some strongly and independent evaluation guideline (like OSSTMM for Penetration testing) , to make this security evaluation process really in the hands of the user.

It would be also very nice to have someone making analysis and evaluation of security product companies, publishing reports about Snake Oil signs.

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Web2.0 privacy leak in Mobile apps

You know that web2.0 world it's plenty of leak of any kind (profiling, profiling, profiling) related to Privacy and users starts being concerned about it.

Users continuously download applications without knowing the details of what they do, for example iFart just because are cool, are fun and sometime are useful.

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On mobile phones users install from 1000% up to 10.000% more applications than on a PC, and those apps may contain malware or other unexpected functionalities.

Recently infobyte analyzed ubertwitter client and discovered that the client was leaking and sending to their server many personal and sensitive data such as:

- Blackberry PIN

- Phone Number

- Email Address

- Geographic positioning information

Read about UbertTwitter 'spyware' features discovery here by infoByte .

It's plenty of applications leaking private and sensitive information but just nobody have a look at it.

Should mandatory data retention and privacy policies became part of application development and submission guideline for mobile application?

Imho a users must not only be warned about the application capabilities and API usage but also what will do with which kind of information it's going to handle inside the mobile phone.

Capabilities means authorizing the application to use a certain functionalities, for example to use GeoLocation API, but what the application will do and to who will provide such information once the user have authorized it?

That's a security profiling level that mobile phone manufacturer does not provide and they should, because it focus on the information and not on the application authorization/permission respect to the usage of device capabilities.

ps yes! ok! I agree! This kind of post would require 3-4 pages long discussion as the topic is hot and quite articulated but it's saturday morning and i gotta go!

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AES algorithm selected for use in space

I encountered a nice paper regarding analysis and consideration on which encryption algorithm it's best suited for use in the space by space ship and equipments.

The paper has been done by the Consultative Committee for Space Data Systems that's a consortium of all space agency around that cumulatively handled more than 400 mission to space .

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Read the paper Encryption Algorithm Trade Survey as it gives interesting consideration and comparison between different encryption algorithms.

Obviously the finally selected algorithm is AES , while KASUMI (used in UMTS networks) was avoided.

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Blackberry Security and Encryption: Devil or Angel?

Blackberry have good and bad reputation regarding his security capability, depending from which angle you look at it.

This post it's a summarized set of information to let the reader the get picture, without taking much a position as RIM and Blackberry can be considered, depending on the point of view, an extremely secure platform or an extremely dangerous one .

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Let's goes on.

On one side Blackberry it's a platform plenty of encryption features, security features everywhere, device encrypted (with custom crypto), communication encrypted (with custom proprietary protocols such as IPPP), very good Advanced Security Settings, Encryption framework from Certicom ( now owned by RIM ).

On the other side they does not provide only a device but an overlay access network, called BIS ( Blackberry Internet Service ), that's a global worldwide wide area network where your blackberry enter while you browse or checkmail using blackberry.net AP.

When you, or an application, use the blackberry.net APN you are not just connecting to the internet with the carrier internet connection, but you are entering inside the RIM network that will proxy and act as a gateway to reach the internet.

The very same happen when you have a corporate use: Both the BB device and the corporate BES connect to the RIM network that act as a sort of vpn concentration network .

So basically all the communications cross trough RIM service infrastructure in encrypted format with a set proprietary encryption and communication protocols.

Just as a notice, think that google to provide gtalk over blackberry.net APN, made an agreement in order to offer service inside the BB network to the BB users. When you install gtalk you get added 3 service books that point to GTALKNA01 that's the name of GTALK gateway inside the RIM network to allow intra-BIS communication and act as a GTALK gateway to the internet.

The mobile operators usually are not even allowed to inspect the traffic between the Blackberry device and the Blackberry Network.

So RIM and Blackberry are somehow unique for their approach as they provide a platform, a network and a service all bundled together and you cannot just “get the device and the software” but the user and the corporate are always bound and connected to the service network.

That's good and that's bad, because it means that RIM provide extremely good security features and capabilities to protect information, device and access to information at various level against third party .

But it's always difficult to estimate the threat and risk related to RIM itself and who could make political pressure against RIM.

Please consider that i am not saying “RIM is looking at your data” but making an objective risk analysis: for how the platform is done RIM have authority on the device, on the information on-the-device and on the information that cross the network. (Read my Mobile Security Slides ).

For example let's consider the very same context for Nokia phones.

Once the Nokia device is sold, Nokia does not have authority on the device, nor on the information on-the-device nor on the information that cross the network. But it's also true that Nokia just provide the device and does not provide the value added services such as the Enterprise integration (The RIM VPN tunnel), the BIS access network and all the local and remote security provisioned features that Blackberry provide.

So it's a matter of considering the risk context in the proper way when choosing the platform, with an example very similar to choosing Microsoft Exchange Server (on your own service) or whether getting a SaaS service like Google Apps.

In both case you need to trust the provider, but in first example you need to trust Microsoft that does not put a backdoor on the software while in the 2nd example you need to trust Google, as a platform and service provider, that does not access your information.

So it's a different paradigm to be evaluated depending on your threat model.

If your threat model let you consider RIM as a trusted third party service provider (much like google) than it's ok. If you have a very high risk context, like top-secret one, then let's consider and evaluate carefully whether it's not better to keep the Blackberry services fully isolated from the device or use another system without interaction with manufacturer servers and services.

Now, let's get back to some research and some facts about blackberry and blackberry security itself.

First of all several governments had to deal with RIM in order to force them to provide access to the information that cross their service networks while other decided to directly ban Blackberry usage for high officials because of servers located in UK and USA, while other decided to install their own backdoors.

There's a lot of discussion when the topics are RIM Blackberry and Governments for various reasons.

Below a set of official Security related information on RIM blackberry platform:

And here a set of unofficial Security and Hacking related information on RIM Blackberry platform:

Because it's 23.32 (GMT+1), i am tired, i think that this post will end up here.

I hope to have provided the reader a set of useful information and consideration to go more in depth in analyzing and considering the overall blackberry security (in the good and in the bad, it always depends on your threat model!).

건배

Fabio Pietrosanti (naif)

ps i am managing security technology development (voice encryption tech) on Blackberry platform, and i can tell you that from the development point of view it's absolutely better than Nokia in terms of compatibility and speed of development, but use only RIMOS 5.0+ !

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Celebrating “Hackers” after 25 years

A cult book , ever green since 25 years.

