Archivio Categoria: Sicurezza

RFC 6189: ZRTP è finalmente uno standard!

Infine ZRTP è stato assegnato un incarico ufficiale RFC, RFC6189 ZRTP: Accordo Percorso Media Key per Unicast Secure RTP.

Era come una dipendenza della SRTP con dimensioni chiave AES di 256bit che ora è stato definito come RFC6188 .

E 'emozionante vedere la RFC finalmente rilasciato, in quanto si tratta di un traguardo importante per impostare ZRTP come standard ufficiale per end-to-end molto simile a PGP è stato per le email.

Ora, qualsiasi organizzazione in tutto il mondo sarà ufficialmente in grado di implementare ZRTP per end-to-end di crittografia del protocollo voce

Attualmente tre diverse implementazioni pubbliche di protocollo ZRTP esiste:

Ciascuno di essi fornisce diverse caratteristiche del protocollo, ma più importanti sono noti per essere interoperabili.

Una nuova ondata sta arrivando al mondo crittografia della voce, irrupting in una zona grigia in cui la maggior parte delle aziende che fanno sistemi di cifratura telefono è stato implementazione della crittografia personalizzati.

Ora uno standard è stata impostata e ci sono pochi motivi a sinistra per attuare qualcosa di diverso.

Hurra Mr. Zimmermann e tutta la comunità di aziende (come PrivateWave ) e privati ​​(come Werner Dittmann ) che ha lavorato su di essa!

Oggi è un grande giorno, questo tipo di tecnologia è ormai ufficiale e anche con più di attuazione vigenti!

Filippo, hai fatto di nuovo, i miei complimenti per il vostro spirito puro e determinazione :-)

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Progressi per GSM fessurazione universitari a Friburgo

Il mondo emozionante dei protocolli di telefonia mobile (GSM, GSM-R, TETRA, UMTS, ecc) hacking è sempre attività di ricerca ufficiale delle università.

L'investimento per rendere il codice opensource release del software di cracking è dare l'opportunità agli studenti di università per lavorare su di esso, migliorare e fare ricerca forte.

L'Università di Friburgo ha appena rilasciato la carta Esercitazione pratica sulla crittografia GSM A5 / 1 insieme ad un gsmframencoder strumento di supporto per migliorare il processo di sniffing, decodifica e screpolature.

Apertura di hardware, software apertura, aprendo il protocollo dimostrano la debolezza di qualsiasi tipo di metodo proprietario o di un processo di accumulo di comunicazione e tecnologie di sicurezza.

Dovrebbe essere l'obiettivo di qualsiasi scienziati per tentare di aprire-up e decifrare qualsiasi tipo di tecnologia proprietaria e chiusa per costringere l'industria a va avanti solo con un approccio interoperabile e aperto durante la progettazione di protocolli di telecomunicazione.

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Hacking TETRA è in arrivo: OsmocomTETRA

E 'molto emozionante vedere il rilascio di OsmocomTETRA , il primo opensource SDR ( Software Defined Radio ) attuazione di TETRA demodulatore, PHY e MAC strati inferiori.

E 'la versione TETRA di airprobe GSM che sbloccare l'accesso ai dati e la struttura del protocollo di comunicazione TETRA, dando così grande opportunità hacking!

Ora che anche la tecnologia TETRA è stato aperto dovremmo aspettarci, nel corso di questo 2011, per vedere opensource sniffer TETRA e molto probabilmente anche la cifratura TEA (l'algoritmo di crittografia Tetra) rotto!

TETRA viene utilizzato dalla Polizia, Servizi di emergenza e le forze armate come una rete alternativa di comunicazione mobile che può funziona anche senza la disponibilità di copertura di rete (solo da cellulare a cellulare senza una stazione di base) e di fornire alcuni servizi speciali ad alta disponibilità.

Ho scritto nella mia presentazione TETRA maggiore revisione del protocollo di sicurezza vocale .

Nella mailing list OsmocomBB c'era già la discussione di alcune stato della rete TETRA:

  • Belgio Polizia TETRA ASTRID rete: in chiaro
  • La polizia tedesca test di rete TETRA ad Aquisgrana: in chiaro
  • Alcuni ex-jugoslawia rete TETRA: in chiaro
  • Olanda C200 rete TETRA: TEA2 cifrati con chiavi statiche
  • UK Airwave rete TETRA: TEA2 criptati con TEA2

Sarà molto divertente vedere che i nuovi servizi di polizia e di soccorso hacking di ritorno da vecchi tempi analogico al digitale radio nuovo :-)

Parte

Cellulare criptato per telefono fisso chiamate con Asterisk 1.8

Abbiamo appena pubblicato un howto tecnico su come costruire protetta mobile per infrastruttura VoIP fisso con:

Nelle prossime settimane altri howto come questo verrà fuori, utilizzando altre piattaforme server come FreeSWITCH, il tutto in uno spirito di trasparenza e di sfruttare tecnologie di sicurezza opensource.

Parte

Otto mancato epica di crittografia regolazione

Un articolo molto illuminante su otto mancato epica di regolazione crittografia e di incomprensione comune da parte dei legislatori del governo che non ha un'ampia vista su come la tecnologia funziona.

Regolamentazione del governo ignorante non capire che una regolamentazione rigorosa avrebbe gli svantaggi seguenti:

  1. Si creerà rischi per la sicurezza
  2. Non si fermerà i cattivi
  3. Si danno l'innovazione
  4. Si danno d'affari degli Stati Uniti
  5. Costerà consumatori
  6. Sarà incostituzionale
  7. Sarà un esborso enorme di dollari di tasse

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PrivateGSM: Blackberry / iPhone / Nokia crittografia della voce mobile con ZRTP o SRTP / SDES

Sono assolutamente evitare di usare il mio blog personale per fare promozione di qualsiasi tipo di prodotto.

Quella volta non è diverso, ma voglio raccontarvi i fatti sui prodotti lavorare senza commercializzazione di fantasia, ma rimanendo tecnico.

Oggi, a PrivateWave dove sto CTO e co-fondatore , abbiamo rilasciato pubblicamente mobili prodotti di cifratura VoIP per Blackberry, iPhone e Nokia:

  • Il 1 ° mai Blackberry VoIP cifrato con ZRTP - PrivateGSM VoIP professionale
  • Il 1 ° mai iPhone VoIP criptato con ZRTP - PrivateGSM VoIP professionale
  • Il 1 ° mai Blackberry cliente VoIP cifrato con SRTP con SDES scambio di chiavi su SIP / TLS - PrivateGSM VoIP Enterprise

logo-PrivateWave-colore.png

A PrivateWave usiamo un approccio diverso rispetto a società di crittografia più voce là fuori, leggere la nostra approccio alla sicurezza .

La rilevanza di questi prodotti della tecnologia e del paesaggio industriale possono essere riassunti come segue:

  • E 'la prima società di crittografia della voce usando solo protocolli di sicurezza standard (e ci aspettiamo che il mercato reagirà, come è chiaro che la tecnologia proprietaria provenienti dal patrimonio della CSD non possono fornire lo stesso valore)
  • E 'il primo approccio di crittografia della voce da utilizzare solo open source e motore di crittografia standard
  • E 'il primo approccio per fornire crittografia della voce diverso modello di sicurezza che utilizzano tecnologie differenti (end-to-end per ZRTP e end-to-site per SRTP )

Quelle suite di client mobili sicure, progettato per utilizzare la protezione professionale utilizzando le migliori tecnologie di telecomunicazione e di sicurezza, forniscono un elevato grado di protezione insieme con buone prestazioni anche in condizioni di rete non valida:

Le applicazioni sono:

icona-pgsm.png

I dispositivi mobili supportati sono:

Per quanto riguarda ZRTP abbiamo deciso di stress e allungare tutta la sicurezza e la caratteristica paranoica del protocollo con qualche piccola aggiunta:

Il nostro rigoroso integrazione rubrica, va oltre ZRTP RFC specifiche, che potrebbero essere vulnerabili a certi attacchi quando viene utilizzato su telefoni cellulari a causa del comportamento degli utenti di non guardare a schermo mobile.

Il nostro modo di usare paranoy ZRTP mitigare tali condizioni, scriveremo su questo più tardi e / o aggiungerà dettagli specifici per l'inclusione RFC.

Alcune parole su PrivateGSM Professional con end-to-end di crittografia con ZRTP

Leggi scheda tecnica c'è!

Per scaricarlo cliccare qui e appena messo il tuo numero di telefono

Questi sono i risultati del duro lavoro di tutta la mia personale molto qualificato (16 persone hanno lavorato a questo 6 progetti per 3 piattaforme diverse) su tecnologie impegnative (crittografia vocale), in un ambiente operativo difficile (sporco reti mobili e sporco sistemi operativi mobili) per maggiori di 2 anni.

Sono molto orgoglioso del nostro staff!

E poi?

Nelle prossime settimane si vedrà il rilascio di grandi serie di documentazioni quali l'integrazione con asterischi, ed altri freeswitch sicurezza Enabled PBX, insieme ad alcune novità emozionanti altre tecnologie di sicurezza che sono sicuro sarà notato;)

E 'stato un lavoro duro e più devono essere fatte, ma sono fiducioso che la sicurezza e la comunità opensource che, come tali prodotti e il nostro approccio trasparente anche con aperta release importante e integrazione open source che fanno molto politicamente neutrale (backdoor libero), la tecnologia .

Parte

Un paio di belle provider VPN

Ci sono un sacco di ragioni per cui si avrebbe bisogno di accedere a Internet tramite una VPN.

Per esempio se si vive in un paese bloccando determinati contenuti (come anti-locali-governo sito web, porno, ecc) e / o protocolli (come skype, voip), probabilmente farete bene a spostare la connettività a Internet al di fuori del paese brutto blocco utilizzando tunnel VPN criptato.

Ho valutato diversi ospitato server VPN e un paio di loro suona abbastanza bene tra l'offerta diffusa di tali servizi:

SwissVPN

Uscire a Internet dalla Svizzera.

Costo 6 CHF / mese

Opzionale pubblico l'indirizzo IP fisso

Utile se avete bisogno di:

  • Basta superare i filtri paese con una buona larghezza di banda
  • Esporre i servizi pubblici attraverso la VPN con l'opzione fisso indirizzo IP pubblico.

Overplay

Uscire a Internet scegliendo tra 20 diversi paesi (ad ogni connessione).

