Archivo delle Categorie: Privacy

RFC 6189: ZRTP è finalmente uno standard!

Infine ZRTP è stato assegnato un incarico ufficiale RFC, RFC6189 ZRTP: Accordo di percorso Media Key per Unicast Secure RTP.

Aveva come una dipendenza della SRTP con la dimensione della chiave AES 256bit che ora è stata definita come RFC6188 .

E 'emozionante vedere la RFC finalmente rilasciato, in quanto è una tappa importante per impostare ZRTP come standard ufficiale per end-to-end molto simile crittografia PGP è stato per email.

Ora, qualsiasi organizzazione in tutto il mondo sarà ufficialmente in grado di implementare ZRTP per end-to-end di crittografia del protocollo vocale

Attualmente 3 diverse implementazioni pubbliche di protocollo ZRTP esiste:

Ognuna di esse fornisce diverse caratteristiche del protocollo, ma più importanti sono noti per essere interoperabili.

Una nuova ondata sta arrivando al mondo crittografia della voce, irrompendo in una zona grigia in cui la maggior parte delle aziende che sistemi di cifratura telefono è stato implementazione della crittografia personalizzato.

Ora una norma è stata impostata e ci sono pochi motivi rimasti ad attuare qualcosa di diverso.

Hurra Mr. Zimmermann e tutta la comunità di aziende (come PrivateWave ) e individui (come Werner Dittmann ) che hanno lavorato su di esso!

Oggi è un grande giorno, questo tipo di tecnologia è ormai ufficiale e anche con più implementazione esistente!

Filippo, hai fatto di nuovo, i miei complimenti al vostro spirito puro e determinazione :-)

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Progressi per GSM di cracking a Friburgo universitaria

Il mondo emozionante di protocolli di telefonia mobile (GSM, GSM-R, TETRA, UMTS, ecc), l'hacking è sempre attività di ricerca ufficiali dalle università.

L'investimento per fare versioni di codice open source del software di cracking sta dando l'opportunità agli studenti di università per lavorare su di esso, migliorare e fare ricerca forte.

L'Università di Friburgo ha appena rilasciato la carta Esercitazione pratica sulla crittografia GSM A5 / 1 insieme a un gsmframencoder strumento di supporto per migliorare il processo di sniffing, la decodifica e screpolature.

Apertura hardware, software apertura, apertura protocollo dimostrano la debolezza di qualsiasi tipo di metodo proprietario o processo per accumulo tecnologie di comunicazione e di sicurezza.

Dovrebbe essere l'obiettivo di tutti gli scienziati per tentare di aprire-up e di rompere ogni tipo di tecnologia proprietaria e chiusa per costringere l'industria a va avanti solo con un approccio interoperabile e aperto durante la progettazione di protocolli di telecomunicazione.

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La mia esperienza TOR exit node cercando di filtrare il traffico rumoroso

All'inizio di quest'anno ho deciso che è il momento di eseguire un nodo TOR exit Così ho portato un VPS a hetzner.de (perché sono elencati come un buon TOR ISP ) e impostare l'uscita-node con nickname privacyresearch.infosecurity.ch con 100 Mbit / Collegamento s per la prima 1TB di dati mensili, poi 10 Mbit / s flat.

E 'anche possibile eseguire TOR2WEB software http://tor.infosecurity.ch .

Ho impostato l' uscita di politica , come suggerito eseguendo exit-node di molestie minima e preparato un modello di risposta di abuso .

Nel primo giorno sono stato in esecuzione il nodo che ho ricevuto immediatamente DMCA si lamentano a causa del traffico peer to peer.

Così ho deciso di filtrare-out po 'di traffico P2P usando OpenDPI iptables modulo e DMCA lamentano automaticamente scomparso:

iptables-A OUTPUT-m-opendpi edonkey-gadugadu-fasttrack-Gnutella-DirectConnect-bittorrent-WinMX-Soulseek-j REJECT

Poi, perché io sono italiano, ho deciso di evitare il mio nodo TOR per la connessione al spaziale italiana indirizzo internet al fine di ridurre la possibilità che un procuratore stupida mi svegliava al mattino, perché non capiva che sto eseguendo un nodo TOR.

Ho provato, con l'aiuto di hellais che hanno scritto uno script per rendere la politica Exit rifiutare dichiarazione , di rifiutare tutti i netblocks italiani sulla base di IOError blockfinder ma abbiamo scoperto che i file torrc configurazione del file con le linee +1000 stava facendo incidente TOR.

Siamo andati ad aprire un ticket per segnalare il crash del nostro tentativo di bloccare TOR exit policy per paese e ha trovato un tentativo simile in cui abbiamo contribuito, ma sembra ancora essere un problema aperto.

La conclusione è che non è possibile fare una politica di uscita è un paese per nodo di uscita TOR in modo pulito ed educato così ho deciso di seguire la strada sporca usando iptables / GeoIP . Dopo aver combattuto affinché venga compilata correttamente, era una linea di iptables per bloccare il traffico andare in Italia:

iptables-A OUTPUT-p tcp-m state-state NEW-m geoip-dst-cc IT-j REJECT

Ora, dal mio exit-node alcuna connessione alle reti italiane sarà fatto e io sono sicuro contro forse non procuratori stupide capire TOR (ho un'eccezione per tutti gli indirizzi IP del nodo TOR applicata prima).

Dopo alcuni altri giorni ho iniziato a ricevere reclami a causa di attività portscan originati dai miei nodi Tor.

Dal mio punto di vista voglio sostenere la rete di anonimato, non anonimi tentativi di hacking e così voglio filtrare-out portscan e gli attacchi originati dalla mia node.That 's una questione complessa che richiede un certo studio, così nel frattempo ho installato Scanlogd e snort perché voglio valutare quanti attacchi, che tipo di attacchi sono sempre fuori dal mio nodo di uscita TOR.
Più tardi cercherò di organizzare un qualche tipo di filtraggio per essere sicuri di essere in grado di filtrare i maggiori attacchi.
Per ciò che è legato al portscan sembra che non ci sono strumenti pubblici per individuare e filtrare portscan in uscita, ma solo per filtrare i portscan in arrivo quindi probabilmente avrà bisogno di scrivere qualcosa ad-hoc.
Mi riferirò come stanno andando le cose e se ci sarà qualche bel modo di attuare in modo lightwave snort-inline al tentativo di filtrare selettivamente-out grande attacco proveniente dalla mia uscita-node.

Il mio obiettivo è quello di mantenere un exit node in esecuzione a lungo termine (almeno 1 TB di traffico al mese donato a TOR), riducendo lo sforzo relativa a ISP lamentarsi e cercando di fare del mio meglio per eseguire l'uscita-nodo con una passività ragionevole.

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TETRA hacker sta arrivando: OsmocomTETRA

E 'molto emozionante vedere il rilascio di OsmocomTETRA , il primo opensource SDR ( Software Defined Radio ) realizzazione di TETRA demodulatore, PHY e MAC strati inferiori.

E 'la versione TETRA di airprobe GSM che sbloccare l'accesso ai dati e la struttura del protocollo di comunicazione TETRA, dando così grande opportunità hacking!

Ora che anche la tecnologia TETRA è stato aperto dovremmo aspettarci, nel corso di questo 2011, per vedere opensource sniffer TETRA e molto probabilmente anche la crittografia TEA (la Tetra Encryption Algorithm) rotto!

TETRA viene utilizzato dai servizi di emergenza di polizia, e le forze armate come una rete alternativa di comunicazione mobile che può funzionare anche senza la disponibilità di copertura della rete (solo mobile-to-mobile senza una stazione base) e di fornire alcuni servizi speciali ad alta disponibilità.

Ho scritto nella mia presentazione TETRA maggiore revisione del protocollo di sicurezza Voice .

In mailing list OsmocomBB c'era già la discussione su alcuni lo stato della rete TETRA:

  • Belgio Polizia TETRA ASTRID rete: in chiaro
  • Polizia tedesca di test della rete TETRA in Aachen: in chiaro
  • Alcuni ex-jugoslawia rete TETRA: in chiaro
  • Netherland C200 rete TETRA: TEA2 criptato con chiavi statiche
  • UK Airwave rete TETRA: TEA2 criptato con TEA2

Sarà molto divertente vedere che la nuova polizia e il servizio di soccorso ritorno di hacking provenienti da vecchi tempi analogici alle nuove radio digitali :-)

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Zorg, il nuovo C + + e Java ZRTP attuazione pubblica di rilascio

Ciao a tutti, oggi a PrivateWave Italia SpA, azienda italiana impegnata nella sviluppo di tecnologie per la protezione della privacy e la sicurezza delle informazioni nel settore delle telecomunicazioni vocali in cui io sono CTO, rilasciamo ZORG, una nuova implementazione open source del protocollo ZRTP disponibile per il download da http://www. zrtp.org .

ZRTP [1] fornisce servizi end-to-end scambio di chiavi con Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellmann 384bit e la crittografia AES-256 SRTP.

Zorg è stato originariamente sviluppato e implementato nei prodotti PrivateWave voce di PrivateGSM di crittografia disponibili per le seguenti piattaforme: Blackberry, Nokia e iOS (iPhone).

Zorg C + + è stato integrato con sorgente aperto PJSIP VoIP SDK [2] ed è fornito come patch per l'integrazione contro PJSIP 1.8.5. E 'stato testato su iPhone, Symbian, Windows, Linux e Mac OS X.

Zorg Java è stato integrato all'interno di una versione personalizzata di MJSIP [3] SDK open source su piattaforma Blackberry e include ottimizzazioni di utilizzo della memoria necessarie per ridurre al minimo l'attività garbage collector.

Entrambe le piattaforme sono separati e crittografico modulare back-end in modo che l'implementazione di algoritmi di crittografia possono essere facilmente scambiati con altri.

. Zorg è sotto licenza GNU AGPL e il codice sorgente è disponibile su github a https://github.com/privatewave/ZORG .

Lo stiamo rilasciando in open source e in coerenza con il nostro approccio alla sicurezza [4], come speriamo davvero che possa essere utile per l'ecosistema open source per creare nuovi sistemi di crittografia della voce a sostegno della libertà di parola.

Più di 20 PJSIP-based open source software di crittografia VoIP e diverse scritte in Java potrebbero beneficiare direttamente dalla versione Zorg.

Saremo lieti di ricevere la proposta di collaborazione, la nuova integrazione, crittografico nuovo back-end, bug scouting e quant'altro utile per migliorare e far affermare come standard ZRTP voce crittografia.

Zorg è disponibile http://www.zrtp.org .

[1] ZRTP: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ZRTP
[2] PJSIP: http://www.pjsip.org
[3] MJSIP: http://www.mjsip.org
[4] approccio alla sicurezza: http://www.privatewave.com/security/approch.html

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Cellulare crittografato per le chiamate di telefonia fissa con Asterisk 1,8

Abbiamo appena pubblicato un howto tecnico su come costruire mobili custodito al landline infrastruttura VoIP con:

Nella prossima settimana gli altri howto come questo verrà con l'ausilio di altre piattaforme server come FreeSWITCH, il tutto nello spirito di trasparenza e leva di tecnologie opensource.

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PrivateGSM: Blackberry / iPhone / Nokia crittografia della voce mobile con ZRTP o SRTP / SDES

Sono assolutamente evitare di usare il mio blog personale per fare promozione di qualsiasi tipo di prodotto.

Quella volta non è diverso, ma voglio dirti fatti riguardanti i prodotti lavorano senza marketing fantasia, ma rimanendo tecnica.