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It's been 25 years since “Hackers” was published. Author Steven Levy reflects on the book and the movement.

http://radar.oreilly.com/2010/06/hackers-at-25.html Steven Levy wrote a book in the mid-1980s that introduced the term "hacker" -- the positive connotation -- to a wide audience. In the ensuing 25 years, that word and its accompanying community have gone through tremendous change. The book itself became a mainstay in tech libraries.O'Reilly recently released an updated 25th anniversary edition of "Hackers," so I checked in with Levy to discuss the book's development, its influence, and the role hackers continue to play.
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Botnet for RSA cracking?

I read an interesting article about putting 1.000.000 computers, given the chance for a serious botnet owner to get it, to crack RSA.

The result is that in such context attacking an RSA 1024bit key would take only 28 years, compared to theoretical 19 billion of years.

Reading of this article , is extremely interesting because it gives our very important consideration on the cryptography strength respect to the computation power required to carry on cracking attempt, along with industry approach to “default security level”.

I would say a must read .

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China Encryption Regulations

Hi all,

i found this very interesting paper on China Encryption Import/Export/Domestic Regulations done by Baker&Mckenzie in the US.

It's strongly business and regulatory oriented giving a very well done view on how china regulations works and how it may behave in future.

Read here Decrypting China Encryption's Regulations (form Bakernet website) .

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IOScat – a Port of Netcat to Cisco IOS

A porting of famous netcat to Cisco IOS router operating system: IOSCat

The only main limit is that it does not support UDP, but that's a very cool tool!

A very good txt to read is Netcat hacker Manual .

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The (old) Crypto AG case and some thinking about it

In the '90, closed source and proprietary cryptography was ruling the world.

That's before open source and scientifically approved encrypted technologies went out as a best practice to do crypto stuff.

I would like to remind when, in 1992, USA along with Israel was, together with switzerland, providing backdoored (proprietary and secret) technologies to Iranian government to tap their communications, cheating them to think that the used solution was secure , making also some consideration on this today in 2010.

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That's called The Crypto AG case , an historical fact involving the United States National Security Agency along with Signal Intelligence Division of Israel Ministry of Defense that are strongly suspected to had made an agreement with the Swiss cryptography producer company Crypto AG .

Basically those entities placed a backdoor in the secure crypto equipment that they provided to Iran to intercept Iranian communications.

Their crypto was based on secret and proprietary encryption algorithms developed by Crypto AG and eventually customized for Iranian government.

You can read some other facts about Crypto AG backdoor related issues:

The demise of global telecommunication security

The NSA-Crypto AG sting

Breaking codes: an impossible task? By BBC

Der Spiegel Crypto AG (german) article

Now, in 2010, we all know and understand that secret and proprietary crypto does not work.

Just some reference by top worldwide cryptographic experts below:

Secrecy, Security, Obscurity by Bruce Schneier

Just say No to Proprietary cryptographic Algorithms by Network Computing (Mike Fratto)

Security Through Obscurity by Ceria Purdue University

Unlocking the Secrets of Crypto: Cryptography, Encryption and Cryptology explained by Symantec

Time change the way things are approached.

I like very much the famous Philip Zimmermann assertion:

“Cryptography used to be an obscure science, of little relevance to everyday life. Historically, it always had a special role in military and diplomatic communications. But in the Information Age, cryptography is about political power, and in particular, about the power relationship between a government and its people. It is about the right to privacy, freedom of speech, freedom of political association, freedom of the press, freedom from unreasonable search and seizure, freedom to be left alone.”

Any scientist today accept and approve the Kerckhoffs' Principle that in 1883 in the Cryptographie Militaire paper stated:

The security of a cryptosystem should not depend on keeping the algorithm secret, but only on keeping the numeric key secret.

It's absolutely clear that the best practice for doing cryptography today obbly any serious person to do open cryptography, subject to public review and that follow the Kerckhoff principle.

So, what we should think about closed source, proprietary cryptography that's based on security trough obscurity concepts?

I was EXTREMELY astonished when TODAY, in 2010, in the age of information society i read some paper on Crypto AG website.

I invite all to read the Crypto AG security paper called Sophisticated Security Architecture designed by Crypto AG of which you can get a significant excerpt below:

The design of this architecture allows Crypto AG to provide a secret proprietary algorithm that can be specified for each customer to assure the perfect degree of cryptographic security and optimum support for the customer's security policy. In turn, the Security Architecture gives you the influence you need to be fully independent in respect of your encryption solution. You can determine all areas that are covered by cryptography and verify how the algorithm works. The original secret proprietary algorithm of Crypto AG is the foundation of the Security Architecture .

I have to say that their architecture is absolutely good from TLC point of view. Also they have done a very good job in making the design of the overall architecture in order to make a tamper-proof resistant crypto system by using dedicated crypto processor .
However there is still something missing:

T he overall cryptographic concept is misleading, based on wrong encryption concepts .

You may think that i am a troll telling this, but given the history of Crypto AG and given the fact that all the scientific and security community does not approve security trough obscurity concepts , it would legitimate to ask ourself:

Why they are still doing security trough obscurity cryptography with secret and proprietary algorithms ?



Hey, i think that they have very depth knowledge on telecommunication and security, but given that the science tell us not to follow the secrecy of algorithms, i really have serious doubt on why they are still providing proprietary encryption and does not move to standard solutions (eventually with some kind of custom enhancement).

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Missiles against cyber attacks?

The cyber conflicts are really reaching a point where war and cyberwar merge together.

NATO countries have the right to use the force against attacks on computer networks .

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Mobile Security talk at WHYMCA conference

I want to share some slides i used to talk about mobile security at whymca mobile conference in Milan.

Read here my slides on mobile security .

The slides provide a wide an in-depth overview of mobile security related matters, i should be doing some slidecast about it putting also audio. Maybe will do, maybe not, it depends on time that's always a insufficient resource.

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iPhone PIN: useless encryption

I recently switched one of my multiple mobile phones with which i go around to iPhone.

I am particularly concerned about data protection in case of theft and so started having a look around about the iPhone provided protection system.

There is an interesting set of iPhone Business Security Features that make me think that iPhone is moving in the right path for security protection of the phone, but still a lot of things has to be done, especially for serious Enterprise and Government users.

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For example it turned out that the iPhone PIN protection is useless and it can be broken just plugging the iPhone to a Linux machine and accessing the device like a USB stick.

That's something disturbing my paranoid mindset that make me think not to use sensitive data on my iPhone if i cannot protect my data.