Utile se dovete fare:

  • di business intelligence sul concorrente (che sembra venire da paese X quando li collega)
  • vedere film / telefilm consentito solo dal livello nazionale spazi web IP
  • vedere i risultati di google tra i diversi paesi

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Non ogni curva ellittica è lo stesso: attraverso il ECC sicurezza

 La mia sicurezza ECC curva e analisi selezione

vn9jna1BdgrzDCYNBJHi09q09q.jpg

La maggior parte dei moderni crypto uso di crittografia ellittica Curve (ECC) che, con una chiave più piccola e ridurre la potenza di calcolo, danno forza equivalente di sicurezza del tradizionale sistema crittografico noto come DH (Diffie-Hellman) o RSA (Rivest, Shamir e Adleman).

Non tutti sanno che la crittografia ECC è selezionato per tutte le applicazioni di crittografia futuro e che anche TLS / SSL (crittografia utilizzate per proteggere il web) si sta muovendo per ECC.

Ho trovato un sacco di cosiddetti "prodotti di crittografia proprietario", che abbandonato RSA e DH va con alternative ECC, che tendono a utilizzare dimensioni arbitrarie bit ECC chiave senza nemmeno specificare che tipo di crittografia ECC abituarsi.

Tuttavia c'è un sacco di confusione intorno curve ellittiche, con un sacco di nomi diversi e la dimensione della chiave rendendo difficile per un non-crittograficamente esperienza-utente di realizzare la vostra figura proprio al momento di valutare alcune cose cripto.

A causa della confusione in modo diffuso ho deciso di fare la mia analisi per scoprire quali sono i migliori curve di cifratura ECC e ECC diritto dimensione della chiave da usare.

Questa analisi vuole fornire una scelta basata settore della sicurezza tra varie curve e lunghezza della chiave, lasciando le considerazioni matematiche e di analisi crittografico che è stato già fatto nel corso degli anni, che riassume le varie scelte prese in diversi standard e protocolli di sicurezza.

Prima della conclusione.

Dalla mia analisi solo le curve seguenti ECC sono da considerarsi per l'uso in sistemi di cifratura, perché sono l'unico scelto tra le varie autorità (ANSI, NSA, SAG, il NIST, ECC Brainpool), diversi standard di protezione IP (IPSec, OpenPGP, ZRTP, Kerberos, SSL / TLS) e l'unico corrispondente NSA Suite B requisiti di sicurezza (standard de-facto anche per l'ambiente militare della NATO):

  • Prime curve ellittiche a 256 bit - P-256
  • Prime curve ellittiche a 384 bit - P-384

con possibilità, solo per davvero paranoico che vuole ottenere po 'di più dimensioni chiave, non ancora considerati utili:

  • Prime curve ellittiche 521 bit - P-521

Vorrei affermare che le curve Koblitz dovrebbe essere evitato, in ogni dimensione della chiave (163 / 283 / 409 / 571) in quanto non ha sufficiente garanzia sull'attività crypto analitica ed efficace sono:

  • Non è parte di NSA Suite-B selezione crittografia
  • Non fa parte della selezione ECC Brainpool
  • Non è parte di ANSI X9.62 selezione
  • Non fa parte della selezione OpenPGP estensione ECC
  • Non è parte di Kerberos estensione per la selezione della curva ECC

Invito il lettore a seguire attraverso la mia analisi per capire i fondamenti che potrebbe essere compreso anche senza profondo background tecnico, ma almeno con un buon background tecnologico un qualche po 'di base della crittografia.

 Ecco a voi l'analisi
 

Il mio obiettivo è quello di fare un'analisi su cosa / come l'apertura e la sicurezza della comunità scientifica scegliere ECC sistema di crittografia per l'utilizzo di protocolli di sicurezza e standard definiti da IETF RFC (quelli che definiscono standard Internet in modo aperto e peer-reviewed).

Qui di seguito una serie di RFC ECC introducendo nel sistema esistente che vengono analizzati per capire cosa è meglio usare e cosa c'è di meglio da escludere:

  • RFC5639 : ECC Brainpool Curve Standard & Generazione Curve
  • RFC4869 : NSA Suite Suite B per la crittografia IPsec
  • RFC5430 : NSA Suite B profilo per Transport Layer Security (TLS)
  • RFC5008 : NSA Suite B a nelle estensioni Secure / Multipurpose Internet Mail (S / MIME)
  • RFC3766 : Punti di forza determinante per la crittografia a chiave pubblica utilizzata per lo scambio di chiavi simmetriche
  • RFC5349 : Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Supporto per Crittografia a chiave pubblica per l'autenticazione iniziale in Kerberos (PKINIT)
  • RFC4492 : Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) pacchetti di crittografia per Transport Layer Security (TLS)
  • ZRTP crittografia della voce di Philip Zimmermann ECC curva
  • ECC a OpenPGP (progetto d zattera-jivsov-OpenPGP-ECC-06 )
  • Curve ECC selezionati da Microsoft per smartcard Kerberos login

Useremo la scelta fatta dallo scienziato definendo protocolli Internet Security a far parte della nostra valutazione.
Inoltre si deve intendere che la scelta della curva viene da diverse autorità che hanno fatto la loro scelta di curve per raccontare l'industria cosa usare e cosa saltare:

Useremo la scelta fatta dallo scienziato definizione dei requisiti di sicurezza nelle agenzie di standardizzazione a far parte della nostra valutazione.
Inoltre, cosa che molte persone non lo sa, ma che è estremamente rilevante per la nostra analisi, è che ci sono diversi tipi di crittografia ECC curva e la loro "dimensione" che è diverso a seconda del tipo di curva:

  • Curve ECC su campo Prime (spesso indicato come curva ellittica e rappresentata dal P-dimensione per la chiave)
  • Curve ECC su campo binario (spesso indicato come curva Koblitz e rappresentata da K-dimensione per la chiave)

Data una forza di sicurezza di equivalenza la curva ellittica e la curva di Kobliz hanno differenti dimensioni della chiave, ad esempio quando leggiamo ECC 571 ci si riferisce alla curva Koblitz con una forza equivalente a 521 ECC curva Prime.

Un confronto di forza tra le curve ellittiche e Curve Kotbliz è riportato di seguito (da Mikey ECC Internet Draft ):

 | Köblitz | ECC | DH / DSA / RSA
 | 163 | 192 | 1024
 | 283 | 256 | 3072
 | 409 | 384 | 7680
 | 571 | 521 ​​| 15360

Qui di seguito c'è un confronto tra tutte le curve selezionate da tutte le varie entità e il loro nome corrispondente (da IETF RFC4492 per l'utilizzo ECC per TLS ):

 I nomi scelti da curva diversi organismi di normazione
 ------------+---------------+-------------
 SECG | ANSI X9.62 | NIST
 ------------+---------------+-------------
 sect163k1 | | NIST K-163
 sect163r1 | |
 sect163r2 | | NIST B-163
 sect193r1 | |
 sect193r2 | |
 sect233k1 | | NIST K-233
 sect233r1 | | NIST B-233
 sect239k1 | |
 sect283k1 | | NIST K-283
 sect283r1 | | NIST B-283
 sect409k1 | | NIST K-409
 sect409r1 | | NIST B-409
 sect571k1 | | NIST K-571
 sect571r1 | | NIST B-571
 secp160k1 | |
 secp160r1 | |
 secp160r2 | |
 secp192k1 | |
 secp192r1 | prime192v1 | NIST P-192
 secp224k1 | |
 secp224r1 |​​ | NIST P-224
 secp256k1 | |
 secp256r1 | prime256v1 | NIST P-256
 secp384r1 | | NIST P-384
 secp521r1 | | NIST P-521
 ------------+---------------+-------------

Che cosa appare immediatamente è che ci sono solo due curve selezionate da tutte le autorità, e che ci sia un generale di dumping da parte di curve Koblitz ANSI.The solo di comune accordo tra le 3 autorità sono i seguenti due curve ECC:

  • secp192r1 / prime192v1 / NIST P-192
  • secp256r1 / prime256v1 / NIST P-256

Di quelli di selezione ECC curva per il TLS RFC5430 saltata completamente curve Koblitz e selezionati per l'utilizzo solo:

  • P-256, P-384, P-521

Il Brainpool ECC saltata completamente curve Koblitz e selezionati per l'utilizzo delle Curve ECC seguenti:

  • P-160, P-192, P-224, P-256, P-320, P-384, P-512 (che è l'unico particolare perché non è P-521, ma P-512, l'unica chiave di dimensioni di cui da ECC Brainpool. Tnx Ian Simons da Athena SCS )

Il progetto per l'utilizzo di internet OpenPGP ECC in PGP d zattera-jivsov-OpenPGP-ECC-06 saltata completamente curve Koblitz e selezionato le seguenti curve ECC

  • P-256, P-384, P-521

L'estensione del protocollo Kerberos per l'uso ECC, definito in RFC5349 e definito da Microsoft per l' accesso smartcard saltata completamente curve Koblitz e selezionato le seguenti curve ECC:

  • P-256, P-384, P-521

Quindi, i suoni chiaro che la scelta giusta di ECC è per P-256, P-384 e P-521, mentre la curva Koblitz sono state saltate per Top Secret e l'uso di qualunque protocollo di sicurezza sensibili (IPSec, OpenPGP, ZRTP, Kerberos, SSL / TLS).

Perché ho ​​fatto questa analisi?

Ho fatto questa analisi a seguito di una discussione che ho avuto per quanto riguarda taluni prodotti di crittografia della voce, tutti basati su protocolli personalizzati e di proprietà, che sono tutti con curva ellittica Diffie Hellman 571 bit / ECDH 571/571 bit ECDH / Koblitz 571 bit.
Tutti loro sono con il K-571 che, come descritto in precedenza, è stata rimossa da tutti gli ambienti sensibili e protocolli di sicurezza ed essendo io stesso un designer di roba voce crittografia penso che la loro scelta crittografia non è assolutamente la scelta migliore sicurezza.
Probabilmente è stato fatto solo per finalità di marketing, perché K-571 (Koblitz curva) sembra più forte di P-521 (curve ellittiche in base al numero Prime). Se si dispone di "po 'di più" i tuoi ragazzi di marketing può affermare di essere "più sicuro". Curva ellittica Koblitz sono più veloci della top secret abilitato curva ellittica primo e così dare il product manager la possibilità di fornire "qualcosa di più" nel suo proprio prodotto mantenendo il veloce scambio di chiavi.

E 'una questione di scelta filosofica.

Io preferisco seguire l'andamento della comunità scientifica, con l'umiltà di non considerare me stesso un esperto di crittografia, più informato rispetto alla sicurezza globale e la comunità scientifica stessa.