Oggi, a PrivateWave dove mi trovo CTO e co-fondatore , abbiamo rilasciato pubblicamente mobili prodotti di cifratura VoIP per Blackberry, iPhone e Nokia:

  • La prima mai Blackberry VoIP cifrato con ZRTP - PrivateGSM VoIP professionale
  • Il primo iPhone mai VoIP criptato con ZRTP - PrivateGSM VoIP professionale
  • La prima mai Blackberry client VoIP cifrato con SRTP con SDES scambio di chiavi over SIP / TLS - PrivateGSM VoIP Enterprise

logo-PrivateWave-colore.png

A PrivateWave usiamo un approccio diverso rispetto alla maggior parte società di crittografia della voce là fuori, leggere il nostro approccio alla sicurezza .

La rilevanza di questi prodotti nel panorama tecnologico e l'industria possono essere riassunti come segue:

  • E 'la prima società di crittografia della voce usando solo protocolli di sicurezza standard (e ci aspettiamo che il mercato reagirà, come è chiaro che la tecnologia proprietaria proveniente dal patrimonio di CSD non è in grado di fornire lo stesso valore)
  • E 'il primo approccio in crittografia della voce da utilizzare solo open source e motore di crittografia standard di
  • E 'il primo approccio alla crittografia della voce a fornire il modello di protezione diverso utilizzando tecnologie diverse (end-to-end per ZRTP e end-to-site per SRTP )

Quelli suite di client mobili sicure, progettato per la sicurezza professionale di usare solo utilizzando al meglio delle telecomunicazioni e tecnologie di sicurezza, garantire un livello elevato di protezione insieme con buone prestazioni anche in cattive condizioni di rete:

Le applicazioni sono:

icona-pgsm.png

I dispositivi mobili supportati sono:

Per quanto riguarda ZRTP abbiamo deciso di sottolineare e allungare tutta la sicurezza e la funzionalità paranoica del protocollo con qualche piccola aggiunta:

Our strict address book integration, goes beyond ZRTP RFC specification , that could be vulnerable to certain attacks when used on mobile phones because of user behavior of not to look at mobile screen.

Our paranoy way of using ZRTP mitigate such conditions, we will write about this later and/or will add specific details for RFC inclusion.

Some words on PrivateGSM Professional with end-to-end encryption with ZRTP

Read technical sheet there!

To download it click here and just put your phone number

Those are the results of hard work of all my very skilled staff (16 persons worked on this 6 projects for 3 different platforms) on challenging technologies (voice encryption) in a difficult operating environment (dirty mobile networks and dirty mobile operating systems) for more than 2 years.

I am very proud of our staff!

What next?

In next weeks you will see releasing of major set of documentations such as integration with asterisks, freeswitch and other Security Enabled PBX, along with some exciting other security technology news that i am sure will be noticed ;)

It has been an hard work and more have to be done but i am confident that the security and opensource community will like such products and our transparent approach also with open important releases and open source integration that make a very politically neutral (backdoor free) technology.

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Un paio di bel fornitore di VPN

There are a lot of reason why one would need to access internet trough a VPN.

For example if you live in a country blocking certain contents (like anti-local-government website, porn, etc) and/or protocols (like skype, voip) you would probably want to move your internet connectivity outside the nasty blocking country by using encrypted VPN tunnels.

I evaluated several hosted VPN server and a couple of them sounds quite good among the widespread offering of such services:

SwissVPN

Exit to the internet from Switzerland.

Cost 6 CHF / months

Optional public fixed IP address

Useful if you need:

  • Just bypass local country filters with good high bandwidth
  • Expose public services trough the VPN with the optional fixed public IP address.

Overplay

Exit to the internet by choosing among 20 different countries (each time you connect).

Useful if you need to do:

  • business intelligence on competitor (appearing to come from country X when connecting them)
  • see film/telefilm allowed only from national IP web spaces
  • see google results among different countries

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Non ogni curva ellittica è lo stesso: attraverso il ECC sicurezza

My own ECC curve security and selection analysis

vn9jna1BdgrzDCYNBJHi09q09q.jpg

Most modern crypto use Elliptic Curve Cryptographic (ECC) that, with a smaller key size and reduce computation power, give equivalent security strength of traditional crypto system known as DH (Diffie-Hellman) or RSA ( Rivest, Shamir and Adleman ) .

Not everyone knows that ECC encryption is selected for any future encryption applications and that even TLS/SSL (encryption used for securing the web) is moving to ECC.

I found plenty of so called “proprietary encryption products” which abandoned RSA and DH to goes with ECC alternatives, that tend to arbitrary use ECC bit key size without even specifying which kind of ECC crypto get used.

However there is a lot of confusion around Elliptic Curves, with a lot of different names and key size making difficult for a non-cryptographically-experienced-user to make your own figure when evaluating some crypto stuff.

Because of so diffused confusion i decided to make my own analysis to find out which are the best ECC encryption curves and right ECC key size to use.

Questa analisi vuole fornire una scelta basata su settore della sicurezza tra le varie curve e lunghezza della chiave, lasciando le considerazioni matematiche e di analisi crittografico che è già stato fatto nel corso degli anni, che riassume le varie scelte adottate in diversi standard e protocolli di sicurezza.

Prima della conclusione.

Dalla mia analisi solo le curve seguenti ECC sono da considerarsi per l'uso in sistemi di cifratura, perché sei l'unico scelto tra diverse autorità (ANSI, NSA, SAG, NIST, ECC Brainpool), diversi protocolli di sicurezza standard (IPSec, OpenPGP, ZRTP, Kerberos, SSL / TLS) e l'unico che corrispondono NSA Suite B (requisiti di sicurezza standard de-facto anche per l'ambiente militare della NATO):

  • Prime Elliptic Curve 256 bit - P-256
  • Prime Elliptic Curve 384 bit - P-384

con possibilità, solo per veramente paranoico che vogliono ottenere dimensioni più po chiave, non ancora considerati utili:

  • Prime Elliptic Curve 521 bit - P-521

Vorrei precisare che le curve Köblitz dovrebbe essere evitato, in ogni dimensione della chiave (163/283/409/571) in quanto non dispone di sufficiente garanzia sull'attività crypto analitica ed efficace sono:

  • Non fa parte della NSA Suite-B selezione crittografia
  • Non fa parte della selezione ECC Brainpool
  • Non è parte di ANSI X9.62 selezione
  • Non fa parte della selezione OpenPGP estensione ECC
  • Non fa parte di estensione Kerberos per la selezione della curva ECC

Invito il lettore a seguire attraverso la mia analisi per capire le basi che potrebbero essere comprensibili anche senza una profonda preparazione tecnica, ma almeno con un buon background tecnologico un qualche po 'di base della crittografia.

 Eccoci con l'analisi
 

Il mio obiettivo è quello di fare un'analisi su cosa / come l'apertura scientifica e la sicurezza della comunità scelgono ECC sistema di crittografia per l'utilizzo in protocolli di sicurezza e degli standard definiti dalla IETF RFC (quelli che definiscono gli standard Internet in un modo aperto e peer-reviewed).

Qui di seguito una serie di RFC ECC introducendo nel sistema esistente che vengono analizzati per capire cosa c'è di meglio da usare e cosa c'è di meglio da escludere:

  • RFC5639 : ECC Brainpool Curve Standard & Generation Curve
  • RFC4869 : NSA Suite B per le Suites di crittografia IPsec
  • RFC5430 : NSA Suite B profilo per Transport Layer Security (TLS)
  • RFC5008 : NSA Suite in B nelle estensioni Secure / Multipurpose Internet Mail (S / MIME)
  • RFC3766 : I punti di forza determinanti per le chiavi pubbliche usate per lo scambio di chiavi simmetriche
  • RFC5349 : Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Supporto per crittografia a chiave pubblica per l'autenticazione iniziale in Kerberos (PKINIT)
  • RFC4492 : la crittografia delle curve ellittiche (ECC) Cipher Suite per Transport Layer Security (TLS)
  • ZRTP crittografia della voce di Philip Zimmermann ECC curva
  • ECC in OpenPGP (draft d zattera jivsov-OpenPGP-ECC-06 )
  • Curve ECC selezionati da Microsoft per Smartcard Kerberos login

Useremo la scelta fatta dagli scienziati la definizione di protocolli Internet Security a far parte della nostra valutazione.
Inoltre, si deve intendere che la selezione Curve proviene da diverse autorità che hanno fatto la loro scelta di curve per raccontare l'industria cosa usare e cosa ignorare:

Useremo la scelta fatta dagli scienziati la definizione dei requisiti di sicurezza nelle agenzie di normalizzazione a far parte della nostra valutazione.
Inoltre, qualcosa che la maggior parte delle persone non lo sa, ma che è estremamente rilevante per la nostra analisi, è che ci sono diversi tipi di crittografia ECC curve e la loro "dimensione" è diverso a seconda del tipo di curva:

  • Curve ECC su Campo Prime (spesso indicato come curva ellittica ed è rappresentato da P-dimensione per la chiave)
  • Curve ECC su campo binario (spesso indicato come curva Koblitz e rappresentata da K-dimensione per la chiave)

Dato un punto di forza di sicurezza di equivalenza della curva ellittica e la curva di Kobliz hanno diversa dimensione della chiave, ad esempio quando leggiamo ECC 571 ci si riferisce alla curva Koblitz con una forza equivalente a 521 ECC curva Prime.

Un confronto di forza tra le curve ellittiche e curve Kotbliz Si riporta di seguito (da Mikey ECC Internet Draft ):

 | Koblitz | ECC | DH / DSA / RSA
 | 163 | 192 | 1024
 | 283 | 256 | 3072
 | 409 | 384 | 7680
 | 571 | 521 ​​| 15360

Sotto c'è un confronto tra tutte le curve selezionate da tutte le varie entità e il loro rispettivo nome (da IETF RFC4492 per l'utilizzo di ECC per TLS ):

 Curve nomi scelti da diversi organismi di normazione
 ------------ + --------------- + -------------
 SECG | ANSI X9.62 | NIST
 ------------ + --------------- + -------------
 sect163k1 | | NIST K-163
 sect163r1 | |
 sect163r2 | | NIST B-163
 sect193r1 | |
 sect193r2 | |
 sect233k1 | | NIST K-233
 sect233r1 | | NIST B-233
 sect239k1 | |
 sect283k1 | | NIST K-283
 sect283r1 | | NIST B-283
 sect409k1 | | NIST K-409
 sect409r1 | | NIST B-409
 sect571k1 | | NIST K-571
 sect571r1 | | NIST B-571
 secp160k1 | |
 secp160r1 | |
 secp160r2 | |
 secp192k1 | |
 secp192r1 | prime192v1 | NIST P-192
 secp224k1 | |
 secp224r1 |​​ | NIST P-224
 secp256k1 | |
 secp256r1 | prime256v1 | NIST P-256
 secp384r1 | | NIST P-384
 secp521r1 | | NIST P-521
 ------------ + --------------- + -------------

Che appare immediatamente è che ci sono solo due curve selezionate da tutte le autorità, e che vi è un generale dumping delle curve Köblitz di ANSI.The solo di comune accordo tra le autorità 3 sono le seguenti due curve ECC:

  • secp192r1 / prime192v1 / NIST P-192
  • secp256r1 / prime256v1 / NIST P-256

Di questi la selezione della curva ECC TLS per la RFC5430 saltata completamente curve Köblitz e selezionati per l'utilizzo solo:

  • P-256, P-384, P-521

Il Brainpool ECC saltata completamente curve Köblitz e selezionati per l'utilizzo delle seguenti curve ECC:

  • P-160, P-192, P-224, P-256, P-320, P-384, P-512 (che è l'unico particolare perché non è P-521, ma P-512, l'unica chiave di dimensioni di cui da ECC Brainpool. Tnx Ian Simons da Athena SCS )

Il progetto per l'utilizzo di internet OpenPGP ECC in PGP d zattera-jivsov-OpenPGP-ECC-06 saltata completamente curve Köblitz e selezionato i seguenti curve ECC

  • P-256, P-384, P-521

L'estensione del protocollo Kerberos per l'uso ECC, definito in RFC5349 e definito da Microsoft per l'accesso smartcard saltata completamente curve Köblitz e selezionato i seguenti curve ECC:

  • P-256, P-384, P-521

Così, sembra chiaro che la selezione diritto di ECC è per P-256, P-384 e P-521, mentre la curva Koblitz sono stati ignorati per Top Secret e l'uso di qualunque protocollo di sicurezza sensibili (IPSec, OpenPGP, ZRTP, Kerberos, SSL / TLS).