Probably an iPhone independent disk encryption product would be very useful in order to let the market create protection schemas that fit the different risk contexts that different users may have.

Probably a general consumer is not worried about this PIN vulnerability but for me, working within highly confidential envirnonment such as intelligence, finance and military, it's something that i cannot accept.

I need strong disk encryption on my mobile phone.

I do strong voice encryption for it , but it would be really nice to have also something to protect the whole iPhone data and not just phone calls.

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Who extract Oil in Iran? Business and UN sanction together

I like geopolitic and i am following carefully iran issues.

I went to National Iranian Oil Company website and have seen “ Exploration & Production ” section where are listed all the companies and their country of origin that are allowed to make Exploration of oil in Iran.

On that list we find the list of countries along with the data of signing of exploration agreement:

  • Norway/Russia (2000)
  • Australia/Spain/Chile (2001)
  • India (2002)
  • China (2001)
  • Brazil (2004)
  • Spain (2004)
  • Thailand (2005)
  • China x 2 (2005)
  • Norway (2006)
  • Italy (2008)
  • Vietnam (2008)

Those countries's oil companies are allowed to do oil extraction in Iran and i would like to point out that Iran is the 2nd world Oil Reserve just after Saudi Arabia.

As you can see there's NO USA company doing extraction.

Of European Countries the only one doing business with IRAN are:

IRAN Norway Relationship

IRAN ITALY Relationship

IRAN SPAIN Relationship

While of the well known non-US-simpatizing countries, the one doing Oil business with Iran are:

IRAN RUSSIA Relationship

IRAN BRAZIL Relationship

IRAN China Relationship

Don't missing some Asian involvement.

IRAN India Relationship

IRAN Vietnam Relationship

As you can see Iran is doing Oil business with most big south America and Far Asia countries, with some little exception in Europe for what apply to Norway, Italy and Spain.

To me it sounds that those European countries are going to face serious trouble whether they will accept and subscribe UN sanction against Iran.

Or some of them, like Italy, are protected by the strenghtening cooperation they are doing with Russia on Energy matters?

Well, i don't know how things will end up, but it's possible the most hypocrit countries like the European ones doing business in Iran while applying Sanctions will be the only European winning in the international competition for Iran Oil (Unless France did not drop a nuclear bomb on theran ;) ).

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Exploit code against SecurStar DriveCrypt published

It seems that the hacking community somehow like to target securstar products, maybe because hacking community doesn't like the often revealed unethical approach already previously described in this blog by articles and user's comments.

In 2004 a lot of accusation against Hafner of SecurStar went out because of alleged intellectual property theft regarding opensource codes such as Encryption 4 the masses and legal advert also against the Free and opensource TrueCrypt project .

In 2008 there was a pre-boot authentication hacking against DriveCrypt Plus posted on Full-Disclosure.

Early 2010 it was the time of the fake infosecurity research secretly sponsored by securstar at http://infosecurityguard.com (that now they tried to remove from the web because of embarrassing situation, but backup of the story are available, hacking community still wait for apologies) .

Now, mid 2010, following a research published in December 2009 about Disk Encryption software vulnerabilities made by Neil Kettle (mu-b), Security researcher at digit-labs and Penetration tester at Convergent Network Solutions , DriveCrypt was found to be vulnerable and exploitable breaking on-device security of the system and exploit code has been just released.

Exploit code reported below (thanks Neil for the code release!):

  • Arbitrary kernel code execution security exploit of DriveCrypt: drivecrypt-dcr.c
  • Arbitrary file reading/writing security exploit via unchecked user-definable parameters to ZxCreateFile/ReadFile/ WriteFile: drivecrypt-fopen.c

The exploit code has been tested against DriveCrypt 5.3, currently released DriveCrypt 5.4 is reported to be vulnerable too as it has just minor changes related to win7 compatibility. Can anyone make a double check and report a comment here?

Very good job Neil!

In the meantime the Free Truecrypt is probably the preferred choice for disk encryption, given the fact that it's difficult to trust DriveCrypt, PGP has been acquired by Symantec and there are very bad rumors about the trust that people have in Symantec and there are not many widely available alternatives.

Rumors say that also PhoneCrypt binaries are getting analyzed and the proprietary encryption system could reveal something fun…

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Quantum cryptography broken

Quantum cryptography it's something very challenging, encryption methods that leverage the law of phisycs to secure communications over fiber lines.

To oversimplify the system is based on the fact that if someone cut the fiber, put a tap in the middle, and joint together the other side of the fiber, the amount of “errors” that will be on the communications path will be higher than 20% .

So if QBER (Quantum Bit Error Rate) goes above 20% then it's assumed that the system is intercepted.

Researcher at university of toronto was able to cheat the system with a staying below the 20%, at 19.7% , thus tweaking the threshold used by the system to consider the communication channel secure vs compromised.

The product found vulnerable is called Cerberis Layer2 and produced by the Swiss ID Quantique .

Some possibile approach to detect the attack has been provided but probably, imho, such kind of systems does not have to be considered 100% reliable until the technology will be mature enough.

Traditional encryption has to be used together till several years, eventually bundled with quantum encryption whether applicable.

When we will see a quantum encryption systems on an RFC like we have seen for ZRTP , PGP and SSL ?

-naif

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FUN! Infosecurity consideration on some well known films

Please read it carefully Film that needed better infosec .

One the the review, imho the most fun one on film Star Wars :

The scene

Death star getting blown up

Infosec Analysis

Darth Vader must be heralded as the prime example of a chief executive who really didn't care about information security. The entire board was unapproachable and clearly no system testing was undertaken. The network security was so poor that it was hacked into and the designs for the death star were stolen without anyone knowing.

Even worse than that, the death star had a major design flaw where by dropping a bomb thingy into a big hole on the outside, it actually blew up the entire thing!

Darth Vader needed to employ a good Security Consultant to sit on the executive board and promise not to force choke him. Should have commissioned a full risk assessment of the death star followed by a full penetration test. Only then should the death star have been released into the production environment.

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great point of view

Because security of a cryptographic system it's not a matter of “how many bits do i use” but using the right approach to do the right thing to mitigate the defined security risk in the most balanced way.

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Encryption is not scrambling: be aware of scrambler!

Most of us know about voice scrambler that can be used across almost any kind of voice based communication technology.

Extremely flexible approach: works everything

Extreme performance: very low latency

but unfortunately…

Extremely weak: Scrambling cannot be considered secure.

Only encryption can be considered secure under the Kerckoff's principle .