Io preferisco invece di utilizzare algoritmi solo che sono omologati per l'uso in ambienti altamente sensibili (classificazione top secret), che sono stati selezionati da tutte le autorità e gli algoritmi di crittografia gruppo di lavoro analizza esistenti fuori là e che rappresentano la scelta di quasi tutti gli standard di sicurezza protocolli (IPSec, OpenPGP, ZRTP, Kerberos, SSL / TLS, ecc.)
Io preferisco contare la quantità di cervelli lavorando sulla crittografia che uso, controllare che questo è davvero sicuro, che valutare se c'è qualche debolezza.

Il numero di Brais lavorando molto diffuso Crypto sono di ordine di grandezza maggiore rispetto al numero di cervelli lavorare su crittografia utilizzato da persone a pochi (come la curva Koblitz).
Quindi io non sono demonizzare chi usa ECDH 571 utilizzando Curva Koblitz, ma di sicuro posso affermare che non hanno preso la scelta migliore in termini di sicurezza e che ogni professionisti della sicurezza facendo un benchmarking di sicurezza prenderebbe in considerazione il fatto che la curva ellittica Diffie Hellman 571 po 'fatto con curva Koblitz non è ampiamente diffusa, è oggetto di dumping da protocolli standard di sicurezza e non è certificato per l'uso top secret.

Parte

ESSOR, Radio europeo Secure Software Defined (SDR)

Ho dato un'occhiata a Agenzia europea per la Difesa sito e trovato il ESSOR progetto, un progetto di lavoro finanziato per 106mln di euro per sviluppare prodotti di comunicazione strategica di difesa basati su nuovi Software Defined Radio approccio.

SDR approach is a revolutionary system that's completely changing the way scientist and industry is approach any kind of wireless technology.

Basically instead of burning hardware chip that implement most of the radio frequency protocols and techniques, they are pushed in “software” to specialized radio hardware that can work on a lot of different frequency, acting as radio interface for a lot of different radio protocols.

For example the USRP (Universal Software Radio Peripheral) from Ettus Research that cost 1000-2000USD fully loaded, trough the opensource GnuRadio framework, have seen opensource implementation of:

And a lot more protocols and transmission technologies.

That kind of new approach to Radio Transmission System is destinated to change the way radio system are implemented, giving new capability such as to upgrade the “radio protocol itself” in software in order to provide “radio protocol” improvements.

In the short terms we have also seen very strong security research using SDR technologies such as the GSM cracking and the Bluetooth Sniffing .

We can expect that other technologies, weak by design but protected by the restriction to hardware devices to hack the low level protocols, will be soon get hacked. In the first list i would really like to see the hacking of TETRA, a technology born with closed mindset and secret encryption algorithms, something i really dislike ;-)

Parte

Remotely intercepting snom VoIP phones

Suggerisco la lettura a distanza intercettazioni telefoni VoIP ", a VoIP Security Alliance blog di Shawn Merdinger .

Un esempio concreto di come l'infrastruttura di telefonia attuali sono sempre più vulnerabili agli attacchi informatici.

Parte

Comunicazione vocale sicurezza laboratorio

Ciao,

ho fatto un discorso di comunicazione vocale tecnologie di sicurezza presso l'Università di Trento a seguito di un interessante scambio di informazioni con Crypto Lab gestito il professor Massimiliano Sala .

Suggerisco di persone interessate a leggerlo, soprattutto la seconda parte, in quanto vi è una classificazione innovativa delle varie tecnologie di crittografia vocale che vengono utilizzati in diversi settori.

Ho cercato di spiegare e uscire da questo settore molto frammentato tecnologico, fornendo un'ampia panoramica sulle tecnologie che di solito sono assolutamente estranei one-ogni-altro, ma praticamente tutti si applicano a voce crittografia successivo stelle:

  • TLC mobili Industria voce crittografia standard
  • Governo e militari voce crittografia standard
  • Pubblica sicurezza la voce crittografia standard
  • IETF voce crittografia standard
  • Varie tecnologie proprietarie voce crittografia

E 'un slideware enorme, 122 diapositive, vi suggerisco di andare a leggere la parte 2 saltare intercettazione panoramica delle tecnologie già coperto dalla mia presentazione del 2009.

Comunicazione vocale di sicurezza


Visualizza più presentazioni da Fabio Pietrosanti .

Soprattutto mi piace il concetto di crittografia cioccolato di qualità che desidera fornire alcune innovazioni sul concetto di crittografia Snake Oil.

Ma ho bisogno di avere più a fondo il contesto di crittografia cioccolato di qualità, probabilmente non prima della fine d'anno, fornendo un corso applicata sulla comprensione e la valutazione del contesto praticamente reale sicurezza di varie tecnologie di crittografia vocale.

Parte

27C3 – CCC Congress CFP: We come in peace

We come in peace

189322778_8cb9af1365_m.jpg

We come in peace, said the conquerers of the New World.

We come in peace, says the government, when it comes to colonise, regulate, and militarise the new digital world.

We come in peace, say the nation-state sized companies that have set out to monetise the net and chain the users to their shiny new devices.

We come in peace, we say as hackers, geeks and nerds, when we set out towards the real world and try to change it, because it has intruded into our natural habitat, the cyberspace…

Call for paper for participation to 27C3 CCC congress is open, and i never saw a so exciting payoff :-)

See you on 30 December 2010 in Berlin!

Parte

GSM cracking in penetration test methodologies (OSSTMM) ?

As most of this blog reader already know, in past years there was a lot of activities related to public research for GSM auditing and cracking.

However when there was huge media coverage to GSM cracking research results, the tools to make the cracking was really early stage and still very inefficient.

Now Frank Stevenson , norwegian cryptanalyst that already broke the Content Scrambling System of DVD video disc, participating to the A51 cracking project started by Karsten Nohl , released Kraken , a new improved version of the A51 cracking system.

It's interesting to notice that WiFi cracking had a similar story, as the first WiFi wep cracking discovery was quite slow in earlier techniques but later Korek, an hacker working on cracking code, improve the attack system drammatically.

That's the story of security research cooperation, you start a research, someone follow it and improve it, some other follow it and improved it and at the end you get the result.

Read more on the Kraken GSM Cracking software release .

And stay tuned as next week at Blackhat Conference Karsten Nohl will explain the details of the required hardware setup and detailed instructions on how to do it :-)

I would really like to see those tools incorporated into Penetration Testing Linux Distribution BackTrack with OSSTMM methodology enforcing the testing of GSM interception and man in the middle :-)

If things proceed that way and Ettus Research (The producer of USRP2 software radio used for low cost GSM signal receiving) will not be taken down, we can still see this.

Parte

Snake-oil security claims on crypto security product

Security market grow, more companies goes to the market, but how many of them are taking seriously what they do?

You know, doing security technology mean that you are personally responsible for the protection of the user's information. You must make them aware of what they need, exactly what your are doing and which kind of threat model your product protect.

A typical problem of product's security features is represented by the inability of the user to evaluate the security claims of the product itself.

So there's a lot companies doing a not-so-ethical marketing of security features, based on the facts that no user will be able to evaluate it.

The previously explained situation reside in the security topic of Snake Oil Encryption , an evolution in the scientific cryptographic environment that let us today use best of breed information protection technologies without having to worry too much about backdoors or insecurities.

Let's speak about Snake Oil Encryption

Snake Oil Cryptography : In cryptography , snake oil is a term used to describe commercial cryptographic methods and products which are considered bogus or fraudulent. Distinguishing secure cryptography from insecure cryptography can be difficult from the viewpoint of a user. Many cryptographers, such as Bruce Schneier and Phil Zimmermann , undertake to educate the public in how secure cryptography is done, as well as highlighting the misleading marketing of some cryptographic products.

The most referenced crypto security guru, Philip Zimmermann and Bruce Schneier, was the 1st to talk about Snake Oil Encryption:

Snake Oil by Philip Zimmermann

Snake Oil by Bruce Schneier

The Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review also made a very good analysis related to the Security Features of Security Products, SNAKE-OIL SECURITY CLAIMS” THE SYSTEMATIC MISREPRESENTATION OF PRODUCT SECURITY . They explain about the nasty marketing tricks used to tweak users inability to evaluate the security features, including economic and legal responsibility implication.

Several snake oil security product companies does not explain and are not clear about the threat model to which the product apply. Very famous is the sentence of Russ Nelson :

“Remember, crypto without a threat model is like cookies without milk. ... .. Cryptography without a threat model is like motherhood without apple pie. Can't say that enough times. More generally, security without a threat model is by definition going to fail.”

So, how to spot snake oil security products?

Check a guideline of to spot Snake Oil Encryption Products: Snake Oil Warning Signs, Encryption Software to Avoid by Matt Curtin .

You can see this very good Cryptographic Snake Oil Examples by Emility Ratliff (IBM Architect at Linux Security), that tried to make clear example on how to spot Cryptographic Snake Oil.

Here represented the basic guideline from Matt Curtin paper:


By checking that points it's possible to evaluate how serious an encryption technology or product is.

But all in all how to fix that unethical security approach?

It's very significative and it would be really useful for each kind of security product category to make some strongly and independent evaluation guideline (like OSSTMM for Penetration testing) , to make this security evaluation process really in the hands of the user.

It would be also very nice to have someone making analysis and evaluation of security product companies, publishing reports about Snake Oil signs.

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Web2.0 perdita di privacy in applicazioni mobili

You know that web2.0 world it's plenty of leak of any kind (profiling, profiling, profiling) related to Privacy and users starts being concerned about it.

Users continuously download applications without knowing the details of what they do, for example iFart just because are cool, are fun and sometime are useful.

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On mobile phones users install from 1000% up to 10.000% more applications than on a PC, and those apps may contain malware or other unexpected functionalities.

Recently infobyte analyzed ubertwitter client and discovered that the client was leaking and sending to their server many personal and sensitive data such as:

- Blackberry PIN

- Phone Number

- Email Address

- Geographic positioning information

Read about UbertTwitter 'spyware' features discovery here by infoByte .

It's plenty of applications leaking private and sensitive information but just nobody have a look at it.

Should mandatory data retention and privacy policies became part of application development and submission guideline for mobile application?

Imho a users must not only be warned about the application capabilities and API usage but also what will do with which kind of information it's going to handle inside the mobile phone.

Capabilities means authorizing the application to use a certain functionalities, for example to use GeoLocation API, but what the application will do and to who will provide such information once the user have authorized it?

That's a security profiling level that mobile phone manufacturer does not provide and they should, because it focus on the information and not on the application authorization/permission respect to the usage of device capabilities.

ps yes! ok! I agree! This kind of post would require 3-4 pages long discussion as the topic is hot and quite articulated but it's saturday morning and i gotta go!