Perché ho ​​fatto questa analisi?

Ho fatto questa analisi a seguito di una discussione che ho avuto per quanto riguarda taluni prodotti di crittografia della voce, tutti basati su protocolli personalizzati e proprietari, che si basano tutti su curva ellittica Diffie Hellman 571 bit / ECDH 571/571-bit ECDH / Koblitz 571 bit.
Tutti loro sono con il K-571 che, come descritto in precedenza, è stata rimossa da tutti gli ambienti sensibili e protocolli di sicurezza ed essendo io stesso un designer di roba voce crittografia penso che la loro scelta di crittografia non è assolutamente la scelta migliore sicurezza.
Probabilmente è stato fatto solo per scopi di marketing, perché K-571 (Koblitz curva) sembra più forte di P-521 (curva ellittica in base al numero Prime). Se si dispone di "più bit" i ragazzi di marketing può affermare di essere "più sicuro". Koblitz curva ellittica sono più veloci della top secret abilitato prime curve ellittiche e così dare il product manager la possibilità di fornire "po 'più" in un suo proprio prodotto mantenendo il veloce scambio di chiavi.

E 'una questione di scelta filosofica.

Io preferisco seguire la tendenza della comunità scientifica con l'umiltà di non considerare me stesso un esperto di crittografia, più informato rispetto alla sicurezza globale e la comunità scientifica stessa.

Io preferisco invece di usare solo gli algoritmi che sono stati approvati per l'uso in ambienti altamente sensibili (classificazione top secret), che sono stati selezionati da tutte le autorità e il gruppo di lavoro che analizza gli algoritmi di crittografia esistenti là fuori e che rappresentano la scelta di quasi tutti standard di sicurezza protocolli (IPSec, OpenPGP, ZRTP, Kerberos, SSL / TLS, etc).
Io preferisco contare la quantità di cervelli che lavorano sul crypto io uso, tale controllo è davvero sicuro, che valutare se c'è qualche debolezza.

Il numero di Brais che lavorano su diffusa Crypto sono di ordine di grandezza superiore al numero di cervelli che lavorano su crypto utilizzati da solo poche persone (come la curva di Koblitz).
Quindi io non sono demonizzazione che fanno uso di ECDH 571 utilizzando Curve Koblitz, ma di sicuro posso affermare che non hanno preso la scelta migliore in termini di sicurezza e che tutti i professionisti della sicurezza facendo una valutazione comparativa di sicurezza avrebbe considerare il fatto che Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman 571 bit fatto con Curve Koblitz non è diffusa, è oggetto di dumping da protocolli di sicurezza standard e non è certificato per l'utilizzo top secret.

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ESSOR, European Software sicuro Defined Radio (SDR)

Ho dato un'occhiata alla Agenzia europea per la Difesa sito e trovato il ESSOR progetto, un progetto di lavoro finanziato per un importo di 106mln per sviluppare prodotti di comunicazione strategiche di difesa basate su nuove Software Defined Radio approccio.

Approccio SDR è un sistema rivoluzionario che sta cambiando completamente il modo in cui lo scienziato e l'industria è l'approccio di qualsiasi tipo di tecnologia wireless.

In pratica invece di bruciare chip hardware che implementano la maggior parte dei protocolli di frequenze e le tecniche, si sono spinti in "software" per hardware radio specializzate in grado di lavorare su un sacco di diversa frequenza, in qualità di interfaccia radio per un sacco di protocolli radio diversi.

Per esempio, il USRP (Universal Software Radio Peripheral) da Research Ettus che costano 1000-2000USD a pieno carico, attraverso l'opensource gnuradio quadro, hanno visto implementazione opensource di:

E molto di più protocolli e tecnologie di trasmissione.

Questo tipo di approccio nuovo sistema di trasmissione radio è destinata a cambiare il sistema radio modalità di attuazione, dando nuova funzionalità in modo da aggiornare il "protocollo radio stessa" nel software al fine di fornire "protocollo radio" miglioramenti.

In breve i termini che abbiamo visto anche la ricerca di sicurezza molto forte utilizzando tecnologie DSP come la fessurazione GSM e Bluetooth Sniffing .

Possiamo aspettarci che altre tecnologie, debole di design, ma protetto dalla restrizione ai dispositivi hardware per hackerare i protocolli di basso livello, sarà presto ottenere violato. Nel primo elenco mi piacerebbe davvero vedere l'hacking di TETRA, una tecnologia nata con la mentalità chiusa e algoritmi di cifratura segrete, qualcosa non mi piace ;-)

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Remoto intercettando i telefoni VoIP snom

Suggerisco la lettura a distanza toccando i telefoni VoIP "on VoIP Security Alliance blog da Shawn Merdinger .

A concrete example on how current telephony infrastructure are getting more vulnerable to cyber attacks.

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Sicurezza della comunicazione Voice Workshop

Ciao,

i made a talk about voice communication security technologies at University of Trento following an interesting information exchange with Crypto Lab managed Professor Massimiliano Sala .

I suggest interested people to read it, especially the second part, as there is an innovative categorization of the various voice encryption technologies that get used in several sectors.

I tried to explain and get out from this widely fragmented technological sector by providing a wide overview on technologies that usually are absolutely unrelated one-each-other but practically they all apply to voice encryption following that categorization:

  • Mobile TLC Industry voice encryption standards
  • Government and Military voice encryption standards
  • Public safety voice encryption standards
  • IETF voice encryption standards
  • Misc proprietary voice encryption technologies

It's a huge slideware, 122 slides, i suggest to go reading the 2nd part skipping interception technologies overview already covered by my presentation of 2009.

Voice communication security


View more presentations from Fabio Pietrosanti .

Especially i like the concept of Chocolate grade encryption that want to provide some innovation on the Snake Oil Encryption concept.

But i need to get more in depth about the Chocolate grade encryption context, will probably do before end-of-year by providing an applied course on understanding and evaluating practically the real security context of various voice encryption technologies.

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27C3 - CCC Congresso CFP: Veniamo in pace

Veniamo in pace

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We come in peace, said the conquerers of the New World.

Veniamo in pace, dice che il governo, quando si tratta di colonizzare, regolare, e militarizzare il nuovo mondo digitale.

Veniamo in pace, dicono le aziende dello stato-nazione di dimensioni che si sono prefissi di monetizzare la rete e la catena gli utenti ai loro dispositivi nuovo fiammante.

Veniamo in pace, noi diciamo come hacker, geek e nerd, quando abbiamo fissato verso il mondo reale e cercare di cambiarlo, perché si è intromesso nel nostro habitat naturale, il cyberspazio ...

Call for paper per la partecipazione al 27C3 CCC congresso è aperto, e non ho mai visto una così eccitante payoff :-)

Ci vediamo il 30 dicembre 2010 a Berlino!

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GSM di cracking in metodologie di test di penetrazione (OSSTMM)?

As most of this blog reader already know, in past years there was a lot of activities related to public research for GSM auditing and cracking.

However when there was huge media coverage to GSM cracking research results, the tools to make the cracking was really early stage and still very inefficient.

Now Frank Stevenson , norwegian cryptanalyst that already broke the Content Scrambling System of DVD video disc, participating to the A51 cracking project started by Karsten Nohl , released Kraken , a new improved version of the A51 cracking system.

It's interesting to notice that WiFi cracking had a similar story, as the first WiFi wep cracking discovery was quite slow in earlier techniques but later Korek, an hacker working on cracking code, improve the attack system drammatically.

That's the story of security research cooperation, you start a research, someone follow it and improve it, some other follow it and improved it and at the end you get the result.

Read more on the Kraken GSM Cracking software release .

And stay tuned as next week at Blackhat Conference Karsten Nohl will explain the details of the required hardware setup and detailed instructions on how to do it :-)

I would really like to see those tools incorporated into Penetration Testing Linux Distribution BackTrack with OSSTMM methodology enforcing the testing of GSM interception and man in the middle :-)

If things proceed that way and Ettus Research (The producer of USRP2 software radio used for low cost GSM signal receiving) will not be taken down, we can still see this.

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Snake-olio di sicurezza afferma sul prodotto crypto sicurezza

Mercato della sicurezza cresce, più aziende va al mercato, ma quanti di loro stanno prendendo sul serio quello che fanno?

Sai, facendo tecnologia di sicurezza significa che si sono personalmente responsabili per la protezione delle informazioni dell'utente. È necessario renderli consapevoli di ciò di cui hanno bisogno, esattamente ciò che stai facendo e quale tipo di modello di rischio prodotto proteggere.

Un problema tipico di elementi di sicurezza prodotto è rappresentato dall'impossibilità di all'utente di valutare le rivendicazioni sicurezza del prodotto stesso.

Quindi c'è una società molto facendo un marketing non-così-etica delle caratteristiche di sicurezza, sulla base dei fatti che nessun utente sarà in grado di valutarlo.

La situazione già spiegato risiedono in tema di sicurezza della crittografia Snake Oil, una evoluzione in un ambiente crittografico scientifica che ci permette oggi di utilizzare al meglio le tecnologie dell'informazione razza di protezione senza doversi preoccupare troppo di backdoor o insicurezze.

Parliamo di crittografia Snake Oil

La crittografia Snake Oil : In crittografia , l'olio di serpente è un termine usato per descrivere i metodi crittografici commerciali e dei prodotti che sono considerati falsi o fraudolenti. Distinguendo crittografia sicura della crittografia insicuro può essere difficile dal punto di vista di un utente. Crittografi della città, come Bruce Schneier e Phil Zimmermann , si impegnano a educare il pubblico in modo sicuro crittografia è fatto, oltre a mettere in evidenza la commercializzazione fuorviante di alcuni prodotti di crittografia.

Il più referenziato Crypto sicurezza guru, Philip Zimmermann e Bruce Schneier, è stato il primo a parlare di crittografia Snake Oil:

Snake Oil di Philip Zimmermann

Snake Oil di Bruce Schneier

Il Telecommunications Law Review Michigan e la tecnologia anche fatto una analisi molto buona in relazione alle caratteristiche di sicurezza di prodotti di sicurezza, SNAKE-petrolio di sicurezza sostiene che "il travisamento SISTEMATICA della sicurezza dei prodotti . spiegano i trucchi di marketing brutto utilizzati per modificare l'incapacità agli utenti di valutare la funzioni di sicurezza, tra cui implicazioni responsabilità giuridica ed economica.

Very famous is the sentence of Russ Nelson : Diverse compagnie petrolifere serpente di prodotti di sicurezza non spiega e non sono chiare sul modello di minaccia alla quale il prodotto si applica Molto famosa è la frase. Russ Nelson :

"Ricordati, crypto senza un modello di minaccia è come i cookie senza latte. ..... La crittografia senza un modello di minaccia è come la maternità senza torta di mele. Non posso dire che i tempi sufficienti. Più in generale, la sicurezza senza un modello di minaccia è, per definizione, andando a fallire ".