So please don't even consider any kind of analog scrambler if you need real security.

Read deeply the paper Implementation of a real-time voice encryption system ” by Markus Brandau, especially the cryptoanalysis paragraph.

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Evidence that infosecurityguard.com/notrax is SecurStar GmbH Phonecrypt – A fake independent research on voice crypto

Below evidence that the security review made by an anonymous hacker on http://infosecurityguard.com is in facts a dishonest marketing plan by the SecurStar GmbH to promote their voice crypto product.

I already wrote about that voice crypto analysis that appeared to me very suspicious.

Now it's confirmed, it's a fake independent hacker security research by SecurStar GmbH, its just a marketing trick!

How do we know that Infosecurityguard.com, the fake independent security research, is a marketing trick from SecurStar GmbH?

1) I posted on http://infosecurityguard.com a comments to a post with a link to my blog to that article on israelian ministry of defense certification

2) The author of http://infosecurityguard.com went to approve the comment and read the link on my own blog http://infosecurity.ch

3) Reaching my blog he leaked the IP address from which he was coming 217.7.213.59 (where i just clicked on from wordpress statistic interface)

4) On http:// 217.7.213.59/panel there is the IP PBX interface of the SecurStar GmbH corporate PBX (openly reachable trough the internet!)

5) The names of the internal PBX confirm 100% that it's the SecurStar GmbH:

6) There is 100% evidence that the anonymous hacker of http://infosecurityguard.com is from SecurStar GmbH

Below the data and reference that let us discover that it's all but a dishonest marketing tips and not an independent security research.

Kudos to Matteo Flora for it's support and for his article in Debunking Infosecurityguard identity !

The http referral tricks

When you read a link going from a website to another one there is an HTTP protocol header, the “Referral”, that tell you from which page someone is going to another webpage.

The referral demonstrated that the authors of http://infosecurityguard.com read my post, because it was coming from http://infosecurityguard.com/wp-admin/edit-comments.php that's the webpage you use as a wordpress author/editor to approve/refuse comments. And here there was the link.

That's the log entry:

217.7.213.59 – - [30/Jan/2010:02:56:37 -0700] “GET /20100129/licensed-by-israel-ministry-of-defense-how-things-really-works/ HTTP/1.0″ 200 5795 “ http://infosecurityguard.com/wp-admin/edit-comments.php ” “Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.1; Trident/4.0; GTB6.3; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; InfoPath.2)”

The PBX open on the internet tell us that's SecurStar GmbH

The SecurStar GmbH PBX is open on the internet, it contains all the names of their employee and confirm us that the author of http:/infosecurityguard.com is that company and is the anonymous hacker called Notrax.

Here there is their forum post where the SecurStar GmbH guys are debugging IPCOPfirewall & Asterisk together (so we see also details of what they use) where there is the ip 217.7.213.59 .

SecurStarproof.png

That's also really fun!

They sell secure telephony but their company telephony system is openly vulnerable on the internet . :-)

I was thinking to call the CEO, Hafner, via SIP on his internal desktop PBX to announce we discovered him tricks.. :->

They measured their marketing activity

Looking at the logs of my website i found that they was sensing the google distribution of information for the following keywords, in order to understand how effectively they was able to attack competing products. It's reasonable, if you invest money in a marketing campaign you want to see the results :-)

They reached my blog and i logged their search:

infosecurityguard+cryptophone

infosecurityguard+gold-lock

217.7.213.59 – - [30/Jan/2010:02:22:42 -0700] “GET / HTTP/1.0″ 200 31057 “Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.1; Trident/4.0; GTB6.3; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; InfoPath.2)”

217.7.213.59 – - [30/Jan/2010:04:15:07 -0700] “GET HTTP/1.0″ 200 15774 “Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.1; Trident/4.0; GTB6.3; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; InfoPath.2)”


The domain registration data

The domain have been registered on 1st December 2009, just two months to start preparing the dishonest marketing campaign:

Domain Name: INFOSECURITYGUARD.COM

Registrar: GODADDY.COM, INC.

Updated Date: 01-dec-2009

Creation Date: 01-dec-2009

The domain is anonymously privacy protected trough a whois privacy service:

Administrative Contact: Private, Registration INFOSECURITYGUARD.COM@domainsbyproxy.com , Domains by Proxy, Inc. DomainsByProxy.com

Notrax hacker does not exist on google
As you know any hacker that get public usually have presence of it's activity on google, attending mailinglists, forum, homepage, past research, participation to conferences, etc, etc.
The fake hacker that they wanted us to to think was writing an independent blog does NOT have any trace on google. Only some hit about an anonymous browser called Notrax but nothing about that hacker.
Maybe when SecurStar provided the anonymity tool to their marketing agency, to help them protecting anonymity for the fake research, their provided them the anonymous browser notrax.So the marketing guy thinking about the nickname of this fake hackers used what? Notrax! :-)

The “independent review”completely oriented in publicizing PhoneCrypt

Of the various review don the phonecrypt review is only positive and amazing good feedback, while the other are only bad feedback and no single good point.

As you can imagine, in any kind of independent product evaluation, for all products there are goods and bad points. No. In this one there are only product that are good and product that are bad.

They missed to consider the security of the technology used by the products

They completely avoided to speak about cryptography and security of the products.

They do not evaluated basic security features that must be in that kind of products.That's in order not to let anyone see that they did not followed basic security rules in building up their PhoneCrypt.
The technology is closed source, no transparency on algorithms and protocols, no peer review.Read my new comparison (from the basic cryptographic requirement point of view) About the voice encryption analysis (criteria, errors and different results) .
The results are somehow different than their one .

UPDATE: Who's Wilfried Hafner (SecurStar founder) ?

I got a notice from a reader regarding Wilfred Hafner, SecurStar founder, CEO and security expert.

He was arrested in 1997 for telephony related fraud (check 2nd article on Phrack) earning from telephony fraud 254.000 USD causing damages to local telcos trough blueboxing for 1.15 Million USD.

He was not doing “Blueboxing” for the pleasure of phreaking and connecting with other hackers, but to earn money.

Hacking for profit (and not for fun) in 1997… brrr…. No hacker's ethic at all!

All in all, is that lawful?

Badmouthing a competitor amounts to an unfair competition practice in most jurisdictions, so it is arguable (to say the least) that SecurStar is right on a legally sound ground here.
Moreover, there are some specific statutes in certain jurisdictions which provide for a straightforward ban on the practice we are talking about. For example in the UK the British Institute of Practitioners in Advertising - in compliance with the Consumer protection from Unfair Trading regulation – ruled that:

”falsely claiming or creating the impression that the trader is not acting for the purposes relating to his trade, business, craft or profession, or falsely representing oneself as a consumer” is a criminal offense .