Parte

AES algorithm selected for use in space

I encountered a nice paper regarding analysis and consideration on which encryption algorithm it's best suited for use in the space by space ship and equipments.

The paper has been done by the Consultative Committee for Space Data Systems that's a consortium of all space agency around that cumulatively handled more than 400 mission to space .

topban.jpg

Read the paper Encryption Algorithm Trade Survey as it gives interesting consideration and comparison between different encryption algorithms.

Obviously the finally selected algorithm is AES , while KASUMI (used in UMTS networks) was avoided.

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Blackberry Security and Encryption: Devil or Angel?

Blackberry have good and bad reputation regarding his security capability, depending from which angle you look at it.

This post it's a summarized set of information to let the reader the get picture, without taking much a position as RIM and Blackberry can be considered, depending on the point of view, an extremely secure platform or an extremely dangerous one .

bblock.jpg

Let's goes on.

On one side Blackberry it's a platform plenty of encryption features, security features everywhere, device encrypted (with custom crypto), communication encrypted (with custom proprietary protocols such as IPPP), very good Advanced Security Settings, Encryption framework from Certicom ( now owned by RIM ).

Dall'altro lato non fornisce solo un dispositivo ma una rete di accesso overlay, chiamato BIS ( Blackberry Internet Service ), è una rete globale in tutto il mondo vasta area in cui il vostro blackberry entrare mentre si naviga o checkmail utilizzando blackberry.net AP.

Quando, o un'applicazione, utilizzare l'APN blackberry.net non sono solo la connessione a internet con la connessione internet del vettore, ma si sta inserendo all'interno della rete RIM che proxy e agire come un gateway per raggiungere Internet.

La stessa accade quando si ha un uso aziendale: Sia il dispositivo BB e il BES aziendale di connettersi alla rete RIM che agiscono come una sorta di rete vpn concentrazione .

Quindi, in pratica tutte le comunicazioni croce RIM infrastrutture attraverso servizi in formato crittografato con un set di crittografia e protocolli proprietari di comunicazione.

Proprio come un avviso, pensano che a Google di fornire gtalk su APN blackberry.net, fatto un accordo al fine di offrire un servizio all'interno della rete BB per gli utenti BB. Quando si installa gtalk si ottiene aggiunto 3 libri servizio che puntano a GTALKNA01 questo è il nome del gateway GTALK all'interno della rete RIM per consentire la comunicazione intra-BIS e agire come un gateway GTALK a Internet.

Gli operatori di telefonia mobile di solito non sono nemmeno permesso di ispezionare il traffico tra il dispositivo BlackBerry e la rete Blackberry.

Così RIM e Blackberry sono in qualche modo uniche per il loro approccio in quanto forniscono una piattaforma, una rete e un servizio di tutti impacchettati insieme e non si può solo "il dispositivo e il software", ma l'utente e le aziende sono sempre legati e collegati al servizio rete.

Che è buono e questo è male, perché significa che RIM di fornire funzionalità di sicurezza estremamente buona e le capacità per proteggere le informazioni, dispositivi e l'accesso alle informazioni ai vari livelli contro terzi.

Ma è sempre difficile valutare la minaccia e di rischio relativi alla RIM stessa e che potrebbe fare pressione politica contro RIM.

Si prega di considerare che non sto dicendo "RIM sta guardando i tuoi dati", ma facendo un'analisi obiettiva del rischio: per quanto la piattaforma è fatto RIM hanno autorità sul dispositivo, sulle informazioni on-the-device e sulle informazioni che attraversano il rete. (Leggi il mio Slides Mobile Security ).

Per esempio prendiamo in considerazione il contesto stesso per i telefoni Nokia.

Una volta che il dispositivo Nokia viene venduto, Nokia non ha autorità sul dispositivo, né sulle informazioni on-the-dispositivo, né sulle informazioni che attraversano la rete. Ma è anche vero che Nokia forniscono solo il dispositivo e non fornisce servizi a valore aggiunto come l'integrazione (Enterprise Il tunnel VPN RIM), la rete di accesso BRI e tutte le caratteristiche di sicurezza locali e remote provisioning che forniscono Blackberry.

Quindi è una questione di considerare il contesto di rischio in modo corretto al momento di scegliere la piattaforma, con un esempio molto simile alla scelta di Microsoft Exchange Server (sul proprio servizio) o se ottenere un servizio SaaS, come Google Apps.

In entrambi i casi è necessario il fornitore di fiducia, ma nel primo esempio è necessario avere fiducia Microsoft che non mette una backdoor sul software mentre nel 2 ° esempio avete bisogno di fidarsi di Google, come piattaforma di e service provider, che non accede i tuoi dati.

Quindi è un paradigma diverso da valutare a seconda del modello di minaccia.

Se il vostro modello di minaccia RIM permettono di considerare un affidabile fornitore di servizi a terzi (come Google) che non è male. Se avete un contesto di rischio molto elevato, come top-secret, poi prendiamo in considerazione e valutare attentamente se non è meglio tenere i servizi Blackberry completamente isolato dal dispositivo o utilizzare un altro sistema senza l'interazione con i server di produttori e servizi.

Ora, torniamo ad alcune ricerche e alcuni fatti di mora e mora stessa sicurezza.

Prima di tutto molti governi avevano a che fare con RIM al fine di costringerli a fornire accesso alle informazioni che attraversano le loro reti di servizi, mentre altri hanno deciso di vietare l'utilizzo direttamente Blackberry per gli alti ufficiali a causa del server che si trovano nel Regno Unito e Stati Uniti, mentre altri hanno deciso di installare le loro proprie backdoor.

There's a lot of discussion when the topics are RIM Blackberry and Governments for various reasons.

Below a set of official Security related information on RIM blackberry platform:

And here a set of unofficial Security and Hacking related information on RIM Blackberry platform:

Because it's 23.32 (GMT+1), i am tired, i think that this post will end up here.

I hope to have provided the reader a set of useful information and consideration to go more in depth in analyzing and considering the overall blackberry security (in the good and in the bad, it always depends on your threat model!).

Evviva

Fabio Pietrosanti (naif)

ps i am managing security technology development (voice encryption tech) on Blackberry platform, and i can tell you that from the development point of view it's absolutely better than Nokia in terms of compatibility and speed of development, but use only RIMOS 5.0+ !

Parte

Celebrating “Hackers” after 25 years

A cult book , ever green since 25 years.

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It's been 25 years since “Hackers” was published. Author Steven Levy reflects on the book and the movement.

http://radar.oreilly.com/2010/06/hackers-at-25.html Steven Levy wrote a book in the mid-1980s that introduced the term "hacker" -- the positive connotation -- to a wide audience. In the ensuing 25 years, that word and its accompanying community have gone through tremendous change. The book itself became a mainstay in tech libraries.O'Reilly recently released an updated 25th anniversary edition of "Hackers," so I checked in with Levy to discuss the book's development, its influence, and the role hackers continue to play.
Parte

Botnet for RSA cracking?

I read an interesting article about putting 1.000.000 computers, given the chance for a serious botnet owner to get it, to crack RSA.

The result is that in such context attacking an RSA 1024bit key would take only 28 years, compared to theoretical 19 billion of years.

Reading of this article , is extremely interesting because it gives our very important consideration on the cryptography strength respect to the computation power required to carry on cracking attempt, along with industry approach to “default security level”.

I would say a must read .

Parte

China Encryption Regulations

Ciao a tutti,

i found this very interesting paper on China Encryption Import/Export/Domestic Regulations done by Baker&Mckenzie in the US.

It's strongly business and regulatory oriented giving a very well done view on how china regulations works and how it may behave in future.

Read here Decrypting China Encryption's Regulations (form Bakernet website) .

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IOScat – a Port of Netcat to Cisco IOS

A porting of famous netcat to Cisco IOS router operating system: IOSCat

The only main limit is that it does not support UDP, but that's a very cool tool!

A very good txt to read is Netcat hacker Manual .

Parte

The (old) Crypto AG case and some thinking about it

In the '90, closed source and proprietary cryptography was ruling the world.

That's before open source and scientifically approved encrypted technologies went out as a best practice to do crypto stuff.

I would like to remind when, in 1992, USA along with Israel was, together with switzerland, providing backdoored (proprietary and secret) technologies to Iranian government to tap their communications, cheating them to think that the used solution was secure , making also some consideration on this today in 2010.

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That's called The Crypto AG case , an historical fact involving the United States National Security Agency along with Signal Intelligence Division of Israel Ministry of Defense that are strongly suspected to had made an agreement with the Swiss cryptography producer company Crypto AG .

Basically those entities placed a backdoor in the secure crypto equipment that they provided to Iran to intercept Iranian communications.

Their crypto was based on secret and proprietary encryption algorithms developed by Crypto AG and eventually customized for Iranian government.

You can read some other facts about Crypto AG backdoor related issues:

The demise of global telecommunication security

The NSA-Crypto AG sting

Breaking codes: an impossible task? By BBC

Der Spiegel Crypto AG (german) article

Now, in 2010, we all know and understand that secret and proprietary crypto does not work.

Just some reference by top worldwide cryptographic experts below:

Secrecy, Security, Obscurity by Bruce Schneier

Just say No to Proprietary cryptographic Algorithms by Network Computing (Mike Fratto)

Security Through Obscurity by Ceria Purdue University

Unlocking the Secrets of Crypto: Cryptography, Encryption and Cryptology explained by Symantec

Time change the way things are approached.

I like very much the famous Philip Zimmermann assertion:

“Cryptography used to be an obscure science, of little relevance to everyday life. Historically, it always had a special role in military and diplomatic communications. But in the Information Age, cryptography is about political power, and in particular, about the power relationship between a government and its people. It is about the right to privacy, freedom of speech, freedom of political association, freedom of the press, freedom from unreasonable search and seizure, freedom to be left alone.”

Any scientist today accept and approve the Kerckhoffs' Principle that in 1883 in the Cryptographie Militaire paper stated:

The security of a cryptosystem should not depend on keeping the algorithm secret, but only on keeping the numeric key secret.

It's absolutely clear that the best practice for doing cryptography today obbly any serious person to do open cryptography, subject to public review and that follow the Kerckhoff principle.

So, what we should think about closed source, proprietary cryptography that's based on security trough obscurity concepts?

I was EXTREMELY astonished when TODAY, in 2010, in the age of information society i read some paper on Crypto AG website.

I invite all to read the Crypto AG security paper called Sophisticated Security Architecture designed by Crypto AG of which you can get a significant excerpt below:

The design of this architecture allows Crypto AG to provide a secret proprietary algorithm that can be specified for each customer to assure the perfect degree of cryptographic security and optimum support for the customer's security policy. In turn, the Security Architecture gives you the influence you need to be fully independent in respect of your encryption solution. You can determine all areas that are covered by cryptography and verify how the algorithm works. The original secret proprietary algorithm of Crypto AG is the foundation of the Security Architecture .