Quindi, come individuare serpente prodotti per la sicurezza del petrolio?

Controllare una linea guida per individuare di prodotti di crittografia Snake Oil: Snake Oil segnali di pericolo, software di crittografia per evitare da Matt Curtin .

Potete vedere questo molto buoni esempi di crittografia di olio di serpente da Emility Ratliff (Architect IBM a Linux Security), che ha cercato di rendere chiaro esempio di come individuare Snake Oil Cryptographic.

Qui ha rappresentato la linea guida di base da Matt Curtin carta:


Controllando che i punti è possibile valutare la gravità di una tecnologia di cifratura o di un prodotto è.

Ma tutto sommato come risolvere il problema che l'approccio etico di sicurezza?

E 'molto significativo e sarebbe davvero utile per ogni tipo di categoria di sicurezza dei prodotti per fare qualche linea guida forte e indipendente di valutazione (come OSSTMM per il test di penetrazione), per rendere questo processo di valutazione della sicurezza proprio nelle mani dell'utente.

Sarebbe anche molto bello avere qualcuno fare analisi e la valutazione delle aziende di prodotti di sicurezza, pubblicazione di relazioni circa i segni di olio di serpente.

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Web2.0 perdita di privacy in applicazioni mobili

Tu sai che mondo web2.0 è un sacco di perdite di qualsiasi tipo (profiling, profiling, profiling) legati alla privacy e degli utenti inizia a preoccuparsi a questo proposito.

Users continuously download applications without knowing the details of what they do, for example iFart just because are cool, are fun and sometime are useful.

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On mobile phones users install from 1000% up to 10.000% more applications than on a PC, and those apps may contain malware or other unexpected functionalities.

Recently infobyte analyzed ubertwitter client and discovered that the client was leaking and sending to their server many personal and sensitive data such as:

- Blackberry PIN

- Phone Number

- Email Address

- Geographic positioning information

Read about UbertTwitter 'spyware' features discovery here by infoByte .

It's plenty of applications leaking private and sensitive information but just nobody have a look at it.

Should mandatory data retention and privacy policies became part of application development and submission guideline for mobile application?

Imho a users must not only be warned about the application capabilities and API usage but also what will do with which kind of information it's going to handle inside the mobile phone.

Capabilities means authorizing the application to use a certain functionalities, for example to use GeoLocation API, but what the application will do and to who will provide such information once the user have authorized it?

That's a security profiling level that mobile phone manufacturer does not provide and they should, because it focus on the information and not on the application authorization/permission respect to the usage of device capabilities.

ps yes! ok! I agree! This kind of post would require 3-4 pages long discussion as the topic is hot and quite articulated but it's saturday morning and i gotta go!

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AES selezionati per l'uso nello spazio

I encountered a nice paper regarding analysis and consideration on which encryption algorithm it's best suited for use in the space by space ship and equipments.

The paper has been done by the Consultative Committee for Space Data Systems that's a consortium of all space agency around that cumulatively handled more than 400 mission to space .

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Read the paper Encryption Algorithm Trade Survey as it gives interesting consideration and comparison between different encryption algorithms.

Obviously the finally selected algorithm is AES , while KASUMI (used in UMTS networks) was avoided.

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Blackberry Security and Encryption: Devil or Angel?

Blackberry have good and bad reputation regarding his security capability, depending from which angle you look at it.

This post it's a summarized set of information to let the reader the get picture, without taking much a position as RIM and Blackberry can be considered, depending on the point of view, an extremely secure platform or an extremely dangerous one .

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Let's goes on.

On one side Blackberry it's a platform plenty of encryption features, security features everywhere, device encrypted (with custom crypto), communication encrypted (with custom proprietary protocols such as IPPP), very good Advanced Security Settings, Encryption framework from Certicom ( now owned by RIM ).

On the other side they does not provide only a device but an overlay access network, called BIS ( Blackberry Internet Service ), that's a global worldwide wide area network where your blackberry enter while you browse or checkmail using blackberry.net AP.

When you, or an application, use the blackberry.net APN you are not just connecting to the internet with the carrier internet connection, but you are entering inside the RIM network that will proxy and act as a gateway to reach the internet.

The very same happen when you have a corporate use: Both the BB device and the corporate BES connect to the RIM network that act as a sort of vpn concentration network .

So basically all the communications cross trough RIM service infrastructure in encrypted format with a set proprietary encryption and communication protocols.

Just as a notice, think that google to provide gtalk over blackberry.net APN, made an agreement in order to offer service inside the BB network to the BB users. When you install gtalk you get added 3 service books that point to GTALKNA01 that's the name of GTALK gateway inside the RIM network to allow intra-BIS communication and act as a GTALK gateway to the internet.

The mobile operators usually are not even allowed to inspect the traffic between the Blackberry device and the Blackberry Network.

So RIM and Blackberry are somehow unique for their approach as they provide a platform, a network and a service all bundled together and you cannot just “get the device and the software” but the user and the corporate are always bound and connected to the service network.

That's good and that's bad, because it means that RIM provide extremely good security features and capabilities to protect information, device and access to information at various level against third party .

But it's always difficult to estimate the threat and risk related to RIM itself and who could make political pressure against RIM.

Please consider that i am not saying “RIM is looking at your data” but making an objective risk analysis: for how the platform is done RIM have authority on the device, on the information on-the-device and on the information that cross the network. (Read my Mobile Security Slides ).

For example let's consider the very same context for Nokia phones.

Once the Nokia device is sold, Nokia does not have authority on the device, nor on the information on-the-device nor on the information that cross the network. But it's also true that Nokia just provide the device and does not provide the value added services such as the Enterprise integration (The RIM VPN tunnel), the BIS access network and all the local and remote security provisioned features that Blackberry provide.

So it's a matter of considering the risk context in the proper way when choosing the platform, with an example very similar to choosing Microsoft Exchange Server (on your own service) or whether getting a SaaS service like Google Apps.

In both case you need to trust the provider, but in first example you need to trust Microsoft that does not put a backdoor on the software while in the 2nd example you need to trust Google, as a platform and service provider, that does not access your information.

So it's a different paradigm to be evaluated depending on your threat model.

If your threat model let you consider RIM as a trusted third party service provider (much like google) than it's ok. If you have a very high risk context, like top-secret one, then let's consider and evaluate carefully whether it's not better to keep the Blackberry services fully isolated from the device or use another system without interaction with manufacturer servers and services.

Now, let's get back to some research and some facts about blackberry and blackberry security itself.

First of all several governments had to deal with RIM in order to force them to provide access to the information that cross their service networks while other decided to directly ban Blackberry usage for high officials because of servers located in UK and USA, while other decided to install their own backdoors.

There's a lot of discussion when the topics are RIM Blackberry and Governments for various reasons.

Below a set of official Security related information on RIM blackberry platform:

And here a set of unofficial Security and Hacking related information on RIM Blackberry platform:

Because it's 23.32 (GMT+1), i am tired, i think that this post will end up here.

I hope to have provided the reader a set of useful information and consideration to go more in depth in analyzing and considering the overall blackberry security (in the good and in the bad, it always depends on your threat model!).

Cin cin

Fabio Pietrosanti (naif)

ps i am managing security technology development (voice encryption tech) on Blackberry platform, and i can tell you that from the development point of view it's absolutely better than Nokia in terms of compatibility and speed of development, but use only RIMOS 5.0+ !

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Botnet for RSA cracking?

I read an interesting article about putting 1.000.000 computers, given the chance for a serious botnet owner to get it, to crack RSA.

The result is that in such context attacking an RSA 1024bit key would take only 28 years, compared to theoretical 19 billion of years.

Reading of this article , is extremely interesting because it gives our very important consideration on the cryptography strength respect to the computation power required to carry on cracking attempt, along with industry approach to “default security level”.

I would say a must read .

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Patent rights and opensource: can they co-exist?

How many of you had to deal with patented technologies?

How many of the patented technologies you dealed with was also “secrets” in their implementation?

Well, there's a set of technologies whose implementation is open source ( copyright) but that are patented ( intellectual property right) .

A very nice paper about the topic opensource & patents that i suggest to read is from Fenwick & West and can be downloaded here (pdf) .

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China Encryption Regulations

Ciao a tutti,

i found this very interesting paper on China Encryption Import/Export/Domestic Regulations done by Baker&Mckenzie in the US.

It's strongly business and regulatory oriented giving a very well done view on how china regulations works and how it may behave in future.

Read here Decrypting China Encryption's Regulations (form Bakernet website) .

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The (old) Crypto AG case and some thinking about it

In the '90, closed source and proprietary cryptography was ruling the world.

That's before open source and scientifically approved encrypted technologies went out as a best practice to do crypto stuff.

I would like to remind when, in 1992, USA along with Israel was, together with switzerland, providing backdoored (proprietary and secret) technologies to Iranian government to tap their communications, cheating them to think that the used solution was secure , making also some consideration on this today in 2010.

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That's called The Crypto AG case , an historical fact involving the United States National Security Agency along with Signal Intelligence Division of Israel Ministry of Defense that are strongly suspected to had made an agreement with the Swiss cryptography producer company Crypto AG .

Basically those entities placed a backdoor in the secure crypto equipment that they provided to Iran to intercept Iranian communications.

Their crypto was based on secret and proprietary encryption algorithms developed by Crypto AG and eventually customized for Iranian government.

You can read some other facts about Crypto AG backdoor related issues:

The demise of global telecommunication security

The NSA-Crypto AG sting

Breaking codes: an impossible task? By BBC

Der Spiegel Crypto AG (german) article

Now, in 2010, we all know and understand that secret and proprietary crypto does not work.

Just some reference by top worldwide cryptographic experts below:

Secrecy, Security, Obscurity by Bruce Schneier

Just say No to Proprietary cryptographic Algorithms by Network Computing (Mike Fratto)

Security Through Obscurity by Ceria Purdue University

Unlocking the Secrets of Crypto: Cryptography, Encryption and Cryptology explained by Symantec

Time change the way things are approached.

I like very much the famous Philip Zimmermann assertion:

“Cryptography used to be an obscure science, of little relevance to everyday life. Historically, it always had a special role in military and diplomatic communications. But in the Information Age, cryptography is about political power, and in particular, about the power relationship between a government and its people. It is about the right to privacy, freedom of speech, freedom of political association, freedom of the press, freedom from unreasonable search and seizure, freedom to be left alone.”

Any scientist today accept and approve the Kerckhoffs' Principle that in 1883 in the Cryptographie Militaire paper stated:

The security of a cryptosystem should not depend on keeping the algorithm secret, but only on keeping the numeric key secret.

It's absolutely clear that the best practice for doing cryptography today obbly any serious person to do open cryptography, subject to public review and that follow the Kerckhoff principle.

So, what we should think about closed source, proprietary cryptography that's based on security trough obscurity concepts?

I was EXTREMELY astonished when TODAY, in 2010, in the age of information society i read some paper on Crypto AG website.

I invite all to read the Crypto AG security paper called Sophisticated Security Architecture designed by Crypto AG of which you can get a significant excerpt below:

The design of this architecture allows Crypto AG to provide a secret proprietary algorithm that can be specified for each customer to assure the perfect degree of cryptographic security and optimum support for the customer's security policy. In turn, the Security Architecture gives you the influence you need to be fully independent in respect of your encryption solution. You can determine all areas that are covered by cryptography and verify how the algorithm works. The original secret proprietary algorithm of Crypto AG is the foundation of the Security Architecture .