We have no doubt that PRPR (which is the UK-based *PR company for SecurStar GmbH, led by Peter Rennison and Allie Andrews as stated in SecurStar Press Release ) did provide their client with this information. Heck, they *are* in the UK, they simply cannot ignore that!

IANAL, but I would not be surpised if someone filed a criminal complaint or start civil litigation for unfair competition against SecurStar GmbH.
Whether this is going to be a matter for criminal and/or civil Courts or not is not that important. However, it is clear enough that SecurStar GmbH appears to be at least ethically questionable and not really worth of trust.

Nice try, gentlemen… however, next time just do it right (whether “right” for them means “in a honest manner” or “in a fashion not to be caught” I will let them choose)”

Fabio Pietrosanti (naif)

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Dishonest security: The SecurStart GmbH Phonecrypt case

I would like to provide considerations on the concept of ethics that a security company should have respect to the users, the media and the security environment.

SecurStar GmbH made very bad things making that infosecuriguard.com fake independent research.

It's unfair approach respect to hacking community.

It's unfair marketing to end user. They should not be tricking by creating fake independent review.

It's unfair competition in the security market.

Let's make some more important consideration on this.

Must be serious on cryptographic products. They are not toys

When you do cryptographic tools you should be really aware of what you are doing, you must be really serious.

If you do bad crypto people could die.

If you don't follow basic security rules for transparency and security for cryptography you are putting people life at risk.

You are taking the responsibility of this. (I want to sleep at night, don't think SecurStar CEO/CTO care about this…)

Security research need reference and transparency

Security research have to be public, well done, always subject to public discussion and cooperation.
Security research should not be instrumentally used for marketing purpose.Security research should be done for awareness and grow of the knowledge of the worldwide security environment.

Hacking environment is neutral, should not be used instrumentally

Hackers are considered neutral, nerds, doing what they do for their pleasure and passion.

If you work in the security market you work with hackers.

If you use hackers and hacking environment for your own marketing purposes you are making something very nasty.

Hackers give you the technology and knowledge and you use them for your own commercial purpose.

Consideration on the authority of the information online

That's something that pose serious consideration on the authority of information online.An anonymous hacker, with no reference online, made a product security review that appear like an independent one. I have to say that the fake review was very well prepared, it always posed good/bad things in an indirect way. It did not appeared to me at 1st time like a fake. But going deeply i found what's going on.

However Journalists, news media and blogger went to the TRAP and reviewed their fake research. TheRegister, NetworkWorld and a lot of blogs reported it. Even if the author was completely anonymous.

What they have done is already illegal in UK

SecurStar GmbH is lucky that they are not in the UK, where doing this kind of things is illegal .

Fabio Pietrosanti (naif)

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About the SecurStar GmbH Phonecrypt voice encryption analysis (criteria, errors and different results)

This article want to clarify and better explain the finding at infosecurityguard.com regaring voice encryption product evaluation.
This article want to tell you a different point of view other than infosecurityguard.com and explaining which are the rational with extensive explaination from security point of view.
Today i read news saying: “PhoneCrypt: Basic Vulnerability Found in 12 out of 15 Voice Encryption Products and went to read the website infosecurityguard .

Initially it appeared to my like a great research activity but then i started reading deeply the read about it.I found that it's not properly a security research but there is are concrete elements that's a marketing campaign well done in order to attract public media and publicize a product.
Imho they was able to cheat journalists and users because the marketing campaign was absolutely well done not to be discovered on 1st read attempt. I personally considered it like a valid one on 1st ready (they cheated me initially!).

But if you go deeply… you will understand that:
- it's a camouflage marketing initiative arranged by SecurStar GmbH and not a independent security research
- they consider a only security context where local device has been compromised (no software can be secured in that case, like saying SSL can be compromised if you have a trojan!)
- they do not consider any basic security and cryptographic security criteria

However a lot of important website reported it:

This article is quite long, if you read it you will understand better what's going on around infosecurityguard.com research and research result.

I want to to tell you why and how (imho) they are wrong.

The research missed to consider Security, Cryptography and Transparency!

Well, all this research sound much like being focused on the marketing goal to say that their PhoneCrypt product is the “super” product best of all the other ones.
Any security expert that would have as duty the “software evaluation” in order to protect the confidentiality of phone calls will evaluate other different characteristics of the product and the technology.

Yes, it's true that most of the product described by SecurStar in their anonymous marketing website called http://infosecurityguard.com have some weakness.
But the relevant weakness are others and PhoneCrypt unfortunately, like most of the described products suffer from this.
Let's review which characteristics are needed basic cryptography and security requirement (the best practice, the foundation and the basics!)

a – Security Trough Obscurity does not work

A basic rule in cryptography cames from 1883 by Auguste Kerckhoffs:

In a well-designed cryptographic system, only the key needs to be secret; there should be no secrecy in the algorithm.
Modern cryptographers have embraced this principle, calling anything else “security by obscurity.”
Read what Bruce Schneir, recognized expert and cryptographer in the world say about this
Any security expert will tell you that's true. Even a novice university student will tell you that's true. Simply because that's the only way to do cryptography.
Almost all product described in the review by SecurStar GmbH, include PhoneCrypt, does not provide precise details about their cryptographic technologies.
Precise details are:
  • Detailed specification of cryptographic algorithm (that's not just saying “we use AES “)
  • Detailed specification of cryptographic protocol (that's not just saying “we use Diffie Hellman ” )
  • Detailed specification of measuring the cryptographic strenght (that's not just saying “we have 10000000 bit key size “)

Providing precise details means having extensive documentation with theoretical and practical implications documenting ANY single way of how the algorithm works, how the protocol works with precise specification to replicate it for interoperability testing.
It means that scientific community should be able to play with the technology, audit it, hack it.
If we don't know anything about the cryptographic system in details, how can we know which are the weakness and strength points?

Mike Fratto, Site editor of Network Computing, made a great article on “Saying NO to proprietary cryptographic systems” .
Cerias Purdue University tell this .

b – NON peer reviewed and NON scientifically approved Cryptography does not work

In any case and in any condition you do cryptography you need to be sure that someone else will check, review, analyze, distruct and reconstract from scratch your technology and provide those information free to the public for open discussion.
That's exactly how AES was born and like US National Institute of Standard make crypto does (with public contest with public peer review where only the best evaluated win).
A public discussion with a public contest where the a lot of review by most famous and expert cryptographer in the world, hackers (with their name,surname and face, not like Notrax) provide their contribution, tell what they thinks.
That's called “peer review”.