I have to say that their architecture is absolutely good from TLC point of view. Also they have done a very good job in making the design of the overall architecture in order to make a tamper-proof resistant crypto system by using dedicated crypto processor .
However there is still something missing:

T he overall cryptographic concept is misleading, based on wrong encryption concepts .

You may think that i am a troll telling this, but given the history of Crypto AG and given the fact that all the scientific and security community does not approve security trough obscurity concepts , it would legitimate to ask ourself:

Why they are still doing security trough obscurity cryptography with secret and proprietary algorithms ?



Hey, i think that they have very depth knowledge on telecommunication and security, but given that the science tell us not to follow the secrecy of algorithms, i really have serious doubt on why they are still providing proprietary encryption and does not move to standard solutions (eventually with some kind of custom enhancement).

Parte

Missiles against cyber attacks?

The cyber conflicts are really reaching a point where war and cyberwar merge together.

NATO countries have the right to use the force against attacks on computer networks .

Parte

Mobile Security talk at WHYMCA conference

I want to share some slides i used to talk about mobile security at whymca mobile conference in Milan.

Read here my slides on mobile security .

The slides provide a wide an in-depth overview of mobile security related matters, i should be doing some slidecast about it putting also audio. Maybe will do, maybe not, it depends on time that's always a insufficient resource.

Parte

iPhone PIN: useless encryption

I recently switched one of my multiple mobile phones with which i go around to iPhone.

I am particularly concerned about data protection in case of theft and so started having a look around about the iPhone provided protection system.

There is an interesting set of iPhone Business Security Features that make me think that iPhone is moving in the right path for security protection of the phone, but still a lot of things has to be done, especially for serious Enterprise and Government users.

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For example it turned out that the iPhone PIN protection is useless and it can be broken just plugging the iPhone to a Linux machine and accessing the device like a USB stick.

That's something disturbing my paranoid mindset that make me think not to use sensitive data on my iPhone if i cannot protect my data.

Probably an iPhone independent disk encryption product would be very useful in order to let the market create protection schemas that fit the different risk contexts that different users may have.

Probably a general consumer is not worried about this PIN vulnerability but for me, working within highly confidential envirnonment such as intelligence, finance and military, it's something that i cannot accept.

I need strong disk encryption on my mobile phone.

I do strong voice encryption for it , but it would be really nice to have also something to protect the whole iPhone data and not just phone calls.

Parte

Who extract Oil in Iran? Business and UN sanction together

I like geopolitic and i am following carefully iran issues.

I went to National Iranian Oil Company website and have seen “ Exploration & Production ” section where are listed all the companies and their country of origin that are allowed to make Exploration of oil in Iran.

On that list we find the list of countries along with the data of signing of exploration agreement:

  • Norway/Russia (2000)
  • Australia/Spain/Chile (2001)
  • India (2002)
  • China (2001)
  • Brazil (2004)
  • Spain (2004)
  • Thailand (2005)
  • China x 2 (2005)
  • Norway (2006)
  • Italy (2008)
  • Vietnam (2008)

Those countries's oil companies are allowed to do oil extraction in Iran and i would like to point out that Iran is the 2nd world Oil Reserve just after Saudi Arabia.

As you can see there's NO USA company doing extraction.

Of European Countries the only one doing business with IRAN are:

IRAN Norway Relationship

IRAN ITALY Relationship

IRAN SPAIN Relationship

While of the well known non-US-simpatizing countries, the one doing Oil business with Iran are:

IRAN RUSSIA Relationship

IRAN BRAZIL Relationship

IRAN China Relationship

Don't missing some Asian involvement.

IRAN India Relationship

IRAN Vietnam Relationship

As you can see Iran is doing Oil business with most big south America and Far Asia countries, with some little exception in Europe for what apply to Norway, Italy and Spain.

To me it sounds that those European countries are going to face serious trouble whether they will accept and subscribe UN sanction against Iran.

Or some of them, like Italy, are protected by the strenghtening cooperation they are doing with Russia on Energy matters?

Well, i don't know how things will end up, but it's possible the most hypocrit countries like the European ones doing business in Iran while applying Sanctions will be the only European winning in the international competition for Iran Oil (Unless France did not drop a nuclear bomb on theran ;) ).

Parte

Exploit code against SecurStar DriveCrypt published

It seems that the hacking community somehow like to target securstar products, maybe because hacking community doesn't like the often revealed unethical approach already previously described in this blog by articles and user's comments.

In 2004 a lot of accusation against Hafner of SecurStar went out because of alleged intellectual property theft regarding opensource codes such as Encryption 4 the masses and legal advert also against the Free and opensource TrueCrypt project .

In 2008 there was a pre-boot authentication hacking against DriveCrypt Plus posted on Full-Disclosure.

Early 2010 it was the time of the fake infosecurity research secretly sponsored by securstar at http://infosecurityguard.com (that now they tried to remove from the web because of embarrassing situation, but backup of the story are available, hacking community still wait for apologies) .

Now, mid 2010, following a research published in December 2009 about Disk Encryption software vulnerabilities made by Neil Kettle (mu-b), Security researcher at digit-labs and Penetration tester at Convergent Network Solutions , DriveCrypt was found to be vulnerable and exploitable breaking on-device security of the system and exploit code has been just released.

Exploit code reported below (thanks Neil for the code release!):

  • Arbitrary kernel code execution security exploit of DriveCrypt: drivecrypt-dcr.c
  • Arbitrary file reading/writing security exploit via unchecked user-definable parameters to ZxCreateFile/ReadFile/ WriteFile: drivecrypt-fopen.c

The exploit code has been tested against DriveCrypt 5.3, currently released DriveCrypt 5.4 is reported to be vulnerable too as it has just minor changes related to win7 compatibility. Can anyone make a double check and report a comment here?

Very good job Neil!

In the meantime the Free Truecrypt is probably the preferred choice for disk encryption, given the fact that it's difficult to trust DriveCrypt, PGP has been acquired by Symantec and there are very bad rumors about the trust that people have in Symantec and there are not many widely available alternatives.

Rumors say that also PhoneCrypt binaries are getting analyzed and the proprietary encryption system could reveal something fun…

Parte

Quantum cryptography broken

Quantum cryptography it's something very challenging, encryption methods that leverage the law of phisycs to secure communications over fiber lines.

To oversimplify the system is based on the fact that if someone cut the fiber, put a tap in the middle, and joint together the other side of the fiber, the amount of “errors” that will be on the communications path will be higher than 20% .

So if QBER (Quantum Bit Error Rate) goes above 20% then it's assumed that the system is intercepted.

Researcher at university of toronto was able to cheat the system with a staying below the 20%, at 19.7% , thus tweaking the threshold used by the system to consider the communication channel secure vs compromised.

The product found vulnerable is called Cerberis Layer2 and produced by the Swiss ID Quantique .

Some possibile approach to detect the attack has been provided but probably, imho, such kind of systems does not have to be considered 100% reliable until the technology will be mature enough.

Traditional encryption has to be used together till several years, eventually bundled with quantum encryption whether applicable.

When we will see a quantum encryption systems on an RFC like we have seen for ZRTP , PGP and SSL ?

-naif

Parte

FUN! Infosecurity consideration on some well known films

Please read it carefully Film that needed better infosec .

One the the review, imho the most fun one on film Star Wars :

The scene

Death star getting blown up

Infosec Analysis

Darth Vader must be heralded as the prime example of a chief executive who really didn't care about information security. The entire board was unapproachable and clearly no system testing was undertaken. The network security was so poor that it was hacked into and the designs for the death star were stolen without anyone knowing.

Even worse than that, the death star had a major design flaw where by dropping a bomb thingy into a big hole on the outside, it actually blew up the entire thing!

Darth Vader needed to employ a good Security Consultant to sit on the executive board and promise not to force choke him. Should have commissioned a full risk assessment of the death star followed by a full penetration test. Only then should the death star have been released into the production environment.

Parte

great point of view

Because security of a cryptographic system it's not a matter of “how many bits do i use” but using the right approach to do the right thing to mitigate the defined security risk in the most balanced way.

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Parte

Encryption is not scrambling: be aware of scrambler!

Most of us know about voice scrambler that can be used across almost any kind of voice based communication technology.

Extremely flexible approach: works everything

Extreme performance: very low latency

but unfortunately…

Extremely weak: Scrambling cannot be considered secure.

Only encryption can be considered secure under the Kerckoff's principle .

So please don't even consider any kind of analog scrambler if you need real security.

Read deeply the paper Implementation of a real-time voice encryption system ” by Markus Brandau, especially the cryptoanalysis paragraph.

Parte

Evidence that infosecurityguard.com/notrax is SecurStar GmbH Phonecrypt – A fake independent research on voice crypto

Below evidence that the security review made by an anonymous hacker on http://infosecurityguard.com is in facts a dishonest marketing plan by the SecurStar GmbH to promote their voice crypto product.

I already wrote about that voice crypto analysis that appeared to me very suspicious.

Now it's confirmed, it's a fake independent hacker security research by SecurStar GmbH, its just a marketing trick!

How do we know that Infosecurityguard.com, the fake independent security research, is a marketing trick from SecurStar GmbH?

1) I posted on http://infosecurityguard.com a comments to a post with a link to my blog to that article on israelian ministry of defense certification

2) The author of http://infosecurityguard.com went to approve the comment and read the link on my own blog http://infosecurity.ch

3) Reaching my blog he leaked the IP address from which he was coming 217.7.213.59 (where i just clicked on from wordpress statistic interface)

4) On http:// 217.7.213.59/panel there is the IP PBX interface of the SecurStar GmbH corporate PBX (openly reachable trough the internet!)

5) The names of the internal PBX confirm 100% that it's the SecurStar GmbH:

6) There is 100% evidence that the anonymous hacker of http://infosecurityguard.com is from SecurStar GmbH

Below the data and reference that let us discover that it's all but a dishonest marketing tips and not an independent security research.

Kudos to Matteo Flora for it's support and for his article in Debunking Infosecurityguard identity !

The http referral tricks

When you read a link going from a website to another one there is an HTTP protocol header, the “Referral”, that tell you from which page someone is going to another webpage.

The referral demonstrated that the authors of http://infosecurityguard.com read my post, because it was coming from http://infosecurityguard.com/wp-admin/edit-comments.php that's the webpage you use as a wordpress author/editor to approve/refuse comments. And here there was the link.