I have to say that their architecture is absolutely good from TLC point of view. Also they have done a very good job in making the design of the overall architecture in order to make a tamper-proof resistant crypto system by using dedicated crypto processor .
However there is still something missing:

T he overall cryptographic concept is misleading, based on wrong encryption concepts .

You may think that i am a troll telling this, but given the history of Crypto AG and given the fact that all the scientific and security community does not approve security trough obscurity concepts , it would legitimate to ask ourself:

Why they are still doing security trough obscurity cryptography with secret and proprietary algorithms ?



Hey, i think that they have very depth knowledge on telecommunication and security, but given that the science tell us not to follow the secrecy of algorithms, i really have serious doubt on why they are still providing proprietary encryption and does not move to standard solutions (eventually with some kind of custom enhancement).

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Mobile Security talk at WHYMCA conference

I want to share some slides i used to talk about mobile security at whymca mobile conference in Milan.

Read here my slides on mobile security .

The slides provide a wide an in-depth overview of mobile security related matters, i should be doing some slidecast about it putting also audio. Maybe will do, maybe not, it depends on time that's always a insufficient resource.

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iPhone PIN: useless encryption

I recently switched one of my multiple mobile phones with which i go around to iPhone.

I am particularly concerned about data protection in case of theft and so started having a look around about the iPhone provided protection system.

There is an interesting set of iPhone Business Security Features that make me think that iPhone is moving in the right path for security protection of the phone, but still a lot of things has to be done, especially for serious Enterprise and Government users.

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For example it turned out that the iPhone PIN protection is useless and it can be broken just plugging the iPhone to a Linux machine and accessing the device like a USB stick.

That's something disturbing my paranoid mindset that make me think not to use sensitive data on my iPhone if i cannot protect my data.

Probably an iPhone independent disk encryption product would be very useful in order to let the market create protection schemas that fit the different risk contexts that different users may have.

Probably a general consumer is not worried about this PIN vulnerability but for me, working within highly confidential envirnonment such as intelligence, finance and military, it's something that i cannot accept.

I need strong disk encryption on my mobile phone.

I do strong voice encryption for it , but it would be really nice to have also something to protect the whole iPhone data and not just phone calls.

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Exploit code against SecurStar DriveCrypt published

Sembra che la comunità degli hacker in qualche modo vuole indirizzare prodotti SecurStar, forse perché comunità degli hacker non piace l'approccio spesso rivelato immorale già descritto in precedenza in questo blog di articoli e commenti degli utenti.

Nel 2004 un sacco di accusa contro Hafner della SecurStar è andato fuori a causa del presunto furto di proprietà intellettuale per quanto riguarda i codici opensource come Encryption 4 le masse e annuncio legale anche contro il libero e opensource TrueCrypt progetto.

Nel 2008 c'è stato un pre-boot di hacking di autenticazione contro DriveCrypt Plus pubblicato su Full-Disclosure.

All'inizio del 2010 fu la volta della ricerca Infosecurity falso segretamente sponsorizzata da SecurStar a http://infosecurityguard.com (che ora hanno cercato di rimuovere dal web a causa della situazione imbarazzante, ma il backup della storia sono disponibili, comunità degli hacker ancora in attesa per le scuse).

Ora, la metà del 2010, a seguito di una ricerca pubblicata nel dicembre 2009 sulle vulnerabilità del software di crittografia dei dischi realizzati da Neil Kettle (mu-b), ricercatore di sicurezza a cifre laboratori e penetration tester a Convergent Network Solutions , DriveCrypt è risultata rottura vulnerabili e sfruttabili il dispositivo di sicurezza del sistema e codice exploit è stato appena rilasciato.

Exploit code reported below (thanks Neil for the code release!):

  • Arbitrary kernel code execution security exploit of DriveCrypt: drivecrypt-dcr.c
  • File arbitrario lettura / scrittura di exploit di sicurezza non controllati tramite definibili dall'utente parametri ZxCreateFile / ReadFile / WriteFile: DriveCrypt-fopen.c

Il codice exploit è stato testato contro DriveCrypt 5.3, attualmente rilasciata DriveCrypt 5.4 è segnalato per essere troppo vulnerabile in quanto ha solo modifiche minori relative alla compatibilità win7. Chiunque può fare un doppio controllo e riportare un commento qui?

Ottimo lavoro di Neil!

Nel frattempo la Free Truecrypt è probabilmente la scelta preferita per la crittografia del disco, dato che è difficile fidarsi DriveCrypt, PGP è stata acquisita da Symantec e non ci sono voci molto male circa la fiducia che le persone hanno in Symantec e non ci sono molti ampiamente alternative disponibili.

Voci dicono che anche PhoneCrypt binari sono sempre analizzati e il sistema di crittografia potrebbe rivelare qualcosa di divertente ...

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Quantum cryptography broken

Quantum cryptography it's something very challenging, encryption methods that leverage the law of phisycs to secure communications over fiber lines.

To oversimplify the system is based on the fact that if someone cut the fiber, put a tap in the middle, and joint together the other side of the fiber, the amount of “errors” that will be on the communications path will be higher than 20% .

So if QBER (Quantum Bit Error Rate) goes above 20% then it's assumed that the system is intercepted.

Researcher at university of toronto was able to cheat the system with a staying below the 20%, at 19.7% , thus tweaking the threshold used by the system to consider the communication channel secure vs compromised.

The product found vulnerable is called Cerberis Layer2 and produced by the Swiss ID Quantique .

Some possibile approach to detect the attack has been provided but probably, imho, such kind of systems does not have to be considered 100% reliable until the technology will be mature enough.

Traditional encryption has to be used together till several years, eventually bundled with quantum encryption whether applicable.

When we will see a quantum encryption systems on an RFC like we have seen for ZRTP , PGP and SSL ?

-naif

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great point of view

Because security of a cryptographic system it's not a matter of “how many bits do i use” but using the right approach to do the right thing to mitigate the defined security risk in the most balanced way.

security.png

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Encryption is not scrambling: be aware of scrambler!

Most of us know about voice scrambler that can be used across almost any kind of voice based communication technology.

Extremely flexible approach: works everything

Extreme performance: very low latency

but unfortunately…

Extremely weak: Scrambling cannot be considered secure.

Only encryption can be considered secure under the Kerckoff's principle .

So please don't even consider any kind of analog scrambler if you need real security.

Read deeply the paper Implementation of a real-time voice encryption system ” by Markus Brandau, especially the cryptoanalysis paragraph.

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SecurStar GmbH Phonecrypt answers on the Infosecurityguard/Notrax case: absolutely unreasonable! :-)

UPDATE 20.04.2010: http://infosecurityguard.com has been disabled. Notrax identity became known to several guys in the voice security environments (cannot tell, but you can imagine, i was right!) and so our friends decided to trow away the website because of legal responsibility under UK and USA laws.

UPDATE: Nice summary of the whole story (i know, it's long and complicated to read at 1st time) on SIPVicious VoIP security blog by Sandro Gauci .

Following my discoveries, Mr. Hafner, SecurStar chief exec, tried to ultimately defend their actions, citing absolutely unreasonable excuses to The Reg instead of publicly apologizing for what they have done: creating a fake independent security research to promote their PhoneCrypt product .

He tried to convince us that the person behind IP 217.7.213.59, used by the author of infosecurityguard.com and pointing to their office DSL line, was this hacker Notrax, using their anonymous surfing service and not one of their employees at their office:

“SecurStar chief exec Wilfried Hafner denied any contact with Notrax. Notrax, he said, must have been using his firm's anonymous browsing service, SurfSolo, to produce the results reported by Pietrosanti”

Let's reflect a moment on this sentence… Would really an hacker looking for anonymity spend 64 EUR to buy their anonymity surfing service called surfsolo instead of using the free and much more secure TOR (the onion router) ?Then let's reflect on this other piece of information:

  • The IP 217.7.213.59 is SecurStar GmbH's office DSL line
  • On 217.7.213.59 they have installed their VoIP/Asterisk PBX and internet gateway
  • They promote their anonymous proxy service for “Anonymous p2p use” ( http://www.securstar.com/products_ssolo.php ). Who would let users do p2p from the office dsl line where they have installed their corporate VoIP PBX ? If you do VoIP you can't let third party flood your line w/ p2p traffic, your phone calls would became obviously unreliable (yes, yes, you can do QoS, but you would not place an anonymous navigation proxy on your company office DSL line…).
  • Which company providing an anonymous navigation service would ever use their own office IP address? Just think how many times you would have the police knocking at your door and your employees as the prime suspects. (In past i used to run a TOR node, i know the risks…). Also think how many times you would find yourself blacklisted on google as a spyware bot.
  • Mr. Hafner also says “We have two million people using this product. Or he may have been an old customer of ours”. 2M users on a DSL line, really?
  • I don't use Surfsolo service, however their proxies are probably these ones:

surfsolo.securstar.net – 67.225.141.74

surfsolo.securstar.com – 69.16.211.133

Frankly speaking I can easily understand that Mr. Hafner is going do whatever he can to protect his company from the scandal, but the “anonymous proxy” excuse is at the very least suspicious.

How does the fact that the “independent research” was semantically a product review of PhoneCrypt, along with the discovery that the author come from the SecurStar GmbH IP address offices, along with the anonymity of this Notrax guy (SecurStar calls him a “well known it security professional” in their press release..) sound to you?

It's possible that earth will get an attack from outer space that's going to destroy our life?

Statistically extremely difficult, but yes, possible. More or less like the “anonymous proxy” story told by Mr. Hafner to cover the fact that they are the ones behind the infosecurityguard.com fake “independent security review”.

Hey, I don't need anything else to convince myself or to let the smart person have his own thoughts on this.

I just think that the best way for SecurStar to get out of this mess would probably be to provide public excuses to the hacking community for abusing the name and reputation of real independent security researches, for the sake of a marketing stunt.

Saluti,

Fabio Pietrosanti

ps I am currently waiting for some other infos that will more precisely confirm that what Mr. Hafner is saying is not properly true. Restate sintonizzati.

Quota

Evidence that infosecurityguard.com/notrax is SecurStar GmbH Phonecrypt – A fake independent research on voice crypto

Below evidence that the security review made by an anonymous hacker on http://infosecurityguard.com is in facts a dishonest marketing plan by the SecurStar GmbH to promote their voice crypto product.

I already wrote about that voice crypto analysis that appeared to me very suspicious.

Now it's confirmed, it's a fake independent hacker security research by SecurStar GmbH, its just a marketing trick!

How do we know that Infosecurityguard.com, the fake independent security research, is a marketing trick from SecurStar GmbH?

1) I posted on http://infosecurityguard.com a comments to a post with a link to my blog to that article on israelian ministry of defense certification

2) The author of http://infosecurityguard.com went to approve the comment and read the link on my own blog http://infosecurity.ch

3) Reaching my blog he leaked the IP address from which he was coming 217.7.213.59 (where i just clicked on from wordpress statistic interface)

4) On http:// 217.7.213.59/panel there is the IP PBX interface of the SecurStar GmbH corporate PBX (openly reachable trough the internet!)

5) The names of the internal PBX confirm 100% that it's the SecurStar GmbH:

6) There is 100% evidence that the anonymous hacker of http://infosecurityguard.com is from SecurStar GmbH

Below the data and reference that let us discover that it's all but a dishonest marketing tips and not an independent security research.

Kudos to Matteo Flora for it's support and for his article in Debunking Infosecurityguard identity !

The http referral tricks

When you read a link going from a website to another one there is an HTTP protocol header, the “Referral”, that tell you from which page someone is going to another webpage.

The referral demonstrated that the authors of http://infosecurityguard.com read my post, because it was coming from http://infosecurityguard.com/wp-admin/edit-comments.php that's the webpage you use as a wordpress author/editor to approve/refuse comments. And here there was the link.