If a cryptographic technology has an extended and important peer review, distributed in the world coming from universities, private security companies, military institutions, hackers and all coming from different part of the world (from USA to Europe to Russia to South America to Middle east to China) and all of them agree that a specific technology it's secure…
Well, in that case we can consider the technology secure because a lot of entities with good reputation and authority coming from a lot of different place in the world have publicly reviewed, analyzed and confirmed that a technology it's secure.

How a private company can even think to invent on it's own a secure communication protocol when it's scientifically stated that it's not possible to do it in a “proprietary and closed way” ?
IBM tell you that peer review it's required for cryptography .
Bruce Schneier tell you that “Good cryptographers know that nothing substitutes for extensive peer review and years of analysis.”
Philip Zimmermann will tell you to beware of Snake Oil where the story is: “Every software engineer fancies himself a cryptographer, which has led to the proliferation of really bad crypto software.”

c – Closed source cryptography does not work

As you know any kind of “serious” and with “good reputation” cryptographic technology is implemented in opensource.
There are usually multiple implementation of the same cryptographic algorithm and cryptographic protocol to be able to review all the way it works and certify the interoperability.
Supposing to use a standard with precise and extended details on “how it works”, that has been “peer reviewed” by the scientific community BUT that has been re-implemented from scratch by a not so smart programmer and the implementation it's plenty of bugs.

Well, if the implementation is “opensource” this means that it can be reviewed, improved, tested, audited and the end user will certaintly have in it's own had a piece of technology “that works safely” .

Google release opensource crypto toolkit
Mozilla release opensource crypto toolkit
Bruce Schneier tell you that Cryptography must be opensource .

Another cryptographic point of view

I don't want to convince anyone but just provide facts related to science, related to cryptography and security in order to reduce the effect of misinformation done by security companies whose only goes is to sell you something and not to do something that make the world a better.

When you do secure products, if they are not done following the proper approach people could die.
It's absolutely something irresponsible not to use best practice to do crypto stuff.

To summarize let's review the infosecurityguard.com review from a security best pratice point of view.

Product name Security Trough Obscurity Public peer review Open Source Compromise locally?
Caspertec Obscurity No public review Closed
CellCrypt Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Cryptophone Transparency Limited public review Public
Gold-Lock Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Illix Obscurity
No public review
Closed
No1.BC Obscurity No public review
Closed
PhoneCrypt Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Rode&Swarz Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Secure-Voice Obscurity
No public review
Closed
SecuSmart Obscurity
No public review
Closed
SecVoice Obscurity
No public review
Closed
SegureGSM Obscurity
No public review
Closed
SnapCell Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Tripleton Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Zfone Transparency Public review
Open
ZRTP Transparency Public review
Open

*Green means that it match basic requirement for a cryptographic secure system

* Red / Broken means that it does not match basic requirement for a cryptographic secure system
That's my analysis using a evaluation method based on cryptographic and security parameters not including the local compromise context that i consider useless.

However, to be clear, those are only basic parameters to be used when considering a voice encryption product (just to avoid being in a situation that appears like i am promoting other products). So it may absolutely possible that a product with good crypto ( transparency, peer reviewed and opensource) is absolutely a not secure product because of whatever reason (badly written, not usable causing user not to use it and use cleartext calls, politically compromised, etc, etc).
I think i will prepare a broader criteria for voice crypto technologies and voice crypto products, so it would be much easier and much practical to have a full transparent set of criterias to evaluate it.

But those are really the basis of security to be matched for a good voice encryption system!
Read some useful past slides on security protocols used in voice encryption systems (2nd part).

Now read below some more practical doubt about their research.

The security concept of the review is misleading: any hacked device can be always intercepted!

I think that the guys completely missed the point: ANY KIND OF SOFTWARE RUNNING ON A COMPROMISED OPERATING SYSTEM CAN BE INTERCEPTED

Now they are pointing out that also Zfone from Philip Zimmermann is broken (a pc software), just because they install a trojan on a PC like in a mobile phone?
Any security software rely on the fact that the underlying operating system is somehow trusted and preserve the integrity of the environment where the software run.

  • If you have a disk encryption system but your PC if infected by a trojan, the computer is already compromised.
  • If you have a voice encryption system but your PC is infected by a trojan, the computer is already compromised.
  • If you have a voice encryption system but your mobile phone is infected by a trojan, the mobile phone is already compromised.

No matter which software you are running, in such case the security of your operating environment is compromised and in one way or another way all the information integrity and confidentiality is compromised.

Like i explained above how to intercept PhoneCrypt.

The only things that can protect you from this threat is running in a closed operating system with Trust Computing capability, implementing it properly.
For sure on any “Open” operating system such us Windows, Windows Mobile, Linux, iPhone or Android there's no chance to really protect a software.
On difficult operating system such as Symbian OS or RimOS maybe the running software can be protected (at least partially)

That's the reason for which the security concept that guys are leveraging to carry on their marketing campaign has no clue.
It's just because they control the environment, they know Flexispy software and so they adjusted their software not to be interceptable when Flexispy is installed.
If you develop a trojan with the other techniques i described above you will 100% intercept PhoneCrypt.

On that subject also Dustin Tamme l, Security researcher of BreakPoint Systems , pointed on on VoIP Security Alliance mailing lists that the security analysis is based on wrong concepts .

The PhoneCrypt can be intercepted: it's just that they don't wanted to tell you!