That's the log entry:

217.7.213.59 – - [30/Jan/2010:02:56:37 -0700] “GET /20100129/licensed-by-israel-ministry-of-defense-how-things-really-works/ HTTP/1.0″ 200 5795 “ http://infosecurityguard.com/wp-admin/edit-comments.php ” “Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.1; Trident/4.0; GTB6.3; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; InfoPath.2)”

The PBX open on the internet tell us that's SecurStar GmbH

The SecurStar GmbH PBX is open on the internet, it contains all the names of their employee and confirm us that the author of http:/infosecurityguard.com is that company and is the anonymous hacker called Notrax.

Here there is their forum post where the SecurStar GmbH guys are debugging IPCOPfirewall & Asterisk together (so we see also details of what they use) where there is the ip 217.7.213.59 .

SecurStarproof.png

That's also really fun!

They sell secure telephony but their company telephony system is openly vulnerable on the internet . :-)

I was thinking to call the CEO, Hafner, via SIP on his internal desktop PBX to announce we discovered him tricks.. : ->

They measured their marketing activity

Looking at the logs of my website i found that they was sensing the google distribution of information for the following keywords, in order to understand how effectively they was able to attack competing products. It's reasonable, if you invest money in a marketing campaign you want to see the results :-)

They reached my blog and i logged their search:

infosecurityguard+cryptophone

infosecurityguard+gold-lock

217.7.213.59 – - [30/Jan/2010:02:22:42 -0700] “GET / HTTP/1.0″ 200 31057 “Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.1; Trident/4.0; GTB6.3; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; InfoPath.2)”

217.7.213.59 – - [30/Jan/2010:04:15:07 -0700] “GET HTTP/1.0″ 200 15774 “Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.1; Trident/4.0; GTB6.3; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; InfoPath.2)”


The domain registration data

The domain have been registered on 1st December 2009, just two months to start preparing the dishonest marketing campaign:

Domain Name: INFOSECURITYGUARD.COM

Registrar: GODADDY.COM, INC.

Updated Date: 01-dec-2009

Creation Date: 01-dec-2009

The domain is anonymously privacy protected trough a whois privacy service:

Administrative Contact: Private, Registration INFOSECURITYGUARD.COM@domainsbyproxy.com , Domains by Proxy, Inc. DomainsByProxy.com

Notrax hacker does not exist on google
As you know any hacker that get public usually have presence of it's activity on google, attending mailinglists, forum, homepage, past research, participation to conferences, etc, etc.
The fake hacker that they wanted us to to think was writing an independent blog does NOT have any trace on google. Only some hit about an anonymous browser called Notrax but nothing about that hacker.
Maybe when SecurStar provided the anonymity tool to their marketing agency, to help them protecting anonymity for the fake research, their provided them the anonymous browser notrax.So the marketing guy thinking about the nickname of this fake hackers used what? Notrax! :-)

The “independent review”completely oriented in publicizing PhoneCrypt

Of the various review don the phonecrypt review is only positive and amazing good feedback, while the other are only bad feedback and no single good point.

As you can imagine, in any kind of independent product evaluation, for all products there are goods and bad points. No. In this one there are only product that are good and product that are bad.

They missed to consider the security of the technology used by the products

They completely avoided to speak about cryptography and security of the products.

They do not evaluated basic security features that must be in that kind of products.That's in order not to let anyone see that they did not followed basic security rules in building up their PhoneCrypt.
The technology is closed source, no transparency on algorithms and protocols, no peer review.Read my new comparison (from the basic cryptographic requirement point of view) About the voice encryption analysis (criteria, errors and different results) .
The results are somehow different than their one .

UPDATE: Who's Wilfried Hafner (SecurStar founder) ?

I got a notice from a reader regarding Wilfred Hafner, SecurStar founder, CEO and security expert.

He was arrested in 1997 for telephony related fraud (check 2nd article on Phrack) earning from telephony fraud 254.000 USD causing damages to local telcos trough blueboxing for 1.15 Million USD.

He was not doing “Blueboxing” for the pleasure of phreaking and connecting with other hackers, but to earn money.

Hacking for profit (and not for fun) in 1997… brrr…. No hacker's ethic at all!

All in all, is that lawful?

Badmouthing a competitor amounts to an unfair competition practice in most jurisdictions, so it is arguable (to say the least) that SecurStar is right on a legally sound ground here.
Moreover, there are some specific statutes in certain jurisdictions which provide for a straightforward ban on the practice we are talking about. For example in the UK the British Institute of Practitioners in Advertising - in compliance with the Consumer protection from Unfair Trading regulation – ruled that:

”falsely claiming or creating the impression that the trader is not acting for the purposes relating to his trade, business, craft or profession, or falsely representing oneself as a consumer” is a criminal offense .

We have no doubt that PRPR (which is the UK-based *PR company for SecurStar GmbH, led by Peter Rennison and Allie Andrews as stated in SecurStar Press Release ) did provide their client with this information. Heck, they *are* in the UK, they simply cannot ignore that!

IANAL, but I would not be surpised if someone filed a criminal complaint or start civil litigation for unfair competition against SecurStar GmbH.
Whether this is going to be a matter for criminal and/or civil Courts or not is not that important. However, it is clear enough that SecurStar GmbH appears to be at least ethically questionable and not really worth of trust.

Nice try, gentlemen… however, next time just do it right (whether “right” for them means “in a honest manner” or “in a fashion not to be caught” I will let them choose)”

Fabio Pietrosanti (naif)

Parte

Dishonest security: The SecurStart GmbH Phonecrypt case

I would like to provide considerations on the concept of ethics that a security company should have respect to the users, the media and the security environment.

SecurStar GmbH made very bad things making that infosecuriguard.com fake independent research.

It's unfair approach respect to hacking community.

It's unfair marketing to end user. They should not be tricking by creating fake independent review.

It's unfair competition in the security market.

Let's make some more important consideration on this.

Must be serious on cryptographic products. They are not toys

When you do cryptographic tools you should be really aware of what you are doing, you must be really serious.

If you do bad crypto people could die.

If you don't follow basic security rules for transparency and security for cryptography you are putting people life at risk.

You are taking the responsibility of this. (I want to sleep at night, don't think SecurStar CEO/CTO care about this…)

Security research need reference and transparency

Security research have to be public, well done, always subject to public discussion and cooperation.
Security research should not be instrumentally used for marketing purpose.Security research should be done for awareness and grow of the knowledge of the worldwide security environment.

Hacking environment is neutral, should not be used instrumentally

Hackers are considered neutral, nerds, doing what they do for their pleasure and passion.

If you work in the security market you work with hackers.

If you use hackers and hacking environment for your own marketing purposes you are making something very nasty.

Hackers give you the technology and knowledge and you use them for your own commercial purpose.

Consideration on the authority of the information online

That's something that pose serious consideration on the authority of information online.An anonymous hacker, with no reference online, made a product security review that appear like an independent one. I have to say that the fake review was very well prepared, it always posed good/bad things in an indirect way. It did not appeared to me at 1st time like a fake. But going deeply i found what's going on.

However Journalists, news media and blogger went to the TRAP and reviewed their fake research. TheRegister, NetworkWorld and a lot of blogs reported it. Even if the author was completely anonymous.

What they have done is already illegal in UK

SecurStar GmbH is lucky that they are not in the UK, where doing this kind of things is illegal .

Fabio Pietrosanti (naif)

Parte

About the SecurStar GmbH Phonecrypt voice encryption analysis (criteria, errors and different results)

This article want to clarify and better explain the finding at infosecurityguard.com regaring voice encryption product evaluation.
This article want to tell you a different point of view other than infosecurityguard.com and explaining which are the rational with extensive explaination from security point of view.
Today i read news saying: “PhoneCrypt: Basic Vulnerability Found in 12 out of 15 Voice Encryption Products and went to read the website infosecurityguard .

Initially it appeared to my like a great research activity but then i started reading deeply the read about it.I found that it's not properly a security research but there is are concrete elements that's a marketing campaign well done in order to attract public media and publicize a product.
Imho they was able to cheat journalists and users because the marketing campaign was absolutely well done not to be discovered on 1st read attempt. I personally considered it like a valid one on 1st ready (they cheated me initially!).

But if you go deeply… you will understand that:
- it's a camouflage marketing initiative arranged by SecurStar GmbH and not a independent security research
- they consider a only security context where local device has been compromised (no software can be secured in that case, like saying SSL can be compromised if you have a trojan!)
- they do not consider any basic security and cryptographic security criteria

However a lot of important website reported it:

This article is quite long, if you read it you will understand better what's going on around infosecurityguard.com research and research result.

I want to to tell you why and how (imho) they are wrong.

The research missed to consider Security, Cryptography and Transparency!

Well, all this research sound much like being focused on the marketing goal to say that their PhoneCrypt product is the “super” product best of all the other ones.
Any security expert that would have as duty the “software evaluation” in order to protect the confidentiality of phone calls will evaluate other different characteristics of the product and the technology.

Yes, it's true that most of the product described by SecurStar in their anonymous marketing website called http://infosecurityguard.com have some weakness.
But the relevant weakness are others and PhoneCrypt unfortunately, like most of the described products suffer from this.
Let's review which characteristics are needed basic cryptography and security requirement (the best practice, the foundation and the basics!)

a – Security Trough Obscurity does not work

A basic rule in cryptography cames from 1883 by Auguste Kerckhoffs:

In a well-designed cryptographic system, only the key needs to be secret; there should be no secrecy in the algorithm.
Modern cryptographers have embraced this principle, calling anything else “security by obscurity.”
Read what Bruce Schneir, recognized expert and cryptographer in the world say about this
Any security expert will tell you that's true. Even a novice university student will tell you that's true. Simply because that's the only way to do cryptography.
Almost all product described in the review by SecurStar GmbH, include PhoneCrypt, does not provide precise details about their cryptographic technologies.
Precise details are:
  • Detailed specification of cryptographic algorithm (that's not just saying “we use AES “)
  • Detailed specification of cryptographic protocol (that's not just saying “we use Diffie Hellman ” )
  • Detailed specification of measuring the cryptographic strenght (that's not just saying “we have 10000000 bit key size “)

Providing precise details means having extensive documentation with theoretical and practical implications documenting ANY single way of how the algorithm works, how the protocol works with precise specification to replicate it for interoperability testing.
It means that scientific community should be able to play with the technology, audit it, hack it.
If we don't know anything about the cryptographic system in details, how can we know which are the weakness and strength points?