That's the log entry:

217.7.213.59 – - [30/Jan/2010:02:56:37 -0700] “GET /20100129/licensed-by-israel-ministry-of-defense-how-things-really-works/ HTTP/1.0″ 200 5795 “ http://infosecurityguard.com/wp-admin/edit-comments.php ” “Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.1; Trident/4.0; GTB6.3; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; InfoPath.2)”

The PBX open on the internet tell us that's SecurStar GmbH

The SecurStar GmbH PBX is open on the internet, it contains all the names of their employee and confirm us that the author of http:/infosecurityguard.com is that company and is the anonymous hacker called Notrax.

Here there is their forum post where the SecurStar GmbH guys are debugging IPCOPfirewall & Asterisk together (so we see also details of what they use) where there is the ip 217.7.213.59 .

SecurStarproof.png

That's also really fun!

They sell secure telephony but their company telephony system is openly vulnerable on the internet . :-)

I was thinking to call the CEO, Hafner, via SIP on his internal desktop PBX to announce we discovered him tricks.. :->

They measured their marketing activity

Looking at the logs of my website i found that they was sensing the google distribution of information for the following keywords, in order to understand how effectively they was able to attack competing products. It's reasonable, if you invest money in a marketing campaign you want to see the results :-)

They reached my blog and i logged their search:

infosecurityguard+cryptophone

infosecurityguard+gold-lock

217.7.213.59 – - [30/Jan/2010:02:22:42 -0700] “GET / HTTP/1.0″ 200 31057 “Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.1; Trident/4.0; GTB6.3; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; InfoPath.2)”

217.7.213.59 – - [30/Jan/2010:04:15:07 -0700] “GET HTTP/1.0″ 200 15774 “Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.1; Trident/4.0; GTB6.3; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; InfoPath.2)”


The domain registration data

The domain have been registered on 1st December 2009, just two months to start preparing the dishonest marketing campaign:

Domain Name: INFOSECURITYGUARD.COM

Registrar: GODADDY.COM, INC.

Updated Date: 01-dec-2009

Creation Date: 01-dec-2009

The domain is anonymously privacy protected trough a whois privacy service:

Administrative Contact: Private, Registration INFOSECURITYGUARD.COM@domainsbyproxy.com , Domains by Proxy, Inc. DomainsByProxy.com

Notrax hacker does not exist on google
As you know any hacker that get public usually have presence of it's activity on google, attending mailinglists, forum, homepage, past research, participation to conferences, etc, etc.
The fake hacker that they wanted us to to think was writing an independent blog does NOT have any trace on google. Only some hit about an anonymous browser called Notrax but nothing about that hacker.
Maybe when SecurStar provided the anonymity tool to their marketing agency, to help them protecting anonymity for the fake research, their provided them the anonymous browser notrax.So the marketing guy thinking about the nickname of this fake hackers used what? Notrax! :-)

The “independent review”completely oriented in publicizing PhoneCrypt

Of the various review don the phonecrypt review is only positive and amazing good feedback, while the other are only bad feedback and no single good point.

As you can imagine, in any kind of independent product evaluation, for all products there are goods and bad points. No. In this one there are only product that are good and product that are bad.

They missed to consider the security of the technology used by the products

They completely avoided to speak about cryptography and security of the products.

They do not evaluated basic security features that must be in that kind of products.That's in order not to let anyone see that they did not followed basic security rules in building up their PhoneCrypt.
The technology is closed source, no transparency on algorithms and protocols, no peer review.Read my new comparison (from the basic cryptographic requirement point of view) About the voice encryption analysis (criteria, errors and different results) .
The results are somehow different than their one .

UPDATE: Who's Wilfried Hafner (SecurStar founder) ?

I got a notice from a reader regarding Wilfred Hafner, SecurStar founder, CEO and security expert.

He was arrested in 1997 for telephony related fraud (check 2nd article on Phrack) earning from telephony fraud 254.000 USD causing damages to local telcos trough blueboxing for 1.15 Million USD.

He was not doing “Blueboxing” for the pleasure of phreaking and connecting with other hackers, but to earn money.

Hacking for profit (and not for fun) in 1997… brrr…. No hacker's ethic at all!

All in all, is that lawful?

Badmouthing a competitor amounts to an unfair competition practice in most jurisdictions, so it is arguable (to say the least) that SecurStar is right on a legally sound ground here.
Moreover, there are some specific statutes in certain jurisdictions which provide for a straightforward ban on the practice we are talking about. For example in the UK the British Institute of Practitioners in Advertising - in compliance with the Consumer protection from Unfair Trading regulation – ruled that:

”falsely claiming or creating the impression that the trader is not acting for the purposes relating to his trade, business, craft or profession, or falsely representing oneself as a consumer” is a criminal offense .

We have no doubt that PRPR (which is the UK-based *PR company for SecurStar GmbH, led by Peter Rennison and Allie Andrews as stated in SecurStar Press Release ) did provide their client with this information. Heck, they *are* in the UK, they simply cannot ignore that!

IANAL, but I would not be surpised if someone filed a criminal complaint or start civil litigation for unfair competition against SecurStar GmbH.
Whether this is going to be a matter for criminal and/or civil Courts or not is not that important. However, it is clear enough that SecurStar GmbH appears to be at least ethically questionable and not really worth of trust.

Nice try, gentlemen… however, next time just do it right (whether “right” for them means “in a honest manner” or “in a fashion not to be caught” I will let them choose)”

Fabio Pietrosanti (naif)

Quota

Dishonest security: The SecurStart GmbH Phonecrypt case

I would like to provide considerations on the concept of ethics that a security company should have respect to the users, the media and the security environment.

SecurStar GmbH made very bad things making that infosecuriguard.com fake independent research.

It's unfair approach respect to hacking community.

It's unfair marketing to end user. They should not be tricking by creating fake independent review.

It's unfair competition in the security market.

Let's make some more important consideration on this.

Must be serious on cryptographic products. They are not toys

When you do cryptographic tools you should be really aware of what you are doing, you must be really serious.

If you do bad crypto people could die.

If you don't follow basic security rules for transparency and security for cryptography you are putting people life at risk.

You are taking the responsibility of this. (I want to sleep at night, don't think SecurStar CEO/CTO care about this…)

Security research need reference and transparency

Security research have to be public, well done, always subject to public discussion and cooperation.
Security research should not be instrumentally used for marketing purpose.Security research should be done for awareness and grow of the knowledge of the worldwide security environment.

Hacking environment is neutral, should not be used instrumentally

Hackers are considered neutral, nerds, doing what they do for their pleasure and passion.

If you work in the security market you work with hackers.

If you use hackers and hacking environment for your own marketing purposes you are making something very nasty.

Hackers give you the technology and knowledge and you use them for your own commercial purpose.

Consideration on the authority of the information online

That's something that pose serious consideration on the authority of information online.An anonymous hacker, with no reference online, made a product security review that appear like an independent one. I have to say that the fake review was very well prepared, it always posed good/bad things in an indirect way. It did not appeared to me at 1st time like a fake. But going deeply i found what's going on.

However Journalists, news media and blogger went to the TRAP and reviewed their fake research. TheRegister, NetworkWorld and a lot of blogs reported it. Even if the author was completely anonymous.

What they have done is already illegal in UK

SecurStar GmbH is lucky that they are not in the UK, where doing this kind of things is illegal .

Fabio Pietrosanti (naif)

Quota

About the SecurStar GmbH Phonecrypt voice encryption analysis (criteria, errors and different results)

This article want to clarify and better explain the finding at infosecurityguard.com regaring voice encryption product evaluation.
This article want to tell you a different point of view other than infosecurityguard.com and explaining which are the rational with extensive explaination from security point of view.
Today i read news saying: “PhoneCrypt: Basic Vulnerability Found in 12 out of 15 Voice Encryption Products and went to read the website infosecurityguard .

Initially it appeared to my like a great research activity but then i started reading deeply the read about it.I found that it's not properly a security research but there is are concrete elements that's a marketing campaign well done in order to attract public media and publicize a product.
Imho they was able to cheat journalists and users because the marketing campaign was absolutely well done not to be discovered on 1st read attempt. I personally considered it like a valid one on 1st ready (they cheated me initially!).

But if you go deeply… you will understand that:
- it's a camouflage marketing initiative arranged by SecurStar GmbH and not a independent security research
- they consider a only security context where local device has been compromised (no software can be secured in that case, like saying SSL can be compromised if you have a trojan!)
- they do not consider any basic security and cryptographic security criteria

However a lot of important website reported it:

This article is quite long, if you read it you will understand better what's going on around infosecurityguard.com research and research result.

I want to to tell you why and how (imho) they are wrong.

The research missed to consider Security, Cryptography and Transparency!

Well, all this research sound much like being focused on the marketing goal to say that their PhoneCrypt product is the “super” product best of all the other ones.
Any security expert that would have as duty the “software evaluation” in order to protect the confidentiality of phone calls will evaluate other different characteristics of the product and the technology.

Yes, it's true that most of the product described by SecurStar in their anonymous marketing website called http://infosecurityguard.com have some weakness.
But the relevant weakness are others and PhoneCrypt unfortunately, like most of the described products suffer from this.
Let's review which characteristics are needed basic cryptography and security requirement (the best practice, the foundation and the basics!)

a – Security Trough Obscurity does not work

A basic rule in cryptography cames from 1883 by Auguste Kerckhoffs:

In a well-designed cryptographic system, only the key needs to be secret; there should be no secrecy in the algorithm.
Modern cryptographers have embraced this principle, calling anything else “security by obscurity.”
Read what Bruce Schneir, recognized expert and cryptographer in the world say about this
Any security expert will tell you that's true. Even a novice university student will tell you that's true. Simply because that's the only way to do cryptography.
Almost all product described in the review by SecurStar GmbH, include PhoneCrypt, does not provide precise details about their cryptographic technologies.
Precise details are:
  • Detailed specification of cryptographic algorithm (that's not just saying “we use AES “)
  • Detailed specification of cryptographic protocol (that's not just saying “we use Diffie Hellman ” )
  • Detailed specification of measuring the cryptographic strenght (that's not just saying “we have 10000000 bit key size “)

Providing precise details means having extensive documentation with theoretical and practical implications documenting ANY single way of how the algorithm works, how the protocol works with precise specification to replicate it for interoperability testing.
It means that scientific community should be able to play with the technology, audit it, hack it.
If we don't know anything about the cryptographic system in details, how can we know which are the weakness and strength points?

Mike Fratto, Site editor of Network Computing, made a great article on “Saying NO to proprietary cryptographic systems” .
Cerias Purdue University tell this .

b – NON peer reviewed and NON scientifically approved Cryptography does not work

In any case and in any condition you do cryptography you need to be sure that someone else will check, review, analyze, distruct and reconstract from scratch your technology and provide those information free to the public for open discussion.
That's exactly how AES was born and like US National Institute of Standard make crypto does (with public contest with public peer review where only the best evaluated win).
A public discussion with a public contest where the a lot of review by most famous and expert cryptographer in the world, hackers (with their name,surname and face, not like Notrax) provide their contribution, tell what they thinks.
That's called “peer review”.

If a cryptographic technology has an extended and important peer review, distributed in the world coming from universities, private security companies, military institutions, hackers and all coming from different part of the world (from USA to Europe to Russia to South America to Middle east to China) and all of them agree that a specific technology it's secure…
Well, in that case we can consider the technology secure because a lot of entities with good reputation and authority coming from a lot of different place in the world have publicly reviewed, analyzed and confirmed that a technology it's secure.