PhoneCrypt can be intercepted with “on device spyware”.
Why?
Because Windows Mobile is an unsecure operating environment and PhoneCrypt runs on Windows Mobile.
Windows Mobile does not use Trusted Computing and so any software can do anything.
The platform choice for a secure telephony system is important.
How?
I quickly discussed with some knowledgeable windows mobile hackers about 2 different way to intercept PhoneCrypt with an on-device spyware (given the unsecure Windows Mobile Platform).

a) Inject a malicious DLL into the software and intercept from within the Phonecrypt itself.
In Windows Mobile any software can be subject to DLL code injection.
What an attacker can do is to inject into the PhoneCrypt software (or any software running on the phone), hooking the Audio related functions acting as a “function proxy” between the PhoneCrypt and the real API to record/play audio.
It's a matter of “hooking” only 2 functions, the one that record and the one that play audio.
Read the official Microsoft documentation on how to do DLL injection on Windows Mobile processes. or forum discussing the technique of injecting DLL on windows mobile processes.
That's simple, any programmer will tell you to do so.
They simply decided that's better not to make any notice about this.
b) Create a new audio driver that simply act as a proxy to the real one and intercept PhoneCrypt
In Windows Mobile you can create new Audio Drivers and new Audio Filters.
What an attacker can do is to load a new audio driver that does not do anything else than passing the real audio driver function TO/FROM the realone. In the meantime intercept everything recorded and everything played :-)
Here there is an example on how to do Audio driver for Windows Mobile .
Here a software that implement what i explain here for Windows “Virtual Audio Cable” .
아주 똑같은 컨셉은 윈도우 모바일에 적용됩니다. Check the book “Mobile Malware Attack and Defense” at that link explaining techniques to play with those techniques.
They simply decided that's better not to make any notice to that way of intercepting phone call on PhoneCrypt .
Those are just 2 quick ideas, more can be probably done.

Sounds much like a marketing activity – Not a security research.

I have to tell you. I analyzed the issue very carefully and on most aspects. All this things about the voice encryption analisys sounds to me like a marketing campaign of SecurStar GmbH to sell PhoneCrypt and gain reputation. A well articulated and well prepared campaign to attract the media saying, in an indirect way cheating the media, that PhoneCrypt is the only one secure. You see the press releases of SecurStar and of the “Security researcher Notrax telling that PhoneCrypt is the only secure product” . SecurStar PhoneCrypt is the only product the anonymous hacker “Notrax” consider secure of the “software solutions”.
The only “software version” in competition with:

SnapCell – No one can buy it. A security company that does not even had anymore a webpage. The company does not almost exist anymore.
rohde-schawarz – A company that have in his list price and old outdated hardware secure phone . No one would buy it, it's not good for genera use.

Does it sounds strange that only those other products are considered secure along with PhoneCrypt .

Also… let's check the kind of multimedia content in the different reviews available of Gold-Lock, Cellcrypt and Phonecrypt in order to understand how much the marketing guys pressed to make the PhoneCrypt review the most attractive:

Application Screenshots of application Video with demonstration of interception Network demonstration
PhoneCrypt 5 0
CellCrypt 0 2 0
GoldLock 2 0

It's clear that PhoneCrypt is reviewed showing more features explicitly shown and major security features product description than the other.

Too much difference between them, should we suspect it's a marketing tips?

But again other strange things analyzing the way it was done…
If it was “an impartial and neutral review” we should see good and bad things on all the products right?

Ok, see the table below regarding the opinion indicated in each paragraph of the different reviews available of Gold-Lock, CellCrypt and Phonecrypt (are the only available) to see if are positive or negative.

Application Number of paragraphs Positive paragraphs Negative paragraphs Neutral paragraphs
PhoneCrypt 9 9 0 0
CellCrypt 12 0 10 2
GoldLock 9 0 8

Detailed paragraphs opinion analysis of Phonecrypt
Paragraph of review Opinion expressed
From their website Positive Marketing feedback
애플 아이폰 Positive Marketing feedback
Disk Encryption or voice Encryption Positive Marketing feedback
PBX Compatibility? Really Positive Marketing feedback
Cracking <10. Not. Positive Marketing feedback
Good thinking! Positive Marketing feedback
A little network action Positive Marketing feedback
UI Positive Marketing feedback
Good Taste Positive Marketing feedback
Detailed paragraphs opinion analysis of Gold-Lock 3G
Paragraph of review Opinion expressed
From their website Negative Marketing feedback
Licensed by The israeli Ministry of Denfese Negative Marketing feedback
Real Company or Part Time hobby Negative Marketing feedback
16.000 bit authentication Negative Marketing feedback
DH 256 Negative Marketing feedback
Downad & Installation! Neutral Marketing feedback
Cracking it <10 Negative Marketing feedback
Marketing BS101 Negative Marketing feedback
Cool video stuff Negative Marketing feedback
Detailed paragraphs opinion analysis of CellCrypt
Paragraph of review Opinion expressed
From their website Neutral Marketing feedback
A little background about cellcrypt Negative Marketing feedback
Master of Marketing Negative Marketing feedback
Secure Voice calling Negative Marketing feedback
Who's buying their wares Negative Marketing feedback
Downad & Installation! Neutral Marketing feedback
My Demo environment Negative Marketing feedback
Did they forget some code Negative Marketing feedback
Cracking it <5 Negative Marketing feedback
Room Monitoring w/ FlexiSpy Negative Marketing feedback
Cellcrypt unique features.. Negative Marketing feedback
Plain old interception Negative Marketing feedback
The Haters out there Negative Marketing feedback

Now it's clear that from their point of view on PhoneCrypt there is no single bad point while the other are always described in a negative way.
No single good point. Strange?
All those considerations along with the next ones really let me think that's very probably a marketing review and not an independent review.

Other similar marketing attempt from SecurStar

SecurStar GmbH is known to have used in past marketing activity leveraging this kind of “technical speculations”, abusing of partial information and fake unconfirmed hacking stuff to make marketing/media coverage.
Imho a rare mix of unfairness in leveraging the difficult for people to really understand the complexity of security and cryptography.

They already used in past Marketing activities like the one about creating a trojan for Windows Mobile and saying that their software is secure from the trojan that they wrote.
Read about their marketing tricks of 2007

They developed a Trojan (RexSpy) for Windows Mobile, made a demonstration capability of the trojan and later on told that they included “Anti-Trojan” capability to their PhoneCrypt software.They never released informations on that trojan, not even proved that it exists.

The researcher Collin Mulliner told at that time that it sounds like a marketing tips (also because he was not able to get from SecurStar CEO Hafner any information about that trojan):

“This makes you wonder if this is just a marketing thing.”

Now, let's try to make some logical reassignment.
It's part of the way they do marketing, an very unfriendly and unpolite approach with customers, journalist and users trying to provide wrong security concepts for a market advantage. Being sure that who read don't have all the skills to do in depth security evaluation and find the truth behind their marketing trips.

Who is the hacker notrax?