Mike Fratto, Site editor of Network Computing, made a great article on “Saying NO to proprietary cryptographic systems” .
Cerias Purdue University tell this .

b – NON peer reviewed and NON scientifically approved Cryptography does not work

In any case and in any condition you do cryptography you need to be sure that someone else will check, review, analyze, distruct and reconstract from scratch your technology and provide those information free to the public for open discussion.
That's exactly how AES was born and like US National Institute of Standard make crypto does (with public contest with public peer review where only the best evaluated win).
A public discussion with a public contest where the a lot of review by most famous and expert cryptographer in the world, hackers (with their name,surname and face, not like Notrax) provide their contribution, tell what they thinks.
That's called “peer review”.

If a cryptographic technology has an extended and important peer review, distributed in the world coming from universities, private security companies, military institutions, hackers and all coming from different part of the world (from USA to Europe to Russia to South America to Middle east to China) and all of them agree that a specific technology it's secure…
Well, in that case we can consider the technology secure because a lot of entities with good reputation and authority coming from a lot of different place in the world have publicly reviewed, analyzed and confirmed that a technology it's secure.

How a private company can even think to invent on it's own a secure communication protocol when it's scientifically stated that it's not possible to do it in a “proprietary and closed way” ?
IBM tell you that peer review it's required for cryptography .
Bruce Schneier tell you that “Good cryptographers know that nothing substitutes for extensive peer review and years of analysis.”
Philip Zimmermann will tell you to beware of Snake Oil where the story is: “Every software engineer fancies himself a cryptographer, which has led to the proliferation of really bad crypto software.”

c – Closed source cryptography does not work

As you know any kind of “serious” and with “good reputation” cryptographic technology is implemented in opensource.
There are usually multiple implementation of the same cryptographic algorithm and cryptographic protocol to be able to review all the way it works and certify the interoperability.
Supposing to use a standard with precise and extended details on “how it works”, that has been “peer reviewed” by the scientific community BUT that has been re-implemented from scratch by a not so smart programmer and the implementation it's plenty of bugs.

Well, if the implementation is “opensource” this means that it can be reviewed, improved, tested, audited and the end user will certaintly have in it's own had a piece of technology “that works safely” .

Google release opensource crypto toolkit
Mozilla release opensource crypto toolkit
Bruce Schneier tell you that Cryptography must be opensource .

Another cryptographic point of view

I don't want to convince anyone but just provide facts related to science, related to cryptography and security in order to reduce the effect of misinformation done by security companies whose only goes is to sell you something and not to do something that make the world a better.

When you do secure products, if they are not done following the proper approach people could die.
It's absolutely something irresponsible not to use best practice to do crypto stuff.

To summarize let's review the infosecurityguard.com review from a security best pratice point of view.

Nome del prodotto Security Trough Obscurity Public peer review Open Source Compromise locally?
Caspertec Obscurity No public review Closed
CellCrypt Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Cryptophone Transparency Limited public review Public
Gold-Lock Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Illix Obscurity
No public review
Closed
No1.BC Obscurity No public review
Closed
PhoneCrypt Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Rode&Swarz Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Secure-Voice Obscurity
No public review
Closed
SecuSmart Obscurity
No public review
Closed
SecVoice Obscurity
No public review
Closed
SegureGSM Obscurity
No public review
Closed
SnapCell Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Tripleton Obscurity
No public review
Closed
Zfone Transparency Public review
Open
ZRTP Transparency Public review
Open

*Green means that it match basic requirement for a cryptographic secure system

* Red / Broken means that it does not match basic requirement for a cryptographic secure system
That's my analysis using a evaluation method based on cryptographic and security parameters not including the local compromise context that i consider useless.

However, to be clear, those are only basic parameters to be used when considering a voice encryption product (just to avoid being in a situation that appears like i am promoting other products). So it may absolutely possible that a product with good crypto ( transparency, peer reviewed and opensource) is absolutely a not secure product because of whatever reason (badly written, not usable causing user not to use it and use cleartext calls, politically compromised, etc, etc).
I think i will prepare a broader criteria for voice crypto technologies and voice crypto products, so it would be much easier and much practical to have a full transparent set of criterias to evaluate it.

But those are really the basis of security to be matched for a good voice encryption system!
Read some useful past slides on security protocols used in voice encryption systems (2nd part).

Now read below some more practical doubt about their research.

The security concept of the review is misleading: any hacked device can be always intercepted!

I think that the guys completely missed the point: ANY KIND OF SOFTWARE RUNNING ON A COMPROMISED OPERATING SYSTEM CAN BE INTERCEPTED

Now they are pointing out that also Zfone from Philip Zimmermann is broken (a pc software), just because they install a trojan on a PC like in a mobile phone?
Any security software rely on the fact that the underlying operating system is somehow trusted and preserve the integrity of the environment where the software run.

  • If you have a disk encryption system but your PC if infected by a trojan, the computer is already compromised.
  • If you have a voice encryption system but your PC is infected by a trojan, the computer is already compromised.
  • If you have a voice encryption system but your mobile phone is infected by a trojan, the mobile phone is already compromised.

No matter which software you are running, in such case the security of your operating environment is compromised and in one way or another way all the information integrity and confidentiality is compromised.

Like i explained above how to intercept PhoneCrypt.

The only things that can protect you from this threat is running in a closed operating system with Trust Computing capability, implementing it properly.
For sure on any “Open” operating system such us Windows, Windows Mobile, Linux, iPhone or Android there's no chance to really protect a software.
On difficult operating system such as Symbian OS or RimOS maybe the running software can be protected (at least partially)

That's the reason for which the security concept that guys are leveraging to carry on their marketing campaign has no clue.
It's just because they control the environment, they know Flexispy software and so they adjusted their software not to be interceptable when Flexispy is installed.
If you develop a trojan with the other techniques i described above you will 100% intercept PhoneCrypt.

On that subject also Dustin Tamme l, Security researcher of BreakPoint Systems , pointed on on VoIP Security Alliance mailing lists that the security analysis is based on wrong concepts .

The PhoneCrypt can be intercepted: it's just that they don't wanted to tell you!

PhoneCrypt can be intercepted with “on device spyware”.
Perché?
Because Windows Mobile is an unsecure operating environment and PhoneCrypt runs on Windows Mobile.
Windows Mobile does not use Trusted Computing and so any software can do anything.
The platform choice for a secure telephony system is important.
Come?
I quickly discussed with some knowledgeable windows mobile hackers about 2 different way to intercept PhoneCrypt with an on-device spyware (given the unsecure Windows Mobile Platform).

a) Inject a malicious DLL into the software and intercept from within the Phonecrypt itself.
In Windows Mobile any software can be subject to DLL code injection.
What an attacker can do is to inject into the PhoneCrypt software (or any software running on the phone), hooking the Audio related functions acting as a “function proxy” between the PhoneCrypt and the real API to record/play audio.
It's a matter of “hooking” only 2 functions, the one that record and the one that play audio.
Read the official Microsoft documentation on how to do DLL injection on Windows Mobile processes. or forum discussing the technique of injecting DLL on windows mobile processes.
That's simple, any programmer will tell you to do so.
They simply decided that's better not to make any notice about this.
b) Create a new audio driver that simply act as a proxy to the real one and intercept PhoneCrypt
In Windows Mobile you can create new Audio Drivers and new Audio Filters.
What an attacker can do is to load a new audio driver that does not do anything else than passing the real audio driver function TO/FROM the realone. In the meantime intercept everything recorded and everything played :-)
Here there is an example on how to do Audio driver for Windows Mobile .
Here a software that implement what i explain here for Windows “Virtual Audio Cable” .
The very same concept apply to Windows Mobile. Check the book “Mobile Malware Attack and Defense” at that link explaining techniques to play with those techniques.
They simply decided that's better not to make any notice to that way of intercepting phone call on PhoneCrypt .
Those are just 2 quick ideas, more can be probably done.

Sounds much like a marketing activity – Not a security research.

I have to tell you. I analyzed the issue very carefully and on most aspects. All this things about the voice encryption analisys sounds to me like a marketing campaign of SecurStar GmbH to sell PhoneCrypt and gain reputation. A well articulated and well prepared campaign to attract the media saying, in an indirect way cheating the media, that PhoneCrypt is the only one secure. You see the press releases of SecurStar and of the “Security researcher Notrax telling that PhoneCrypt is the only secure product” . SecurStar PhoneCrypt is the only product the anonymous hacker “Notrax” consider secure of the “software solutions”.
The only “software version” in competition with:

SnapCell – No one can buy it. A security company that does not even had anymore a webpage. The company does not almost exist anymore.
rohde-schawarz – A company that have in his list price and old outdated hardware secure phone . No one would buy it, it's not good for genera use.

Does it sounds strange that only those other products are considered secure along with PhoneCrypt .

Also… let's check the kind of multimedia content in the different reviews available of Gold-Lock, Cellcrypt and Phonecrypt in order to understand how much the marketing guys pressed to make the PhoneCrypt review the most attractive:

Applicazione Screenshots of application Video with demonstration of interception Network demonstration
PhoneCrypt 5 0 1
CellCrypt 0 2 0
GoldLock 1 2 0

It's clear that PhoneCrypt is reviewed showing more features explicitly shown and major security features product description than the other.

Too much difference between them, should we suspect it's a marketing tips?

But again other strange things analyzing the way it was done…
If it was “an impartial and neutral review” we should see good and bad things on all the products right?

Ok, see the table below regarding the opinion indicated in each paragraph of the different reviews available of Gold-Lock, CellCrypt and Phonecrypt (are the only available) to see if are positive or negative.

Applicazione Number of paragraphs Positive paragraphs Negative paragraphs Neutral paragraphs
PhoneCrypt 9 9 0 0
CellCrypt 12 0 10 2
GoldLock 9 0 8 1

Detailed paragraphs opinion analysis of Phonecrypt
Paragraph of review Opinion expressed
From their website Positive Marketing feedback
Apple iPhone Positive Marketing feedback
Disk Encryption or voice Encryption Positive Marketing feedback
PBX Compatibility? Really Positive Marketing feedback
Cracking <10. Not. Positive Marketing feedback
Good thinking! Positive Marketing feedback
A little network action Positive Marketing feedback
UI Positive Marketing feedback
Good Taste Positive Marketing feedback
Detailed paragraphs opinion analysis of Gold-Lock 3G
Paragraph of review Opinion expressed
From their website Negative Marketing feedback
Licensed by The israeli Ministry of Denfese Negative Marketing feedback
Real Company or Part Time hobby Negative Marketing feedback
16.000 bit authentication Negative Marketing feedback
DH 256 Negative Marketing feedback
Downad & Installation! Neutral Marketing feedback
Cracking it <10 Negative Marketing feedback
Marketing BS101 Negative Marketing feedback
Cool video stuff Negative Marketing feedback
Detailed paragraphs opinion analysis of CellCrypt
Paragraph of review Opinion expressed
From their website Neutral Marketing feedback
A little background about cellcrypt Negative Marketing feedback
Master of Marketing Negative Marketing feedback
Secure Voice calling Negative Marketing feedback
Who's buying their wares Negative Marketing feedback
Downad & Installation! Neutral Marketing feedback
My Demo environment Negative Marketing feedback
Did they forget some code Negative Marketing feedback
Cracking it <5 Negative Marketing feedback
Room Monitoring w/ FlexiSpy Negative Marketing feedback
Cellcrypt unique features.. Negative Marketing feedback
Plain old interception Negative Marketing feedback
The Haters out there Negative Marketing feedback

Now it's clear that from their point of view on PhoneCrypt there is no single bad point while the other are always described in a negative way.
No single good point. Strano?
All those considerations along with the next ones really let me think that's very probably a marketing review and not an independent review.