How a private company can even think to invent on it's own a secure communication protocol when it's scientifically stated that it's not possible to do it in a “proprietary and closed way” ?
IBM tell you that peer review it's required for cryptography .
Bruce Schneier tell you that “Good cryptographers know that nothing substitutes for extensive peer review and years of analysis.”
Philip Zimmermann will tell you to beware of Snake Oil where the story is: “Every software engineer fancies himself a cryptographer, which has led to the proliferation of really bad crypto software.”

c – Closed source cryptography does not work

As you know any kind of “serious” and with “good reputation” cryptographic technology is implemented in opensource.
There are usually multiple implementation of the same cryptographic algorithm and cryptographic protocol to be able to review all the way it works and certify the interoperability.
Supposing to use a standard with precise and extended details on “how it works”, that has been “peer reviewed” by the scientific community BUT that has been re-implemented from scratch by a not so smart programmer and the implementation it's plenty of bugs.

Well, if the implementation is “opensource” this means that it can be reviewed, improved, tested, audited and the end user will certaintly have in it's own had a piece of technology “that works safely” .

Google release opensource crypto toolkit
Mozilla release opensource crypto toolkit
Bruce Schneier tell you that Cryptography must be opensource .

Another cryptographic point of view

I don't want to convince anyone but just provide facts related to science, related to cryptography and security in order to reduce the effect of misinformation done by security companies whose only goes is to sell you something and not to do something that make the world a better.

When you do secure products, if they are not done following the proper approach people could die.
It's absolutely something irresponsible not to use best practice to do crypto stuff.

To summarize let's review the infosecurityguard.com review from a security best pratice point of view.

Product name Security Trough Obscurity Public peer review Open Source Compromise locally?
Caspertec Obscurity No public review Closed
CellCrypt Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Cryptophone Transparency Limited public review Public
Gold-Lock Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Illix Obscurity
No public review
Closed
No1.BC Obscurity No public review
Closed
PhoneCrypt Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Rode&Swarz Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Secure-Voice Obscurity
No public review
Closed
SecuSmart Obscurity
No public review
Closed
SecVoice Obscurity
No public review
Closed
SegureGSM Obscurity
No public review
Closed
SnapCell Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Tripleton Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Zfone Transparency Public review
Open
ZRTP Transparency Public review
Open

*Green means that it match basic requirement for a cryptographic secure system

* Red / Broken means that it does not match basic requirement for a cryptographic secure system
That's my analysis using a evaluation method based on cryptographic and security parameters not including the local compromise context that i consider useless.

However, to be clear, those are only basic parameters to be used when considering a voice encryption product (just to avoid being in a situation that appears like i am promoting other products). So it may absolutely possible that a product with good crypto ( transparency, peer reviewed and opensource) is absolutely a not secure product because of whatever reason (badly written, not usable causing user not to use it and use cleartext calls, politically compromised, etc, etc).
I think i will prepare a broader criteria for voice crypto technologies and voice crypto products, so it would be much easier and much practical to have a full transparent set of criterias to evaluate it.

But those are really the basis of security to be matched for a good voice encryption system!
Read some useful past slides on security protocols used in voice encryption systems (2nd part).

Now read below some more practical doubt about their research.

The security concept of the review is misleading: any hacked device can be always intercepted!

I think that the guys completely missed the point: ANY KIND OF SOFTWARE RUNNING ON A COMPROMISED OPERATING SYSTEM CAN BE INTERCEPTED

Now they are pointing out that also Zfone from Philip Zimmermann is broken (a pc software), just because they install a trojan on a PC like in a mobile phone?
Any security software rely on the fact that the underlying operating system is somehow trusted and preserve the integrity of the environment where the software run.

  • If you have a disk encryption system but your PC if infected by a trojan, the computer is already compromised.
  • If you have a voice encryption system but your PC is infected by a trojan, the computer is already compromised.
  • If you have a voice encryption system but your mobile phone is infected by a trojan, the mobile phone is already compromised.

No matter which software you are running, in such case the security of your operating environment is compromised and in one way or another way all the information integrity and confidentiality is compromised.

Like i explained above how to intercept PhoneCrypt.

The only things that can protect you from this threat is running in a closed operating system with Trust Computing capability, implementing it properly.
For sure on any “Open” operating system such us Windows, Windows Mobile, Linux, iPhone or Android there's no chance to really protect a software.
On difficult operating system such as Symbian OS or RimOS maybe the running software can be protected (at least partially)

That's the reason for which the security concept that guys are leveraging to carry on their marketing campaign has no clue.
It's just because they control the environment, they know Flexispy software and so they adjusted their software not to be interceptable when Flexispy is installed.
If you develop a trojan with the other techniques i described above you will 100% intercept PhoneCrypt.

On that subject also Dustin Tamme l, Security researcher of BreakPoint Systems , pointed on on VoIP Security Alliance mailing lists that the security analysis is based on wrong concepts .

The PhoneCrypt can be intercepted: it's just that they don't wanted to tell you!

PhoneCrypt can be intercepted with “on device spyware”.
Perché?
Because Windows Mobile is an unsecure operating environment and PhoneCrypt runs on Windows Mobile.
Windows Mobile does not use Trusted Computing and so any software can do anything.
The platform choice for a secure telephony system is important.
Come?
I quickly discussed with some knowledgeable windows mobile hackers about 2 different way to intercept PhoneCrypt with an on-device spyware (given the unsecure Windows Mobile Platform).

a) Inject a malicious DLL into the software and intercept from within the Phonecrypt itself.
In Windows Mobile any software can be subject to DLL code injection.
What an attacker can do is to inject into the PhoneCrypt software (or any software running on the phone), hooking the Audio related functions acting as a “function proxy” between the PhoneCrypt and the real API to record/play audio.
It's a matter of “hooking” only 2 functions, the one that record and the one that play audio.
Read the official Microsoft documentation on how to do DLL injection on Windows Mobile processes. or forum discussing the technique of injecting DLL on windows mobile processes.
That's simple, any programmer will tell you to do so.
They simply decided that's better not to make any notice about this.
b) Create a new audio driver that simply act as a proxy to the real one and intercept PhoneCrypt
In Windows Mobile you can create new Audio Drivers and new Audio Filters.
What an attacker can do is to load a new audio driver that does not do anything else than passing the real audio driver function TO/FROM the realone. In the meantime intercept everything recorded and everything played :-)
Here there is an example on how to do Audio driver for Windows Mobile .
Here a software that implement what i explain here for Windows “Virtual Audio Cable” .
The very same concept apply to Windows Mobile. Check the book “Mobile Malware Attack and Defense” at that link explaining techniques to play with those techniques.
They simply decided that's better not to make any notice to that way of intercepting phone call on PhoneCrypt .
Those are just 2 quick ideas, more can be probably done.

Sounds much like a marketing activity – Not a security research.

I have to tell you. I analyzed the issue very carefully and on most aspects. All this things about the voice encryption analisys sounds to me like a marketing campaign of SecurStar GmbH to sell PhoneCrypt and gain reputation. A well articulated and well prepared campaign to attract the media saying, in an indirect way cheating the media, that PhoneCrypt is the only one secure. You see the press releases of SecurStar and of the “Security researcher Notrax telling that PhoneCrypt is the only secure product” . SecurStar PhoneCrypt is the only product the anonymous hacker “Notrax” consider secure of the “software solutions”.
The only “software version” in competition with:

SnapCell – No one can buy it. A security company that does not even had anymore a webpage. The company does not almost exist anymore.
rohde-schawarz – A company that have in his list price and old outdated hardware secure phone . No one would buy it, it's not good for genera use.

Does it sounds strange that only those other products are considered secure along with PhoneCrypt .

Also… let's check the kind of multimedia content in the different reviews available of Gold-Lock, Cellcrypt and Phonecrypt in order to understand how much the marketing guys pressed to make the PhoneCrypt review the most attractive:

Application Screenshots of application Video with demonstration of interception Network demonstration
PhoneCrypt 5 0 1
CellCrypt 0 2 0
GoldLock 1 2 0

It's clear that PhoneCrypt is reviewed showing more features explicitly shown and major security features product description than the other.

Too much difference between them, should we suspect it's a marketing tips?

But again other strange things analyzing the way it was done…
If it was “an impartial and neutral review” we should see good and bad things on all the products right?

Ok, see the table below regarding the opinion indicated in each paragraph of the different reviews available of Gold-Lock, CellCrypt and Phonecrypt (are the only available) to see if are positive or negative.

Application Number of paragraphs Positive paragraphs Negative paragraphs Neutral paragraphs
PhoneCrypt 9 9 0 0
CellCrypt 12 0 10 2
GoldLock 9 0 8 1

Detailed paragraphs opinion analysis of Phonecrypt
Paragraph of review Opinion expressed
From their website Positive Marketing feedback
Apple iPhone Positive Marketing feedback
Disk Encryption or voice Encryption Positive Marketing feedback
PBX Compatibility? Really Positive Marketing feedback
Cracking <10. Not. Positive Marketing feedback
Good thinking! Positive Marketing feedback
A little network action Positive Marketing feedback
UI Positive Marketing feedback
Good Taste Positive Marketing feedback
Detailed paragraphs opinion analysis of Gold-Lock 3G
Paragraph of review Opinion expressed
From their website Negative Marketing feedback
Licensed by The israeli Ministry of Denfese Negative Marketing feedback
Real Company or Part Time hobby Negative Marketing feedback
16.000 bit authentication Negative Marketing feedback
DH 256 Negative Marketing feedback
Downad & Installation! Neutral Marketing feedback
Cracking it <10 Negative Marketing feedback
Marketing BS101 Negative Marketing feedback
Cool video stuff Negative Marketing feedback
Detailed paragraphs opinion analysis of CellCrypt
Paragraph of review Opinion expressed
From their website Neutral Marketing feedback
A little background about cellcrypt Negative Marketing feedback
Master of Marketing Negative Marketing feedback
Secure Voice calling Negative Marketing feedback
Who's buying their wares Negative Marketing feedback
Downad & Installation! Neutral Marketing feedback
My Demo environment Negative Marketing feedback
Did they forget some code Negative Marketing feedback
Cracking it <5 Negative Marketing feedback
Room Monitoring w/ FlexiSpy Negative Marketing feedback
Cellcrypt unique features.. Negative Marketing feedback
Plain old interception Negative Marketing feedback
The Haters out there Negative Marketing feedback

Now it's clear that from their point of view on PhoneCrypt there is no single bad point while the other are always described in a negative way.
No single good point. Strange?
All those considerations along with the next ones really let me think that's very probably a marketing review and not an independent review.

Other similar marketing attempt from SecurStar

SecurStar GmbH is known to have used in past marketing activity leveraging this kind of “technical speculations”, abusing of partial information and fake unconfirmed hacking stuff to make marketing/media coverage.
Imho a rare mix of unfairness in leveraging the difficult for people to really understand the complexity of security and cryptography.

They already used in past Marketing activities like the one about creating a trojan for Windows Mobile and saying that their software is secure from the trojan that they wrote.
Read about their marketing tricks of 2007

They developed a Trojan (RexSpy) for Windows Mobile, made a demonstration capability of the trojan and later on told that they included “Anti-Trojan” capability to their PhoneCrypt software.They never released informations on that trojan, not even proved that it exists.

The researcher Collin Mulliner told at that time that it sounds like a marketing tips (also because he was not able to get from SecurStar CEO Hafner any information about that trojan):

“This makes you wonder if this is just a marketing thing.”

Now, let's try to make some logical reassignment.
It's part of the way they do marketing, an very unfriendly and unpolite approach with customers, journalist and users trying to provide wrong security concepts for a market advantage. Being sure that who read don't have all the skills to do in depth security evaluation and find the truth behind their marketing trips.