It sounds like a camouflage of a fake identity required to have an “independent hacker” that make an “independent review” that is more strong on reputation building.
Read about his bio:

¾ Human, ¼ Android (Well that would be cool at least.) I am just an enthusiast of pretty much anything that talks binary and if it has a RS232 port even better. During the day I masquerade as an engineer working on some pretty cool projects at times, but mostly I do the fun stuff at night. I have been thinking of starting an official blog for about 4.5 years to share some of the things I come across, can't figure out, or just cross my mind. Due to my day job and my nighttime meddling, I will update this when I can. I hope some find it useful, if you don't, well you don't.

There are no information about this guy on google.
Almost any hacker that get public have articles online, post in mailing archive and/or forum or some result of their activity.
For notrax, nothing is available.

Additionally let's look at the domain…
The domain infosecurityguard.com is privacy protected by domainsbyproxy to prevent understanding who is the owner.
The domain has been created 2 months ago on 01-Dec-09 on godaddy.com registrar.

What's also very interesting to notice that this “unknown hacker with no trace on google about him that appeared on December 2009 on the net” is referred on SecurStar GmbH Press Release as a “An IT security expert”.

Maybe they “know personally” who's this anonymous notrax? :)

Am i following my own conspiracy thinking or maybe there's some reasonable doubt that everything was arrange in that funny way just for a marketing activity?

Social consideration

If you are a security company you job have also a social aspects, you should also work to make the world a better place (sure to make business but “not being evil”). You cannot cheat the skills of the end users in evaluating security making fake misleading information.

You should do awareness on end users, to make them more conscious of security issues, giving them the tools to understand and decide themselves.

Hope you had fun reading this article and you made your own consideration about this.

Fabio Pietrosanti (naif)

ps Those are my personal professional opinion, let's speak about technology and security, not marketing.
pps i am not that smart in web writing, so sorry for how the text is formatted and how the flow of the article is unstructured!

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Licensed by Israel Ministry of Defense? How things really works!

You should know that Israel is a country where if a company need to develop encryption product they must be authorized by the government.

The government don't want that companies doing cryptography can do anything bad to them and what they can do of good for the government, so they have to first be authorized.

Companies providing interception and encryptio n m ust apply to a license because Israel law on this is so restrictive to be similar to china law .

That's because those kind of technologies are considered fundamental for the intelligence and espionage capabilities of Israel country.

To give some example of “Licensed by Israel Ministry of Defense” companies:

GSM encryption products “Licensed by Israel Ministry of Defense” – Gold-lock

Interception of communication products “Licensed by Israel Ministry of Defense” – Verint

HF encrypted Radio “Licensed by Israel Ministry of Defense” – Kavit

Surveillance services and equipment “Licensed by Israel Ministry of Defense” – Multi Tier Solutions

For example how to apply for a “License by Israel Ministry of Defense” if you do encryption technologies in Israel?

Be sure to be an israeli company, click here and fill the forms.

Someone will contact you from encryption-control@mod.gov.il and will discuss with you whether to give you or not the license to sell.

What does the department of defense will require from an israeli company in order to provide them the authorization to make and sell interception and encryption products?

Well, what they want and what they really ask nobody knows.

It's a secret dealing of Israel Ministry of Defense with each “licensed” company.

What we know for sure is that Verint, a “Licensed by Israel Ministry of Defense”, placed a backdoor to intercept companies and governments in the US and Netherland into the interception systems they was selling.

Verint, a Licensed by Israel Ministry of Defense Company, provided to Israel government eavesdropped communications of private and government users in the United States and in the Netherland .

CIA officier reported that Israel Ministry of Defense was known to pay Verint a reimbursement of 50% of their costs in order to have from Verint espionage services trough their commercial activity on selling “backdoored” interception equipment to spy foreign users.


It can be a legitimate doubt that the cooperation within the Israeli Ministry of Defense may be problematic for an Israeli company that want to sell interception and encryption product abroad.

Those companies may be forced to make the interests of Israel Ministry of Defense and not the interests of the customers (like Verint scandal is a real-world example).

So, how would a “Licensed by Israel Ministry of Defense” be a good things to promote?

It represent the risk that the “Israel Ministry of Defense”, like is publicly known that it has already have done with Verint, will interfere with what the company do.

It represent the risk that the “Israel Ministry of Defense” may reasonably provide “reimbursement” of costs paying the company and get what they would likely would like to get.

So, what does really “Israel Ministry of Defense” want from Israel companies doing encryption and interception technologies?

Should we ask ourself whether Israeli companies doing encryption and interception businesses are more interested to do business or to do “outsourced espionage services” for their always paying customer, the “Israel Ministry of Defense”.

For sure, in the age of financial crisis, the Israel Ministry of Defense is a paying customer that does not have budget problem…

Strict control, strict rules, strong government strategic and military cooperation.

Be careful.

If you want to read more about this matters, about how technologies from certain countries is usually polluted with their governments military and secret services strategies stay tuned as i am preparing a post about this .

You will much better understand about that subjects on the “Licensed by Israel Ministry of Defense”.

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Recuva: Nice windows data recovery tool

Not a professional tool but an easy, quick and free one.

If you just accidently deleted some files on windows or your employee leave the company deleting all his data, well that you get out from trouble quickly.

It also came out in a 'portable' version to be loaded from an usb stick drive.

Check Recuva recovery tool

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Military contractors going commercial

Most military contractors are suffering from the restriction of government's budgets for military expenses and are moving into commercial markets, still they have to adjust a lot of things.

Read here a nice analysis from rochtel on how military contractors should adapt their strategy.

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Brazilian Electrical Blackout: preview of cyberwar

In 2005 and 2007 in Brazil million of people was targetted by a blackout.

Initially it appeared like an accident.

Now it's known that was caused by a cyber attack against electricity control systems.

That was just a preview of what a cyber attack in a cyberwar means.

In near future we'll probably see something like 'virtual custom offices' at internet borders, defining what get in and what get out like several “not so democratic” countries are doing.

Does the cyberwar will affect digital rights? Probably yes, even i hope not.

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Conventionality is not morality.

During my daily RSS OCD reading I had to deal with this article : it has been written by a “senior anti-virus researcher at Kaspersky Lab's “. Talk about personal interest.

I wont comment on the practical implications of useless signature based AV's and how cyber criminals will never need amateur-ish projects to carry on their malicious tactics.

But what is always interesting is watching the very same people who use billion dollar scare tactics to sell you a perfectly useless piece of software (which will give you a false sense of security, hence will make you more insecure), talking about ethics.

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Hackers Hacking Hackers

Hackers hacking hackers are always pretty fun.

And I am not talking about ZF0 5 (which was cool reading, even if not as cool as ~El8 was), I am talking about this .

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