Other similar marketing attempt from SecurStar

SecurStar GmbH is known to have used in past marketing activity leveraging this kind of “technical speculations”, abusing of partial information and fake unconfirmed hacking stuff to make marketing/media coverage.
Imho a rare mix of unfairness in leveraging the difficult for people to really understand the complexity of security and cryptography.

They already used in past Marketing activities like the one about creating a trojan for Windows Mobile and saying that their software is secure from the trojan that they wrote.
Read about their marketing tricks of 2007

They developed a Trojan (RexSpy) for Windows Mobile, made a demonstration capability of the trojan and later on told that they included “Anti-Trojan” capability to their PhoneCrypt software.They never released informations on that trojan, not even proved that it exists.

The researcher Collin Mulliner told at that time that it sounds like a marketing tips (also because he was not able to get from SecurStar CEO Hafner any information about that trojan):

“This makes you wonder if this is just a marketing thing.”

Now, let's try to make some logical reassignment.
It's part of the way they do marketing, an very unfriendly and unpolite approach with customers, journalist and users trying to provide wrong security concepts for a market advantage. Being sure that who read don't have all the skills to do in depth security evaluation and find the truth behind their marketing trips.

Who is the hacker notrax?

It sounds like a camouflage of a fake identity required to have an “independent hacker” that make an “independent review” that is more strong on reputation building.
Read about his bio:

¾ Human, ¼ Android (Well that would be cool at least.) I am just an enthusiast of pretty much anything that talks binary and if it has a RS232 port even better. During the day I masquerade as an engineer working on some pretty cool projects at times, but mostly I do the fun stuff at night. I have been thinking of starting an official blog for about 4.5 years to share some of the things I come across, can't figure out, or just cross my mind. Due to my day job and my nighttime meddling, I will update this when I can. I hope some find it useful, if you don't, well you don't.

There are no information about this guy on google.
Almost any hacker that get public have articles online, post in mailing archive and/or forum or some result of their activity.
For notrax, nothing is available.

Additionally let's look at the domain…
The domain infosecurityguard.com is privacy protected by domainsbyproxy to prevent understanding who is the owner.
The domain has been created 2 months ago on 01-Dec-09 on godaddy.com registrar.

What's also very interesting to notice that this “unknown hacker with no trace on google about him that appeared on December 2009 on the net” is referred on SecurStar GmbH Press Release as a “An IT security expert”.

Maybe they “know personally” who's this anonymous notrax? :)

Am i following my own conspiracy thinking or maybe there's some reasonable doubt that everything was arrange in that funny way just for a marketing activity?

Social consideration

If you are a security company you job have also a social aspects, you should also work to make the world a better place (sure to make business but “not being evil”). You cannot cheat the skills of the end users in evaluating security making fake misleading information.

You should do awareness on end users, to make them more conscious of security issues, giving them the tools to understand and decide themselves.

Hope you had fun reading this article and you made your own consideration about this.

Fabio Pietrosanti (naif)

ps Those are my personal professional opinion, let's speak about technology and security, not marketing.
pps i am not that smart in web writing, so sorry for how the text is formatted and how the flow of the article is unstructured!

Parte

Concesso in licenza da Ministero Israeliano della Difesa? Come le cose funziona davvero!

Si deve sapere che Israele è un paese in cui se una società necessità di sviluppare prodotti di crittografia devono essere autorizzati dal governo.

Il governo non vuole che le aziende facendo crittografia può fare nulla di male a loro e che cosa possono fare del bene per il governo, quindi devono essere preventivamente autorizzati.

Società che forniscono l'intercettazione e ust nm encryptio si applicano a una licenza perché la legge di Israele su questo è così restrittiva per essere simile a legge porcellana .

Questo perché quel tipo di tecnologie sono considerate fondamentali per la capacità di intelligence e di spionaggio della nazione Israele.

Per dare qualche esempio di "licenza da parte di Israele Ministero della Difesa" le aziende:

Prodotti di cifratura GSM "licenza da parte di Israele Ministero della Difesa" - Oro-lock

Intercettazione di prodotti di comunicazione "licenza da parte di Israele Ministero della Difesa" - Verint

Radio HF criptato "Concesso in licenza da parte di Israele Ministero della Difesa" - Kavit

Servizi di sorveglianza e "licenza da parte di Israele Ministero della Difesa" - Multi Solutions Tier

Per esempio come fare domanda per una "licenza da parte di Israele Ministero della Difesa" se fai tecnologie di crittografia in Israele?

Assicuratevi di essere una società israeliana, clicca qui e compila i moduli.

Qualcuno si metterà in contatto da encryption-control@mod.gov.il e discuterà con lei se dare o non la licenza per la vendita.

Che cosa significa il dipartimento di difesa richiederà da una società israeliana al fine di fornire loro l'autorizzazione a produrre e vendere intercettazione e prodotti di cifratura?

Ebbene, ciò che vogliono e ciò che realmente chiedono nessuno lo sa.

E 'un segreto che fare di Israele Ministero della Difesa con l'azienda "licenza".

Quello che sappiamo per certo è che Verint, una "licenza da parte di Israele Ministero della Difesa", posto una backdoor per intercettare aziende e dei governi di USA e Olanda nei sistemi di intercettazione che stava vendendo.

Verint, una licenza dal Ministero Israeliano della Difesa società, purché in Israele il governo intercettazioni di comunicazioni di utenti privati ​​e di governo degli Stati Uniti e in Olanda .

CIA officier riferito che Israele Ministero della Difesa è stato conosciuto per pagare Verint un rimborso del 50% dei loro costi al fine di avere dallo spionaggio Verint attraverso i loro servizi di attività commerciale sulla vendita attrezzature "backdoored" intercettazioni per spiare gli utenti stranieri.


Può essere un dubbio legittimo che la cooperazione all'interno del Ministero della Difesa israeliano può essere problematico per una società israeliana che vogliono vendere l'intercettazione e la crittografia dei prodotti all'estero.

Tali società potrebbero essere costretti a fare gli interessi di Israele Ministero della Difesa e non gli interessi dei clienti (come lo scandalo Verint è un esempio reale).

Quindi, come fosse una "licenza da parte di Israele Ministero della Difesa" essere un bene per la promozione?

Rappresenta il rischio che il "Ministero Israeliano della Difesa", come è pubblicamente noto che ha già fatto con Verint, interferisce con ciò che l'azienda fare.

Rappresenta il rischio che il "Ministero Israeliano della Difesa" può ragionevolmente fornire "rimborso" dei costi di pagare l'azienda e ottenere ciò che probabilmente vorrebbe ottenere.

Allora, che cosa fa veramente "Ministero Israeliano della Difesa" vogliono da società di Israele facendo tecnologie di crittografia e di intercettazione?

Dovremmo chiedere noi stessi se le imprese israeliane facendo le aziende di crittografia e di intercettazione sono più interessati a fare affari o per fare "i servizi di spionaggio in outsourcing" per i loro clienti sempre a pagamento, il "Ministero Israeliano della Difesa".

Di sicuro, in epoca di crisi finanziaria, il Ministero Israeliano della Difesa è un cliente pagante, che non ha problemi di bilancio ...

Stretto controllo, regole ferree, la cooperazione forte governo strategico e militare.

Stare attenti.

Se vuoi saperne di più su questa materia, su come le tecnologie di alcuni paesi di solito è inquinato con i loro governi militari e servizi segreti strategie rimanete sintonizzati come mi sto preparando un post su questo.

Sarete molto meglio capire su che argomenti sulla "licenza da parte di Israele Ministero della Difesa".

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Recuva: Nice finestre degli strumenti di recupero dati

Non è uno strumento professionale ma facile, una veloce e gratuito.

Se hai appena accidentalmente cancellato alcuni file di Windows o il dipendente lascia l'azienda cancellando tutti i suoi dati, così che si ottiene fuori dai guai in fretta.

E 'anche uscito in una versione' portatile 'per essere caricato da un drive chiavetta usb.

Controllare strumento di recupero Recuva

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Appaltatori militari andando commerciale

Most military contractors are suffering from the restriction of government's budgets for military expenses and are moving into commercial markets, still they have to adjust a lot of things.

Leggi qui una analisi bella da rochtel su come appaltatori militari devono adattare la loro strategia.

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Blackout elettrico brasiliano: anteprima della cyberwar

Nel 2005 e nel 2007 in Brasile milioni di persone stato preso di mira da un blackout.

Inizialmente si presentava come un incidente.

Ora è noto che è stato causato da un attacco informatico contro i sistemi di controllo di elettricità.

Che era solo un anteprima di ciò che un attacco informatico in un mezzo guerra cibernetica.

Nel prossimo futuro avremo probabilmente vedere qualcosa di simile 'uffici virtuali personalizzati' alle frontiere internet, definendo ciò che entrare e uscire da quello che come molti "non così democratici" paesi stanno facendo.

La cyberwar impregiudicati i diritti digitali? Probabilmente sì, anche io spero di no.

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Conventionality is not morality.

During my daily RSS OCD reading I had to deal with this article : it has been written by a “senior anti-virus researcher at Kaspersky Lab's “. Talk about personal interest.

I wont comment on the practical implications of useless signature based AV's and how cyber criminals will never need amateur-ish projects to carry on their malicious tactics.

But what is always interesting is watching the very same people who use billion dollar scare tactics to sell you a perfectly useless piece of software (which will give you a false sense of security, hence will make you more insecure), talking about ethics.

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Hackers Hacking Hackers

Hackers hacking hackers are always pretty fun.

And I am not talking about ZF0 5 (which was cool reading, even if not as cool as ~El8 was), I am talking about this .

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