Who is the hacker notrax?

It sounds like a camouflage of a fake identity required to have an “independent hacker” that make an “independent review” that is more strong on reputation building.
Read about his bio:

¾ Human, ¼ Android (Well that would be cool at least.) I am just an enthusiast of pretty much anything that talks binary and if it has a RS232 port even better. During the day I masquerade as an engineer working on some pretty cool projects at times, but mostly I do the fun stuff at night. I have been thinking of starting an official blog for about 4.5 years to share some of the things I come across, can't figure out, or just cross my mind. Due to my day job and my nighttime meddling, I will update this when I can. I hope some find it useful, if you don't, well you don't.

There are no information about this guy on google.
Almost any hacker that get public have articles online, post in mailing archive and/or forum or some result of their activity.
For notrax, nothing is available.

Additionally let's look at the domain…
The domain infosecurityguard.com is privacy protected by domainsbyproxy to prevent understanding who is the owner.
The domain has been created 2 months ago on 01-Dec-09 on godaddy.com registrar.

What's also very interesting to notice that this “unknown hacker with no trace on google about him that appeared on December 2009 on the net” is referred on SecurStar GmbH Press Release as a “An IT security expert”.

Maybe they “know personally” who's this anonymous notrax? :)

Am i following my own conspiracy thinking or maybe there's some reasonable doubt that everything was arrange in that funny way just for a marketing activity?

Social consideration

If you are a security company you job have also a social aspects, you should also work to make the world a better place (sure to make business but “not being evil”). You cannot cheat the skills of the end users in evaluating security making fake misleading information.

You should do awareness on end users, to make them more conscious of security issues, giving them the tools to understand and decide themselves.

Hope you had fun reading this article and you made your own consideration about this.

Fabio Pietrosanti (naif)

ps Those are my personal professional opinion, let's speak about technology and security, not marketing.
pps i am not that smart in web writing, so sorry for how the text is formatted and how the flow of the article is unstructured!

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Licensed by Israel Ministry of Defense? How things really works!

You should know that Israel is a country where if a company need to develop encryption product they must be authorized by the government.

The government don't want that companies doing cryptography can do anything bad to them and what they can do of good for the government, so they have to first be authorized.

Companies providing interception and encryptio n m ust apply to a license because Israel law on this is so restrictive to be similar to china law .

That's because those kind of technologies are considered fundamental for the intelligence and espionage capabilities of Israel country.

To give some example of “Licensed by Israel Ministry of Defense” companies:

GSM encryption products “Licensed by Israel Ministry of Defense” – Gold-lock

Interception of communication products “Licensed by Israel Ministry of Defense” – Verint

HF encrypted Radio “Licensed by Israel Ministry of Defense” – Kavit

Surveillance services and equipment “Licensed by Israel Ministry of Defense” – Multi Tier Solutions

For example how to apply for a “License by Israel Ministry of Defense” if you do encryption technologies in Israel?

Be sure to be an israeli company, click here and fill the forms.

Someone will contact you from encryption-control@mod.gov.il and will discuss with you whether to give you or not the license to sell.

What does the department of defense will require from an israeli company in order to provide them the authorization to make and sell interception and encryption products?

Well, what they want and what they really ask nobody knows.

It's a secret dealing of Israel Ministry of Defense with each “licensed” company.

What we know for sure is that Verint, a “Licensed by Israel Ministry of Defense”, placed a backdoor to intercept companies and governments in the US and Netherland into the interception systems they was selling.

Verint, a Licensed by Israel Ministry of Defense Company, provided to Israel government eavesdropped communications of private and government users in the United States and in the Netherland .

CIA officier reported that Israel Ministry of Defense was known to pay Verint a reimbursement of 50% of their costs in order to have from Verint espionage services trough their commercial activity on selling “backdoored” interception equipment to spy foreign users.


It can be a legitimate doubt that the cooperation within the Israeli Ministry of Defense may be problematic for an Israeli company that want to sell interception and encryption product abroad.

Those companies may be forced to make the interests of Israel Ministry of Defense and not the interests of the customers (like Verint scandal is a real-world example).

So, how would a “Licensed by Israel Ministry of Defense” be a good things to promote?

It represent the risk that the “Israel Ministry of Defense”, like is publicly known that it has already have done with Verint, will interfere with what the company do.

It represent the risk that the “Israel Ministry of Defense” may reasonably provide “reimbursement” of costs paying the company and get what they would likely would like to get.

So, what does really “Israel Ministry of Defense” want from Israel companies doing encryption and interception technologies?

Should we ask ourself whether Israeli companies doing encryption and interception businesses are more interested to do business or to do “outsourced espionage services” for their always paying customer, the “Israel Ministry of Defense”.

For sure, in the age of financial crisis, the Israel Ministry of Defense is a paying customer that does not have budget problem…

Strict control, strict rules, strong government strategic and military cooperation.

Be careful.

If you want to read more about this matters, about how technologies from certain countries is usually polluted with their governments military and secret services strategies stay tuned as i am preparing a post about this .

You will much better understand about that subjects on the “Licensed by Israel Ministry of Defense”.

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O3B Networks: a new satellite broadband approach

That's something amazing, “other 3 billion” broadband coverage not trough fiber but trough satellite.

A project where also google is one of the shareholder, covering 3 billion persons trough low orbit, low latency broadband (10GBit) satellite network.

Check here technical infrastructure details on ITU website.

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Location Based Services: the big brother thanks you ;-)

Do you use your iphone, google phone, blackberry or nokia smartphone with cool built-in GPS?

Well law enforcement can now know even better where you are, at any time, even with historical data and much better than BTS based location systems.

Sprint has given 8 million times customer's GPS information to law enforcement (sound something like a semi-automatic request).

Read here .

Nice extract is:

Sprint Nextel provided law enforcement agencies with its customers' (GPS) location information over 8 million times between September 2008 and October 2009. This massive disclosure of sensitive customer information was made possible due to the roll-out by Sprint of a new, special web portal for law enforcement officers.

The informations was provided at wiretapping and interception industry conference ISS WASH in Washingtown.

If you want see directly the video:


Sprint: 50 million customers, 8 million law enforcement GPS requests in 1 year from Christopher Soghoian on Vimeo .


Then you know that “big brother” is watching you only because you let him to watch you.

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Gold-Lock Security Encryption Contest: be careful!

This post is to talk about the “unfair” marketing approach of Gold-Lock, an israeli company doing mobile voice encryption authorized by Israeli Ministry of Defence .

Following an announcement seen on Linkedin “Information Security Community” group:

GoldLock is offering US$ 100.000 and a job for an unencryption

GoldLock, an israeli encryption and security company is offering US$ 100.000 and a job to anyone capable to decrypt a cellular conversation contained in a file provided in their site ( https://www.gold-lock.com/app/en/?wicket:interface=:8 ::::).
The transcription must be sent back to GoldLock until February 1st, 2010.
The contest is open to all and any tools or technology may be used.
Good luck to all!!!

I commented:

Not having a public protocol specification is not even scientifically serious to make a marketing tricks like this.
I would say to gold-lock, let's release the source code and let anyone compile the cryptographic engine if you trust not to to have something nasty inside… ;)

Toni Koivunen from F-secure said:

So… They will pay $100k if you get through the AES and the hassle with keys.
If someone would pull it off they would certainly make a truckload more money elsewhere. Plus they would retain the rights to the code/technology that they created, which isn't the case if they go for the $100k since the License pretty clearly says that:
# An assignment letter to Gold Line, in a form satisfactory to Gold Line of your technology and the Work Plan (the “Technology”). Such assignment form shall enable Gold Line to transfer the rights on the Technology to Gold Line, including the right to register patents and all other rights.
# A release and waiver form, in a form satisfactory to Gold Line, duly executed by you and any other participant of any rights to the Technology.
Plus of course Gold Line retains the right to change the rules of the game with prior notice. Or needing to notify afterwards either.
Sounds fair :)

Michel Scovetta from Computer Associates said:

It sounds like the purpose of this is to get some cheap testing out of it, and to be able to say something like, “The best crypto experts in the world tried to break it, and were unable to.”

According to some of the docs on Gold Lock's website, they use ECC-256 and a “modified DH key exchange” (which tingles my spidey senses), SHA-256, and then XOR for the actual data encryption. They use practically blasphemous language like, “Each component of the Gold Lock Enterprise solution is tested and proven secure against any conceivable attack.”

*Proven* secure? *Any conceivable* attack? Yikes!

In another doc on their site, they talk about their first layer relying on 1024-bit RSA. GoDaddy doesn't even allow 1024-bit keys to be used anymore when generating $20 SSL certificates. They quote 300 billion MIPS-years to break, but if my math is correct, that comes down to about 52 days on the top supercomputer right now. Not trivial, but this is an offline attack, so time is on the side of the attacker.

The description then talks about the device generating 16k keys when you register the device. If the protocol is “secure”, then it should be “secure” with only a single key. If it's not secure with a single key, then generating 16k keys could only make it 16k times more secure, which is far off from a proof of security.

I agree with Fabio – a fair contest would be to include source code and the cryptographic specification. Also, as other contests have proven (eg SecureWebMail), the weakest point isn't usually the cryptography. It's all of the other stuff, and it doesn't look like any of it is being disclosed for the contest.

http://xkcd.com/538/

Microfono

I would say that all those considerations from security experts from well known and established security companies bring us to consider that:

  • Gold-lock is not transparent on their encryption at all and they work trough bad practice of Security Trough Obscurity (no one know what's inside the product)
  • Gold-lock is not playing a fair game by proposing this 'security contest'
  • Gold-lock being certified by Israeli ministry of defence may raise doubt related to possible relationship with the intelligence… Read by post Certified by Israeli MInistry of Defense .

Voice security is a sensible matters and lacks of transparency and governmental relationship for cryptographic choices usually does not provide anything good…

Think about it…

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Disk encryption sometimes 'works'

I am one of the person convinced that a computer disk encryption system will not protect you from public authorities if they are convinced enough and the case is very important.

There are a lot of way to convince a person to release a password.

However there's a case in Australia where not revealing the disk password resulted in a successful way to avoid going in jail:

Secret code saves man who spied on flatmates

My opinion is just that spying flatmates is not a so relevant and particular crime and that law enforcement did not used 'convincing systems' to get the password of encrypted disk.

UPDATE 29.06.2010: It also worked for Daniel Dantas against FBI .

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Political conflict in Turkey between Prosecutors and Wiretappers

It seems that in Turkey the Telecommunication Directorate (TIB), in charge of managing the wiretapping, intercepted the president of the Judge and Prosecutors Associations.

Prosecutors and Judge usually does not like being tapped, and so the 1st High Criminal Court ordered an audit of all the recording done by the TIB since 2006.

Per saperne di più qui .

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Hackers Hacking Hackers

Hackers hacking hackers are always pretty fun.

And I am not talking about ZF0 5 (which was cool reading, even if not as cool as ~El8 was), I am talking about this .

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This is big business, this is the American way

43 years old “UFO eccentric” hacker Gary McKinnon just loses appeal against his extradition to the States for computer crimes he committed 7 years ago.

If you've lived under a rock during the last few years what this dude did was basically break into .gov computers looking for UFO related material.

Probably the last case of recreational hacking I've heard about.

So his case is obviously going to be a classical “Strike one to educate one hundred” kind of message to every hacker attacking american computer systems: we can reach you everywhere you live and have you extradited to our country where we will sentence you to life in prison.

Unless you are a multi millionaire cyber criminal living in Russia or a chinese spy, of course.

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